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Mathematics and Politics [[electronic resource] ] : Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof / / by Alan D. Taylor
| Mathematics and Politics [[electronic resource] ] : Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof / / by Alan D. Taylor |
| Autore | Taylor Alan D |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 1995.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, NY : , : Springer New York : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XIV, 284 p.) |
| Disciplina | 519.5 |
| Collana | Textbooks in Mathematical Sciences |
| Soggetto topico |
Statistics
Economic theory Statistical Theory and Methods Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Statistics for Social Sciences, Humanities, Law |
| ISBN | 1-4612-2512-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | 1 Escalation -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Game-Tree Analyses -- 1.3. Limitations and Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations -- 1.4. Statement of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 1.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 2 Conflict -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibria -- 2.3. Prisoner’s Dilemma -- 2.4. A Game-Theoretic Model of the Arms Race -- 2.5. Chicken -- 2.6. Game-Theoretic Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis -- 2.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 3 Yes-No Voting -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Swap Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the Federal System -- 3.3. Trade Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the Procedure to Amend the Canadian Constitution -- 3.4. Statement of the Characterization Theorem -- 3.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 4 Political Power -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The Shapley-Shubik Index of Power -- 4.3. Calculations for the European Economic Community -- 4.4. A Theorem on Voting Blocs -- 4.5. The Banzhaf Index of Power -- 4.6. Two Methods of Computing Banzhaf Power -- 4.7. Ordinal Power: Incomparability -- 4.8. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 5 Social Choice -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Five Examples of Social Choice Procedures -- 5.3. Four Desirable Properties of Social Choice Procedures -- 5.4. Positive Results—Proofs -- 5.5. Negative Results—Proofs -- 5.6. The Condorcet Voting Paradox -- 5.7. A Glimpse of Impossibility -- 5.8. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 6 More Escalation -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Statement of the Strong Version of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 6.3. Proof (by Mathematical Induction) of the Strong Version of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 6.4. Vickrey Auctions -- 6.5. Vickrey Auctions as a Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma -- 6.6. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 7 More Conflict -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The Yom Kippur War -- 7.3. The Theory of Moves -- 7.4. Models of Deterrence -- 7.5. A Probabilistic Model of Deterrence -- 7.6. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games -- 7.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 8 More Yes-No Voting -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. A Magic Square Voting System -- 8.3. Dimension Theory and the U.S. Federal System -- 8.4. Vector-Weighted Voting Systems -- 8.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 9 More Political Power -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. The Johnston Index of Power -- 9.3. The Deegan-Packel Index of Power -- 9.4. The Power of the President -- 9.5. Ordinal Power: Comparability -- 9.6. The Chair’s Paradox -- 9.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 10 More Social Choice -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. Social Welfare Functions -- 10.3. May’s Theorem for Two Alternatives -- 10.4. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem -- 10.5. Single Peakedness—Theorems of Black and Sen -- 10.6. Conclusions -- Exercises -- Attributions -- References. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910480325503321 |
Taylor Alan D
|
||
| New York, NY : , : Springer New York : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Mathematics and Politics [[electronic resource] ] : Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof / / by Alan D. Taylor
| Mathematics and Politics [[electronic resource] ] : Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof / / by Alan D. Taylor |
| Autore | Taylor Alan D |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 1995.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, NY : , : Springer New York : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XIV, 284 p.) |
| Disciplina | 519.5 |
| Collana | Textbooks in Mathematical Sciences |
| Soggetto topico |
Statistics
Economic theory Statistical Theory and Methods Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Statistics for Social Sciences, Humanities, Law |
| ISBN | 1-4612-2512-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | 1 Escalation -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Game-Tree Analyses -- 1.3. Limitations and Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations -- 1.4. Statement of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 1.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 2 Conflict -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibria -- 2.3. Prisoner’s Dilemma -- 2.4. A Game-Theoretic Model of the Arms Race -- 2.5. Chicken -- 2.6. Game-Theoretic Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis -- 2.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 3 Yes-No Voting -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Swap Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the Federal System -- 3.3. Trade Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the Procedure to Amend the Canadian Constitution -- 3.4. Statement of the Characterization Theorem -- 3.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 4 Political Power -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The Shapley-Shubik Index of Power -- 4.3. Calculations for the European Economic Community -- 4.4. A Theorem on Voting Blocs -- 4.5. The Banzhaf Index of Power -- 4.6. Two Methods of Computing Banzhaf Power -- 4.7. Ordinal Power: Incomparability -- 4.8. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 5 Social Choice -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Five Examples of Social Choice Procedures -- 5.3. Four Desirable Properties of Social Choice Procedures -- 5.4. Positive Results—Proofs -- 5.5. Negative Results—Proofs -- 5.6. The Condorcet Voting Paradox -- 5.7. A Glimpse of Impossibility -- 5.8. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 6 More Escalation -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Statement of the Strong Version of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 6.3. Proof (by Mathematical Induction) of the Strong Version of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 6.4. Vickrey Auctions -- 6.5. Vickrey Auctions as a Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma -- 6.6. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 7 More Conflict -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The Yom Kippur War -- 7.3. The Theory of Moves -- 7.4. Models of Deterrence -- 7.5. A Probabilistic Model of Deterrence -- 7.6. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games -- 7.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 8 More Yes-No Voting -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. A Magic Square Voting System -- 8.3. Dimension Theory and the U.S. Federal System -- 8.4. Vector-Weighted Voting Systems -- 8.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 9 More Political Power -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. The Johnston Index of Power -- 9.3. The Deegan-Packel Index of Power -- 9.4. The Power of the President -- 9.5. Ordinal Power: Comparability -- 9.6. The Chair’s Paradox -- 9.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 10 More Social Choice -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. Social Welfare Functions -- 10.3. May’s Theorem for Two Alternatives -- 10.4. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem -- 10.5. Single Peakedness—Theorems of Black and Sen -- 10.6. Conclusions -- Exercises -- Attributions -- References. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910789221203321 |
|
Taylor Alan D
|
||
| New York, NY : , : Springer New York : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Mathematics and Politics : Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof / / by Alan D. Taylor
| Mathematics and Politics : Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof / / by Alan D. Taylor |
| Autore | Taylor Alan D |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 1995.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, NY : , : Springer New York : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XIV, 284 p.) |
| Disciplina | 519.5 |
| Collana | Textbooks in Mathematical Sciences |
| Soggetto topico |
Statistics
Economic theory Statistical Theory and Methods Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Statistics for Social Sciences, Humanities, Law |
| ISBN | 1-4612-2512-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | 1 Escalation -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Game-Tree Analyses -- 1.3. Limitations and Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations -- 1.4. Statement of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 1.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 2 Conflict -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibria -- 2.3. Prisoner’s Dilemma -- 2.4. A Game-Theoretic Model of the Arms Race -- 2.5. Chicken -- 2.6. Game-Theoretic Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis -- 2.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 3 Yes-No Voting -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Swap Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the Federal System -- 3.3. Trade Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the Procedure to Amend the Canadian Constitution -- 3.4. Statement of the Characterization Theorem -- 3.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 4 Political Power -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The Shapley-Shubik Index of Power -- 4.3. Calculations for the European Economic Community -- 4.4. A Theorem on Voting Blocs -- 4.5. The Banzhaf Index of Power -- 4.6. Two Methods of Computing Banzhaf Power -- 4.7. Ordinal Power: Incomparability -- 4.8. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 5 Social Choice -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Five Examples of Social Choice Procedures -- 5.3. Four Desirable Properties of Social Choice Procedures -- 5.4. Positive Results—Proofs -- 5.5. Negative Results—Proofs -- 5.6. The Condorcet Voting Paradox -- 5.7. A Glimpse of Impossibility -- 5.8. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 6 More Escalation -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Statement of the Strong Version of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 6.3. Proof (by Mathematical Induction) of the Strong Version of O’Neill’s Theorem -- 6.4. Vickrey Auctions -- 6.5. Vickrey Auctions as a Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma -- 6.6. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 7 More Conflict -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The Yom Kippur War -- 7.3. The Theory of Moves -- 7.4. Models of Deterrence -- 7.5. A Probabilistic Model of Deterrence -- 7.6. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games -- 7.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 8 More Yes-No Voting -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. A Magic Square Voting System -- 8.3. Dimension Theory and the U.S. Federal System -- 8.4. Vector-Weighted Voting Systems -- 8.5. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 9 More Political Power -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. The Johnston Index of Power -- 9.3. The Deegan-Packel Index of Power -- 9.4. The Power of the President -- 9.5. Ordinal Power: Comparability -- 9.6. The Chair’s Paradox -- 9.7. Conclusions -- Exercises -- 10 More Social Choice -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. Social Welfare Functions -- 10.3. May’s Theorem for Two Alternatives -- 10.4. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem -- 10.5. Single Peakedness—Theorems of Black and Sen -- 10.6. Conclusions -- Exercises -- Attributions -- References. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910818802103321 |
|
Taylor Alan D
|
||
| New York, NY : , : Springer New York : , : Imprint : Springer, , 1995 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||