James M. Buchanan : A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy / / edited by Richard E. Wagner
| James M. Buchanan : A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy / / edited by Richard E. Wagner |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2018.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2018 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XXI, 1182 p. 34 illus., 7 illus. in color.) |
| Disciplina |
330.1509
330 |
| Collana | Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists |
| Soggetto topico |
Economics - History
Economic policy Econometrics Social choice Welfare economics Social sciences - Philosophy Finance, Public History of Economic Thought and Methodology Economic Policy Quantitative Economics Social Choice and Welfare Social Philosophy Public Finance |
| ISBN |
9783030030803
3030030806 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | 1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner -- Part I: Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy -- 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden -- 3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger -- 4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela -- 5. James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program- Stefan Kolev -- 6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. Wagner -- Part II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State -- 7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White -- 8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke -- 9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert -- 10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly -- 11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones -- 12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan -- 13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus -- 14. Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner -- Part III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy -- 15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller -- 16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin -- 17. Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan -- 18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts -- 19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.-20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson -- 21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke -- 22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg -- 23. On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas -- 24. Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James Ruhland -- Part IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy -- 25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg -- 26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe -- 27. Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto -- 28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg -- 29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter -- 30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux -- 31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart -- 32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain Marciano -- Part V: Economic Theory as Social Theory -- 33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus -- 34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton -- 35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt -- 36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon -- 37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young -- 38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D’Amico -- 39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein -- 40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel Houser -- Part VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law -- 41. Rules Versus Authorities: Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson -- 42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld -- 43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi -- 44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi -- 45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz -- Part VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars -- 46. Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca -- 47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure -- 48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica -- 49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish -- 50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910311939403321 |
| Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2018 | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Realism, Ideology, and the Convulsions of Democracy / / edited by Mikayla Novak, Marta Podemska-Mikluch, Richard E. Wagner
| Realism, Ideology, and the Convulsions of Democracy / / edited by Mikayla Novak, Marta Podemska-Mikluch, Richard E. Wagner |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2023.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxi, 148 pages) |
| Disciplina | 321.8 |
| Altri autori (Persone) |
NovakMikayla
Podemska-MikluchMarta WagnerRichard E |
| Collana | Studies in Public Choice |
| Soggetto topico |
Economics
Social choice Political science Public Choice and Political Economy Political Economy and Economic Systems Political Theory |
| ISBN |
9783031394584
3031394585 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction Meg Tuszynski -- Beneficial vs. Problematic Entanglement: A Taxonomy-Rosolino Candela -- Can Classical Liberalism Transcend the Distinction Between Reason and Sentiment?-Dave Hebert -- Mr. President, Tear Down This Fence-Jim Caton -- Community and Reason in a Pluralistic World-Laurent Dobuzinskis -- Nonideal Fairness: Searching for a Pragmatically Virtuous Entanglement-Kevin Vallier.-Trust, Polarization, and Affective Looping: The Emotional Decay of Liberalism-Vlad Tarko -- Economic efficiency and moral values-Giampaolo Garzarelli -- Duality, Liberty, and Realism in Entangled Political Economy. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910751396303321 |
| Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023 | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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