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Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics / / James Stacey Taylor
| Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics / / James Stacey Taylor |
| Autore | Taylor James Stacey <1970-, > |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Routledge, , 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (243 p.) |
| Disciplina | 128/.5 |
| Collana | Routledge annals of bioethics |
| Soggetto topico |
Death
Death - Moral and ethical aspects Respect for persons Dead Bioethics |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-283-70926-0
0-203-10642-3 1-136-25776-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Death Unterrible; Full-blooded Epicureanism and Contemporary Bioethics; A Note on Methodology; Outline of this Volume; 1 Posthumous Harm and Interest-based Accounts of Well-being; The Intuitive Case for Posthumous Harm; The Anti-Hedonistic Intuition; Wronging the Dead; The Feinberg-Pitcher Argument for Posthumous Harm; Assessing the Argument for Posthumous Harm; Accommodating Orphaned Intuitions; Accommodating Feinberg's and Parfit's Anti-Hedonistic Intuitions; Can the Dead be Wronged?
Portmore, Posthumous Harm, and the Desire Theory of WelfareConclusion; 2 Further Criticisms of the Possibility of Posthumous Harm; Levenbook's Account of Harm as Loss; Levenbook's Argument; Criticisms of Levenbook's Argument; Grover's Quality of Life Arguments; Grover's Argument; Criticisms of Grover's Argument; Sperling's Human Subject Account; Sperling's Argument; Criticisms of Sperling's Argument; Harm and Implication in Evil; Conclusion; 3 The Impossibility of Posthumous Harm; Death, Goods, and the Extinction of Desires; Responding to Luper; Towards Hedonism; Objects and Causes Conclusion4 Can the Dead Be Wronged?; Desert and Injustice; Blustein and the "Dear Departed"; Responses to Blustein's Arguments; Response to the Rescue from Insignificance Argument; Response to the Enduring Duties Argument; Response to the Reciprocity Argument; Rights and Interests; Conclusion; 5 Why Death Is Not a Harm to the One Who Dies; The Epicurean Argument; Hedonism Revisited; Death and Deprivation; Does a Person's Death Deprive Her of the Goods of Life?; Responses to these Deprivation-based Arguments for the Harm of Death; The Existence Variant and Presentism Defended; Conclusion 6 Fearless SymmetryLucretian Arguments; Challenges to the Lucretian Symmetry Argument; Responses to Nagel's Objection; Stoic fate; Hetherington's Symmetry Arguments; Earlier Birth and Personal Identity; Kaufman's Defense of Nagel's Argument; Responses to Kaufman; Responses to the Other Criticisms of this Lucretian Argument; The Backfire Problem; Feldman's Objection; Parfit's Hospital Example; Conclusion; 7 Epicureanism, Suicide, and Euthanasia; McMahan's Reconciliation Strategy; An Epicurean Approach to Suicide and Euthanasia; Suicide; Euthanasia; Conclusion 8 Epicureanism and Organ ProcurementEpicureanism and Policies of Presumed Consent; Presumed Consent and the "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Gill's Arguments; Why Gill's Argument against the Qualitative "Fewer Mistakes" Argument Fails; Objections to Gill's Quantitative Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Argument; The "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments and Violations of Autonomy; Presumed Consent and Respect for Autonomy; From Presumed Consent to Organ Taking; The Standard Pro-Taking Argument; Two Unjustified Assumptions-Moving Towards Markets The Ownership of Organs |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910462297603321 |
Taylor James Stacey <1970-, >
|
||
| New York : , : Routledge, , 2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics / / James Stacey Taylor
| Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics / / James Stacey Taylor |
| Autore | Taylor James Stacey <1970-, > |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Routledge, , 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (243 p.) |
| Disciplina | 128/.5 |
| Collana | Routledge annals of bioethics |
| Soggetto topico |
Death
Death - Moral and ethical aspects Respect for persons Dead Bioethics |
| ISBN |
1-136-25775-6
1-283-70926-0 0-203-10642-3 1-136-25776-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Death Unterrible; Full-blooded Epicureanism and Contemporary Bioethics; A Note on Methodology; Outline of this Volume; 1 Posthumous Harm and Interest-based Accounts of Well-being; The Intuitive Case for Posthumous Harm; The Anti-Hedonistic Intuition; Wronging the Dead; The Feinberg-Pitcher Argument for Posthumous Harm; Assessing the Argument for Posthumous Harm; Accommodating Orphaned Intuitions; Accommodating Feinberg's and Parfit's Anti-Hedonistic Intuitions; Can the Dead be Wronged?
Portmore, Posthumous Harm, and the Desire Theory of WelfareConclusion; 2 Further Criticisms of the Possibility of Posthumous Harm; Levenbook's Account of Harm as Loss; Levenbook's Argument; Criticisms of Levenbook's Argument; Grover's Quality of Life Arguments; Grover's Argument; Criticisms of Grover's Argument; Sperling's Human Subject Account; Sperling's Argument; Criticisms of Sperling's Argument; Harm and Implication in Evil; Conclusion; 3 The Impossibility of Posthumous Harm; Death, Goods, and the Extinction of Desires; Responding to Luper; Towards Hedonism; Objects and Causes Conclusion4 Can the Dead Be Wronged?; Desert and Injustice; Blustein and the "Dear Departed"; Responses to Blustein's Arguments; Response to the Rescue from Insignificance Argument; Response to the Enduring Duties Argument; Response to the Reciprocity Argument; Rights and Interests; Conclusion; 5 Why Death Is Not a Harm to the One Who Dies; The Epicurean Argument; Hedonism Revisited; Death and Deprivation; Does a Person's Death Deprive Her of the Goods of Life?; Responses to these Deprivation-based Arguments for the Harm of Death; The Existence Variant and Presentism Defended; Conclusion 6 Fearless SymmetryLucretian Arguments; Challenges to the Lucretian Symmetry Argument; Responses to Nagel's Objection; Stoic fate; Hetherington's Symmetry Arguments; Earlier Birth and Personal Identity; Kaufman's Defense of Nagel's Argument; Responses to Kaufman; Responses to the Other Criticisms of this Lucretian Argument; The Backfire Problem; Feldman's Objection; Parfit's Hospital Example; Conclusion; 7 Epicureanism, Suicide, and Euthanasia; McMahan's Reconciliation Strategy; An Epicurean Approach to Suicide and Euthanasia; Suicide; Euthanasia; Conclusion 8 Epicureanism and Organ ProcurementEpicureanism and Policies of Presumed Consent; Presumed Consent and the "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Gill's Arguments; Why Gill's Argument against the Qualitative "Fewer Mistakes" Argument Fails; Objections to Gill's Quantitative Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Argument; The "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments and Violations of Autonomy; Presumed Consent and Respect for Autonomy; From Presumed Consent to Organ Taking; The Standard Pro-Taking Argument; Two Unjustified Assumptions-Moving Towards Markets The Ownership of Organs |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910785973403321 |
|
Taylor James Stacey <1970-, >
|
||
| New York : , : Routledge, , 2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics / / James Stacey Taylor
| Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics / / James Stacey Taylor |
| Autore | Taylor James Stacey <1970-, > |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Routledge, , 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (243 p.) |
| Disciplina | 128/.5 |
| Collana | Routledge annals of bioethics |
| Soggetto topico |
Death
Death - Moral and ethical aspects Respect for persons Dead Bioethics |
| ISBN |
1-136-25775-6
1-283-70926-0 0-203-10642-3 1-136-25776-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Death Unterrible; Full-blooded Epicureanism and Contemporary Bioethics; A Note on Methodology; Outline of this Volume; 1 Posthumous Harm and Interest-based Accounts of Well-being; The Intuitive Case for Posthumous Harm; The Anti-Hedonistic Intuition; Wronging the Dead; The Feinberg-Pitcher Argument for Posthumous Harm; Assessing the Argument for Posthumous Harm; Accommodating Orphaned Intuitions; Accommodating Feinberg's and Parfit's Anti-Hedonistic Intuitions; Can the Dead be Wronged?
Portmore, Posthumous Harm, and the Desire Theory of WelfareConclusion; 2 Further Criticisms of the Possibility of Posthumous Harm; Levenbook's Account of Harm as Loss; Levenbook's Argument; Criticisms of Levenbook's Argument; Grover's Quality of Life Arguments; Grover's Argument; Criticisms of Grover's Argument; Sperling's Human Subject Account; Sperling's Argument; Criticisms of Sperling's Argument; Harm and Implication in Evil; Conclusion; 3 The Impossibility of Posthumous Harm; Death, Goods, and the Extinction of Desires; Responding to Luper; Towards Hedonism; Objects and Causes Conclusion4 Can the Dead Be Wronged?; Desert and Injustice; Blustein and the "Dear Departed"; Responses to Blustein's Arguments; Response to the Rescue from Insignificance Argument; Response to the Enduring Duties Argument; Response to the Reciprocity Argument; Rights and Interests; Conclusion; 5 Why Death Is Not a Harm to the One Who Dies; The Epicurean Argument; Hedonism Revisited; Death and Deprivation; Does a Person's Death Deprive Her of the Goods of Life?; Responses to these Deprivation-based Arguments for the Harm of Death; The Existence Variant and Presentism Defended; Conclusion 6 Fearless SymmetryLucretian Arguments; Challenges to the Lucretian Symmetry Argument; Responses to Nagel's Objection; Stoic fate; Hetherington's Symmetry Arguments; Earlier Birth and Personal Identity; Kaufman's Defense of Nagel's Argument; Responses to Kaufman; Responses to the Other Criticisms of this Lucretian Argument; The Backfire Problem; Feldman's Objection; Parfit's Hospital Example; Conclusion; 7 Epicureanism, Suicide, and Euthanasia; McMahan's Reconciliation Strategy; An Epicurean Approach to Suicide and Euthanasia; Suicide; Euthanasia; Conclusion 8 Epicureanism and Organ ProcurementEpicureanism and Policies of Presumed Consent; Presumed Consent and the "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Gill's Arguments; Why Gill's Argument against the Qualitative "Fewer Mistakes" Argument Fails; Objections to Gill's Quantitative Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Argument; The "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments and Violations of Autonomy; Presumed Consent and Respect for Autonomy; From Presumed Consent to Organ Taking; The Standard Pro-Taking Argument; Two Unjustified Assumptions-Moving Towards Markets The Ownership of Organs |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910818653403321 |
|
Taylor James Stacey <1970-, >
|
||
| New York : , : Routledge, , 2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||