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Consciousness revisited [[electronic resource] ] : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye
| Consciousness revisited [[electronic resource] ] : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye |
| Autore | Tye Michael |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.) |
| Disciplina | 126 |
| Collana | Representation and mind |
| Soggetto topico |
Consciousness
Phenomenology Materialism |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-282-24013-7
0-262-25517-0 9786612240133 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910454308103321 |
Tye Michael
|
||
| Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Consciousness revisited [[electronic resource] ] : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye
| Consciousness revisited [[electronic resource] ] : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye |
| Autore | Tye Michael |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.) |
| Disciplina | 126 |
| Collana | Representation and mind |
| Soggetto topico |
Consciousness
Phenomenology Materialism |
| ISBN |
1-282-24013-7
0-262-25517-0 9786612240133 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910782856203321 |
|
Tye Michael
|
||
| Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye
| Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / / Michael Tye |
| Autore | Tye Michael |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xiv, 229 p.) |
| Disciplina | 126 |
| Collana | Representation and mind |
| Soggetto topico |
Consciousness
Phenomenology Materialism |
| ISBN |
1-282-24013-7
0-262-25517-0 9786612240133 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910808383603321 |
|
Tye Michael
|
||
| Cambridge, MA, : MIT Press, c2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Tense bees and shell-shocked crabs : are animals conscious? / / Michael Tye
| Tense bees and shell-shocked crabs : are animals conscious? / / Michael Tye |
| Autore | Tye Michael |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, NY : , : Oxford University Press, , 2016 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xvii, 231 pages) : illustrations (black and white) |
| Disciplina | 591.5 |
| Soggetto topico | Consciousness in animals |
| ISBN |
0-19-027803-X
0-19-027804-8 0-19-027802-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910154686003321 |
|
Tye Michael
|
||
| New York, NY : , : Oxford University Press, , 2016 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||