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Evolution, games, and economic behaviour [[electronic resource] /] / Fernando Vega-Redondo
| Evolution, games, and economic behaviour [[electronic resource] /] / Fernando Vega-Redondo |
| Autore | Vega-Redondo Fernando |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (222 p.) |
| Disciplina | 519.3 |
| Soggetto topico |
Game theory
Evolutionary economics Equilibrium (Economics) |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
9786612052545
0-19-152508-1 1-282-05254-3 0-19-877472-9 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Contents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 What is an Evolutionary Model; 1.2 Why Evolutionary Models?; 1.3 The Plan of What Follows; 2 Static Analysis; 2.1 Theoretical Framework; 2.1.1 Basic model; 2.1.2 Alternative scenarios: "Playing the Field" or "Pairwise Contests"; 2.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; 2.2.1 General definition; 2.2.2 Alternative interpretations of ESS: monomorphic vs. polymorphic populations; 2.3 Examples; 2.3.1 Pairwise contests: the Hawk- Dove game; 2.3.2 Playing the field: the Sex-Ratio game; 2.4 ESS and Refinements of Nash Equilibrium; 2.5 The Existence of an ESS
2.6 Asymmetric Contests2.6.1 Introduction; 2.6.2 Ex ante symmetry with ex post asymmetries; 2.6.3 Example: the Hawk- Dove game revisited (I); 2.6.4 Extensive-form contests; 2.7 ESS and Finite Populations; 2.7.1 The "spite" of an ESS; 2.7.2 An example of oligopolistic competition; 2.8 Evolution and Cheap Talk; 3 Basic Dynamic Analysis; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Replicator Dynamics; 3.2.1 The discrete-time case; 3.2.2 The continuous-time case; 3.2.3 Properties of the Replicator Dynamics; 3.3 The ESS and the Replicator Dynamics; 3.3.1 The implicit dynamics of a monomorphic ESS 3.3.2 ESS conditions and polymorphic stability3.4 Evolutionary Dynamics and Nash Refinements; 3.5 Some Examples; 3.5.1 The Hawk- Dove game revisited (II); 3.5.2 The Rock-Scissors-Paper game; 3.6 Replicator Dynamics in Mixed Strategies; 3.6.1 The model; 3.6.2 ESS conditions and dynamic evolutionary stability; 3.7 Permanence and Survival; 3.7.1 Definitions; 3.7.2 Necessary conditions for persistence and permanence; 3.7.3 Sufficient conditions for permanence; 3.7.4 Average behaviour in permanent systems; 3.8 Population Genetics; 3.9 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 3.9.1 Basic (unperturbed) model 3.9.2 Noisy dynamics3.10 Pollination and Reward: An Example; 3.10.1 Preliminaries; 3.10.2 The model; 4 Evolution in Social Environments; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Theoretical Framework; 4.3 Evolutionary Growth Dynamics; 4.3.1 The model; 4.3.2 Monotonicity properties; 4.3.3 Some examples; 4.4 Dynamics of Monotonic Evolutionary Systems; 4.4.1 Dynamic stability and Nash equilibrium; 4.4.2 Set stability; 4.4.3 Long-run regularities; 4.5 Evolution and Rationality; 4.5.1 Evolution and pay-off dominance; 4.5.2 Evolution, iterative dominance, and rationalizability; 4.6 General Evolutionary Processes 4.6.1 Gradient monotonicity4.6.2 Dynamic stability and rationality; 4.7 Examples; 4.7.1 Trading complementarities; 4.7.2 Risky trading; 4.8 A Simplified Ultimatum Game; 4.9 A Hierarchic Model of Cultural Evolution; 5 Stochastic Evolution; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 A Simple Example; 5.3 Theoretical Framework; 5.4 Analysis; 5.4.1 Large matching noise; 5.4.2 Small matching noise; 5.4.3 On the role of noise in evolutionary models; 5.4.4 Extensions; 5.5 Continuous-Time Dynamics; 5.6 Rate of Convergence and Interaction Pattern; 5.6.1 Global interaction; 5.6.2 Local interaction 5.7 The Evolution of Walrasian Behaviour |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910465489803321 |
Vega-Redondo Fernando
|
||
| Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Evolution, games, and economic behaviour [[electronic resource] /] / Fernando Vega-Redondo
| Evolution, games, and economic behaviour [[electronic resource] /] / Fernando Vega-Redondo |
| Autore | Vega-Redondo Fernando |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 |
| Descrizione fisica | xi, 209 p. : ill |
| Soggetto topico |
Game theory
Evolutionary economics Equilibrium (Economics) |
| ISBN |
9780191525087
0191525081 0-19-877472-9 0-19-877473-7 1-282-05254-3 9786612052545 0-19-152508-1 0-19-159697-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910795858703321 |
|
Vega-Redondo Fernando
|
||
| Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Evolution, games, and economic behaviour / / Fernando Vega-Redondo
| Evolution, games, and economic behaviour / / Fernando Vega-Redondo |
| Autore | Vega-Redondo Fernando |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 |
| Descrizione fisica | xi, 209 p. : ill |
| Disciplina | 519.3 |
| Soggetto topico |
Game theory
Evolutionary economics Equilibrium (Economics) Equilibri (Economia) Teoria de jocs Economia matemàtica |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Llibres electrònics |
| ISBN |
9786612052545
9780191525087 0191525081 9780198774723 0198774729 9780198774730 0198774737 9781282052543 1282052543 9780191596971 0191596973 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 What is an Evolutionary Model -- 1.2 Why Evolutionary Models? -- 1.3 The Plan of What Follows -- 2 Static Analysis -- 2.1 Theoretical Framework -- 2.1.1 Basic model -- 2.1.2 Alternative scenarios: "Playing the Field" or "Pairwise Contests" -- 2.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy -- 2.2.1 General definition -- 2.2.2 Alternative interpretations of ESS: monomorphic vs. polymorphic populations -- 2.3 Examples -- 2.3.1 Pairwise contests: the Hawk- Dove game -- 2.3.2 Playing the field: the Sex-Ratio game -- 2.4 ESS and Refinements of Nash Equilibrium -- 2.5 The Existence of an ESS -- 2.6 Asymmetric Contests -- 2.6.1 Introduction -- 2.6.2 Ex ante symmetry with ex post asymmetries -- 2.6.3 Example: the Hawk- Dove game revisited (I) -- 2.6.4 Extensive-form contests -- 2.7 ESS and Finite Populations -- 2.7.1 The "spite" of an ESS -- 2.7.2 An example of oligopolistic competition -- 2.8 Evolution and Cheap Talk -- 3 Basic Dynamic Analysis -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Replicator Dynamics -- 3.2.1 The discrete-time case -- 3.2.2 The continuous-time case -- 3.2.3 Properties of the Replicator Dynamics -- 3.3 The ESS and the Replicator Dynamics -- 3.3.1 The implicit dynamics of a monomorphic ESS -- 3.3.2 ESS conditions and polymorphic stability -- 3.4 Evolutionary Dynamics and Nash Refinements -- 3.5 Some Examples -- 3.5.1 The Hawk- Dove game revisited (II) -- 3.5.2 The Rock-Scissors-Paper game -- 3.6 Replicator Dynamics in Mixed Strategies -- 3.6.1 The model -- 3.6.2 ESS conditions and dynamic evolutionary stability -- 3.7 Permanence and Survival -- 3.7.1 Definitions -- 3.7.2 Necessary conditions for persistence and permanence -- 3.7.3 Sufficient conditions for permanence -- 3.7.4 Average behaviour in permanent systems -- 3.8 Population Genetics -- 3.9 The Prisoner's Dilemma -- 3.9.1 Basic (unperturbed) model.
3.9.2 Noisy dynamics -- 3.10 Pollination and Reward: An Example -- 3.10.1 Preliminaries -- 3.10.2 The model -- 4 Evolution in Social Environments -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Theoretical Framework -- 4.3 Evolutionary Growth Dynamics -- 4.3.1 The model -- 4.3.2 Monotonicity properties -- 4.3.3 Some examples -- 4.4 Dynamics of Monotonic Evolutionary Systems -- 4.4.1 Dynamic stability and Nash equilibrium -- 4.4.2 Set stability -- 4.4.3 Long-run regularities -- 4.5 Evolution and Rationality -- 4.5.1 Evolution and pay-off dominance -- 4.5.2 Evolution, iterative dominance, and rationalizability -- 4.6 General Evolutionary Processes -- 4.6.1 Gradient monotonicity -- 4.6.2 Dynamic stability and rationality -- 4.7 Examples -- 4.7.1 Trading complementarities -- 4.7.2 Risky trading -- 4.8 A Simplified Ultimatum Game -- 4.9 A Hierarchic Model of Cultural Evolution -- 5 Stochastic Evolution -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 A Simple Example -- 5.3 Theoretical Framework -- 5.4 Analysis -- 5.4.1 Large matching noise -- 5.4.2 Small matching noise -- 5.4.3 On the role of noise in evolutionary models -- 5.4.4 Extensions -- 5.5 Continuous-Time Dynamics -- 5.6 Rate of Convergence and Interaction Pattern -- 5.6.1 Global interaction -- 5.6.2 Local interaction -- 5.7 The Evolution of Walrasian Behaviour -- 6 Evolution, Expectations, and Drift -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 General Theoretical Framework -- 6.3 Static Expectations -- 6.4 Simultaneous Contexts -- 6.4.1 Co-ordination games -- 6.4.2 A simple model of bargaining -- 6.5 Multi-Stage Contexts -- 6.5.1 Introduction -- 6.5.2 Forward induction and efficient co-ordination -- 6.6 Dynamic Expectations -- 6.6.1 Introduction -- 6.6.2 Admissible updating rules -- 6.6.3 Equilibrium volatility -- 6.7 On the Evolution of Sophistication -- 6.7.1 Introduction -- 6.7.2 The model -- 6.7.3 Narrow sophistication range. 6.7.4 Wide sophistication range -- 6.7.5 Discussion -- Afterword -- 7 Appendix -- 7.1 Liapunov's Theorem -- 7.2 Liouville's Theorem -- 7.3 A Characterization of Negative-Definiteness -- 7.4 Invariant Distribution: Graph Characterization -- Bibliography -- Subject Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- H -- I -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- W. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910966791803321 |
|
Vega-Redondo Fernando
|
||
| Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||