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Sameness and substance renewed / / David Wiggins [[electronic resource]]
| Sameness and substance renewed / / David Wiggins [[electronic resource]] |
| Autore | Wiggins David <1933-> |
| Edizione | [Second edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2001 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xvi, 257 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
| Disciplina | 110 |
| Soggetto topico |
Identity (Philosophical concept)
Individuation (Philosophy) Essentialism (Philosophy) Conceptualism Substance (Philosophy) |
| ISBN |
1-107-11231-1
0-521-45411-5 9786610416790 0-511-05289-8 1-280-41679-3 0-511-15362-7 0-511-17407-1 0-511-32797-8 0-511-61275-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Preamble, Chiefly concerned with matters methodological and terminological -- 1. The absoluteness of sameness -- 1. A central question about identity: and rival answers given by defenders of the absoluteness of identity and the relativity of identity -- 2. Leibniz's Law and the difficulties of relative identity -- 3. Five ways for it to be false that [superscript a = b] [subscript g] -- 4. Possible examples of type-(4) relativity -- 5. Some cases that might be alleged to be of type (5) -- 6. Discussion of type-(4) cases -- 7. Discussion of type-(5) cases and some attempted amendments of Leibniz's Law -- 8. A mathematical example supposedly of type (5) -- 9. Conclusion concerning R, the Relativity of Identity -- 10. Absoluteness and sortal dependence jointly affirmed and formalized -- 2. Outline of a theory of individuation -- 1. Proposition D and the rationale of the 'same what?' question -- 2. The charge of circularity, or of emptiness -- 3. The identity of indiscernibles -- 4. Proposition D further explicated and amplified: and D(ii) as the proper development of D -- 5. Existence and sortal predications -- 6. Further D principles -- 7. Miscellaneous further principles; and a doubt about counting -- 3. Sortal concepts: and the characteristic activity or function or purpose of things falling under them -- 1. The sortal predicates of natural kinds -- 2. The other sortal predicates -- 3. Problems of artefact identity -- 4. Two approaches to the problem of artefact identity -- 5. Summary of conclusions to date: and a methodological remark -- 6. Transition to Chapters Four and Five -- 4. Individuative essentialism -- 1. Independence from the explicitly modal of the foregoing theory of individuation -- 2. Principles and maxims governing the derivation of a modest essentialism -- 3. The necessity of identity and the necessity of difference -- 4. Conceivability, theory and essence -- 5. Conceivability continued -- 6. Individuative essentialism and its consequences -- 7. That the idea of haecceities' is as misbegotten as the word itself is unlovely -- 8. The essentialist 'must' and 'can' -- 9. Avoiding overspecificity, allowing vagueness -- 10. Other de re necessities, real or putative: a framework for further inquiry -- 11. The essences of artefacts and the matter of artefacts -- 12. One special kind of artefact: works of art and the essences of these -- 5. Conceptualism and realism -- 1. Anti-realist conceptualism and anti-conceptualist realism -- 2. Four clarifications -- 3. A conventionalist reconstruction of our modal convictions: a conceptualist anti-realist view of essence -- 4. A hypothesis concerning the sources of anti-essentialism -- 5. An exaggeration of conceptualism, deprecated and corrected in the light of certain truisms; and the reply to the anti-conceptualist realist begun -- 6. The perfect consonance of sober realism and sober conceptualism -- 7. The realist requirement restated, refurbished and satisfied -- 8. Concluding suggestions -- 6. Identity: absolute, determinate, and all or nothing, like no other relation but itself -- 1. Three contrasted views of singling out an object -- 2. Back and forth between the object and the thought of the object -- 3. Some putative examples of indeterminate objects -- 4. If object a is the same as object b, then a is determinately the same as b -- 5. What, if anything, follows from such formal derivations? -- 6. Treatment of examples (a), (b), (c); of [actual symbol not reproducible]3 -- 7. Sense and point; and sense as the work of the mind -- 8. On the level of reference, things cannot be simply conceived into being or postulated into existence -- not even material things with matter putatively ready at hand -- 9. Once again (one last time) the things to which simple identity sentences make a reference -- 10. More about the relation of identity -- 11. Might it ever be true to say that a was almost b, that a was almost numerically identical with b? -- 12. Conclusion -- 7. Personal identity -- 1. An expeditious if precipitate answer to the question of personal identity -- 2. Doubts, and answers to doubts: subjects of consciousness -- 3. The Lockean conception; and Butler's criticisms of such conceptions -- 4. A neo-Lockean identity-condition -- 5. Butler's central insight -- 6. A neo-Lockean conception -- 7. Unfinished business -- 8. The theses to be argued in this chapter -- 9. Co-consciousness again, and quasi-memory -- 10. A second and third question about Parfit's definition of 'Q-remember' -- 11. Digression: an alternative method of definition, revealing by its inadequacy the semantical point of the attribution of experiential memory -- 12. More about 'dependent in the right way' -- 13. As it now appears, the state of the whole argument to date -- 14. Participation in the growth of knowledge -- 15. The penultimate problem and a verdict upon it, all leading in due course to a reassessment of the original Shoemaker case -- 16. Brown-Brownson reconsidered -- 17. One last variant -- and the philosophical moral of same. Finally, human persons as artefacts? |
| Altri titoli varianti | Sameness & Substance Renewed |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910455337703321 |
Wiggins David <1933->
|
||
| Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2001 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Sameness and substance renewed / / David Wiggins [[electronic resource]]
| Sameness and substance renewed / / David Wiggins [[electronic resource]] |
| Autore | Wiggins David <1933-> |
| Edizione | [Second edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2001 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xvi, 257 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
| Disciplina | 110 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | WigginsDavid |
| Soggetto topico |
Identity (Philosophical concept)
Individuation (Philosophy) Essentialism (Philosophy) Conceptualism Substance (Philosophy) |
| ISBN |
1-107-11231-1
0-521-45411-5 9786610416790 0-511-05289-8 1-280-41679-3 0-511-15362-7 0-511-17407-1 0-511-32797-8 0-511-61275-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Preamble, Chiefly concerned with matters methodological and terminological -- 1. The absoluteness of sameness -- 1. A central question about identity: and rival answers given by defenders of the absoluteness of identity and the relativity of identity -- 2. Leibniz's Law and the difficulties of relative identity -- 3. Five ways for it to be false that [superscript a = b] [subscript g] -- 4. Possible examples of type-(4) relativity -- 5. Some cases that might be alleged to be of type (5) -- 6. Discussion of type-(4) cases -- 7. Discussion of type-(5) cases and some attempted amendments of Leibniz's Law -- 8. A mathematical example supposedly of type (5) -- 9. Conclusion concerning R, the Relativity of Identity -- 10. Absoluteness and sortal dependence jointly affirmed and formalized -- 2. Outline of a theory of individuation -- 1. Proposition D and the rationale of the 'same what?' question -- 2. The charge of circularity, or of emptiness -- 3. The identity of indiscernibles -- 4. Proposition D further explicated and amplified: and D(ii) as the proper development of D -- 5. Existence and sortal predications -- 6. Further D principles -- 7. Miscellaneous further principles; and a doubt about counting -- 3. Sortal concepts: and the characteristic activity or function or purpose of things falling under them -- 1. The sortal predicates of natural kinds -- 2. The other sortal predicates -- 3. Problems of artefact identity -- 4. Two approaches to the problem of artefact identity -- 5. Summary of conclusions to date: and a methodological remark -- 6. Transition to Chapters Four and Five -- 4. Individuative essentialism -- 1. Independence from the explicitly modal of the foregoing theory of individuation -- 2. Principles and maxims governing the derivation of a modest essentialism -- 3. The necessity of identity and the necessity of difference -- 4. Conceivability, theory and essence -- 5. Conceivability continued -- 6. Individuative essentialism and its consequences -- 7. That the idea of haecceities' is as misbegotten as the word itself is unlovely -- 8. The essentialist 'must' and 'can' -- 9. Avoiding overspecificity, allowing vagueness -- 10. Other de re necessities, real or putative: a framework for further inquiry -- 11. The essences of artefacts and the matter of artefacts -- 12. One special kind of artefact: works of art and the essences of these -- 5. Conceptualism and realism -- 1. Anti-realist conceptualism and anti-conceptualist realism -- 2. Four clarifications -- 3. A conventionalist reconstruction of our modal convictions: a conceptualist anti-realist view of essence -- 4. A hypothesis concerning the sources of anti-essentialism -- 5. An exaggeration of conceptualism, deprecated and corrected in the light of certain truisms; and the reply to the anti-conceptualist realist begun -- 6. The perfect consonance of sober realism and sober conceptualism -- 7. The realist requirement restated, refurbished and satisfied -- 8. Concluding suggestions -- 6. Identity: absolute, determinate, and all or nothing, like no other relation but itself -- 1. Three contrasted views of singling out an object -- 2. Back and forth between the object and the thought of the object -- 3. Some putative examples of indeterminate objects -- 4. If object a is the same as object b, then a is determinately the same as b -- 5. What, if anything, follows from such formal derivations? -- 6. Treatment of examples (a), (b), (c); of [actual symbol not reproducible]3 -- 7. Sense and point; and sense as the work of the mind -- 8. On the level of reference, things cannot be simply conceived into being or postulated into existence -- not even material things with matter putatively ready at hand -- 9. Once again (one last time) the things to which simple identity sentences make a reference -- 10. More about the relation of identity -- 11. Might it ever be true to say that a was almost b, that a was almost numerically identical with b? -- 12. Conclusion -- 7. Personal identity -- 1. An expeditious if precipitate answer to the question of personal identity -- 2. Doubts, and answers to doubts: subjects of consciousness -- 3. The Lockean conception; and Butler's criticisms of such conceptions -- 4. A neo-Lockean identity-condition -- 5. Butler's central insight -- 6. A neo-Lockean conception -- 7. Unfinished business -- 8. The theses to be argued in this chapter -- 9. Co-consciousness again, and quasi-memory -- 10. A second and third question about Parfit's definition of 'Q-remember' -- 11. Digression: an alternative method of definition, revealing by its inadequacy the semantical point of the attribution of experiential memory -- 12. More about 'dependent in the right way' -- 13. As it now appears, the state of the whole argument to date -- 14. Participation in the growth of knowledge -- 15. The penultimate problem and a verdict upon it, all leading in due course to a reassessment of the original Shoemaker case -- 16. Brown-Brownson reconsidered -- 17. One last variant -- and the philosophical moral of same. Finally, human persons as artefacts? |
| Altri titoli varianti | Sameness & Substance Renewed |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910780087203321 |
|
Wiggins David <1933->
|
||
| Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2001 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||