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Problems from Kant / / James Van Cleve
| Problems from Kant / / James Van Cleve |
| Autore | Van Cleve James |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York ; ; Oxford, [England] : , : Oxford University Press, , 1999 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xii, 340 p. ) : ill |
| Disciplina | 121/.092 |
| Soggetto topico |
Causation
Reason |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
0-585-35823-0
0-19-802447-9 1-280-65548-8 0-19-534701-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910453940003321 |
Van Cleve James
|
||
| New York, New York ; ; Oxford, [England] : , : Oxford University Press, , 1999 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Problems from Kant / / James Van Cleve
| Problems from Kant / / James Van Cleve |
| Autore | Van Cleve James |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York ; ; Oxford, [England] : , : Oxford University Press, , 1999 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xii, 340 p. ) : ill |
| Disciplina | 121/.092 |
| Soggetto topico |
Causation
Reason Knowledge, Theory of |
| ISBN |
0-19-773139-2
0-585-35823-0 0-19-802447-9 1-280-65548-8 0-19-534701-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910782348403321 |
|
Van Cleve James
|
||
| New York, New York ; ; Oxford, [England] : , : Oxford University Press, , 1999 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Problems from Kant / / James Van Cleve
| Problems from Kant / / James Van Cleve |
| Autore | Van Cleve James |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York ; ; Oxford, [England] : , : Oxford University Press, , 1999 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xii, 340 p. ) : ill |
| Disciplina | 121/.092 |
| Soggetto topico |
Causation
Reason Knowledge, Theory of |
| ISBN |
0-19-773139-2
0-585-35823-0 0-19-802447-9 1-280-65548-8 0-19-534701-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910812187803321 |
|
Van Cleve James
|
||
| New York, New York ; ; Oxford, [England] : , : Oxford University Press, , 1999 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Problems from Reid / / James Van Cleve
| Problems from Reid / / James Van Cleve |
| Autore | Van Cleve James |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (567 p.) |
| Disciplina | 192 |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN | 0-19-985704-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1. Sensation and Perception; A. Explanations of Terms; B. Sensation versus Perception; C. Reid's Threefold Account of Perception; D. The Conception in Perception; E. Perception and Belief; F. Consciousness and Attention; G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive?; 2. Reid's Nativism; A. Reid's Nativism; B. Natural Signs; C. The Experimentum Crucis; D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis; E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds?; F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism; 3. Direct Realism versus the Way of Ideas; A. The Way of Ideas
B. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a DistanceC. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume's Table Argument; D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision; E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche's Master Argument; F. Three Forms of Direct Realism; G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Perception?; H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist?; I. All Perception Is Direct Perception; 4. Primary and Secondary Qualities; A. Reid's Relation to Locke and Berkeley; B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical?; C. Dispositions or Bases? D. Intrinsic or Extrinsic?E. Fixed or Variable?; F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid's; 5. Acquired Perception; A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception; B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception?; C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only?; D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of Our Original Perceptions?; E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception?; F. Is Reid Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception?; 6. The Geometry of Visibles; A. The Properties of Spherical Figures; B. Depth Is Not Perceived C. The Argument from IndistinguishabilityD. Visibles as Sense Data; E. Coincidence as Identity; F. Angell's Approach; G. The Argument of Paragraph 4; H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles; I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism?; J. What Are Visibles?; K. Direct Realism and Seeing What We Touch; L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects; M. Mediated but Direct?; 7. Erect and Inverted Vision; A. The Naïve Puzzle and Rock's Question; B. The Classical Solution; C. Berkeley's Solution(s) to the Naïve Puzzle D. Reid's Alternative to Berkeley's SolutionE. Answers to Rock's Question; F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses; G. Perceptual Adaptation; 8. Molyneux's Question; A. Molyneux's Question; B. Empirical Evidence; C. Berkeley's Answer; D. Reid's Answer(s); E. Is Berkeley's Modus Tollens Reid's Modus Ponens?; F. The One-Two Molyneux Question; G. Concluding Confession; 9. Memory and Personal Identity; A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory; B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory; C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past; D. The Specious Present E. Personal Identity |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910460952003321 |
|
Van Cleve James
|
||
| New York, New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Problems from Reid / / James Van Cleve
| Problems from Reid / / James Van Cleve |
| Autore | Van Cleve James |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (567 p.) |
| Disciplina | 192 |
| ISBN | 0-19-985704-0 |
| Classificazione | PHI004000PHI016000 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1. Sensation and Perception; A. Explanations of Terms; B. Sensation versus Perception; C. Reid's Threefold Account of Perception; D. The Conception in Perception; E. Perception and Belief; F. Consciousness and Attention; G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive?; 2. Reid's Nativism; A. Reid's Nativism; B. Natural Signs; C. The Experimentum Crucis; D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis; E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds?; F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism; 3. Direct Realism versus the Way of Ideas; A. The Way of Ideas
B. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a DistanceC. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume's Table Argument; D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision; E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche's Master Argument; F. Three Forms of Direct Realism; G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Perception?; H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist?; I. All Perception Is Direct Perception; 4. Primary and Secondary Qualities; A. Reid's Relation to Locke and Berkeley; B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical?; C. Dispositions or Bases? D. Intrinsic or Extrinsic?E. Fixed or Variable?; F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid's; 5. Acquired Perception; A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception; B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception?; C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only?; D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of Our Original Perceptions?; E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception?; F. Is Reid Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception?; 6. The Geometry of Visibles; A. The Properties of Spherical Figures; B. Depth Is Not Perceived C. The Argument from IndistinguishabilityD. Visibles as Sense Data; E. Coincidence as Identity; F. Angell's Approach; G. The Argument of Paragraph 4; H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles; I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism?; J. What Are Visibles?; K. Direct Realism and Seeing What We Touch; L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects; M. Mediated but Direct?; 7. Erect and Inverted Vision; A. The Naïve Puzzle and Rock's Question; B. The Classical Solution; C. Berkeley's Solution(s) to the Naïve Puzzle D. Reid's Alternative to Berkeley's SolutionE. Answers to Rock's Question; F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses; G. Perceptual Adaptation; 8. Molyneux's Question; A. Molyneux's Question; B. Empirical Evidence; C. Berkeley's Answer; D. Reid's Answer(s); E. Is Berkeley's Modus Tollens Reid's Modus Ponens?; F. The One-Two Molyneux Question; G. Concluding Confession; 9. Memory and Personal Identity; A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory; B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory; C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past; D. The Specious Present E. Personal Identity |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910797232903321 |
|
Van Cleve James
|
||
| New York, New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Problems from Reid / / James Van Cleve
| Problems from Reid / / James Van Cleve |
| Autore | Van Cleve James |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (567 p.) |
| Disciplina | 192 |
| ISBN | 0-19-985704-0 |
| Classificazione | PHI004000PHI016000 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1. Sensation and Perception; A. Explanations of Terms; B. Sensation versus Perception; C. Reid's Threefold Account of Perception; D. The Conception in Perception; E. Perception and Belief; F. Consciousness and Attention; G. Are Sensations Self-Reflexive?; 2. Reid's Nativism; A. Reid's Nativism; B. Natural Signs; C. The Experimentum Crucis; D. Responses to the Experimentum Crucis; E. Woulds, Coulds, or Shoulds?; F. Nativism as an Antidote to Skepticism; 3. Direct Realism versus the Way of Ideas; A. The Way of Ideas
B. First Argument for the Way of Ideas: No Action at a DistanceC. Second Argument for the Way of Ideas: Hume's Table Argument; D. Third Argument for the Way of Ideas: Double Vision; E. Fourth Argument for the Way of Ideas: Malebranche's Master Argument; F. Three Forms of Direct Realism; G. Do Sensations Obstruct Direct Perception?; H. Is Reid a Presentational Direct Realist?; I. All Perception Is Direct Perception; 4. Primary and Secondary Qualities; A. Reid's Relation to Locke and Berkeley; B. The Real Foundation: Epistemological or Metaphysical?; C. Dispositions or Bases? D. Intrinsic or Extrinsic?E. Fixed or Variable?; F. Four Views that Conflict with Reid's; 5. Acquired Perception; A. The Mechanics of Acquired Perception; B. Is Acquired Perception Really Perception?; C. Are Secondary Qualities Objects of Acquired Perception Only?; D. Does Acquired Perception Alter the Content of Our Original Perceptions?; E. Could Anything Become an Object of Acquired Perception?; F. Is Reid Inconsistent about the Requisites of Perception?; 6. The Geometry of Visibles; A. The Properties of Spherical Figures; B. Depth Is Not Perceived C. The Argument from IndistinguishabilityD. Visibles as Sense Data; E. Coincidence as Identity; F. Angell's Approach; G. The Argument of Paragraph 4; H. The Real Basis of the Geometry of Visibles; I. Does the Geometry of Visibles Jeopardize Direct Realism?; J. What Are Visibles?; K. Direct Realism and Seeing What We Touch; L. Visible Figure as a Relativized Property of Ordinary Objects; M. Mediated but Direct?; 7. Erect and Inverted Vision; A. The Naïve Puzzle and Rock's Question; B. The Classical Solution; C. Berkeley's Solution(s) to the Naïve Puzzle D. Reid's Alternative to Berkeley's SolutionE. Answers to Rock's Question; F. Experiments with Inverting Lenses; G. Perceptual Adaptation; 8. Molyneux's Question; A. Molyneux's Question; B. Empirical Evidence; C. Berkeley's Answer; D. Reid's Answer(s); E. Is Berkeley's Modus Tollens Reid's Modus Ponens?; F. The One-Two Molyneux Question; G. Concluding Confession; 9. Memory and Personal Identity; A. Things Obvious and Certain with Regard to Memory; B. Critique of the Impression and Idea Theories of Memory; C. Memory as Direct Awareness of Things Past; D. The Specious Present E. Personal Identity |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910829075703321 |
|
Van Cleve James
|
||
| New York, New York : , : Oxford University Press, , 2015 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||