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Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Authors -- Introduction and Acknowledgements -- Part I: Theoretical implications -- Chapter 1: Populism and populist constitutionalism -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The impalpable concept of populism -- 1.3 Conceptualizing populism -- 1.3.1 Historical background -- 1.3.2 The dimensions of populism -- 1.3.3 Types of populism -- 1.4 The mysterious notion of populist constitutionalism -- 1.4.1 'Authoritarian', 'illiberal', or 'populist' constitutionalism? -- 1.4.2 Populist constitutionalism: an oxymoron, or a special kind of constitutional system? -- 1.4.3 Defining populist constitutionalism: positive and negative criteria -- 1.4.3.1 Negative criteria of populist constitutionalism -- 1.4.3.1.1 Criticism of the separation of law and politics -- 1.4.3.1.2 Anti-elitism -- 1.4.3.1.3 Anti-institutionalism -- 1.4.3.1.4 Anti-pluralism -- 1.4.3.1.5 Illiberalism -- 1.4.3.2 Positive criteria of populist constitutionalism -- 1.4.3.2.1 Popular sovereignty and direct democracy -- 1.4.3.2.2 Authentic popular representation -- 1.4.3.2.3 Extreme majoritarianism -- 1.4.3.2.4 The strong leader (personification of power) and the strengthening of executive power -- 1.4.3.2.5 The instrumentalization of law -- 1.4.3.2.6 Other (secondary) criteria -- Chapter 2: The art of constitutional interpretation -- 2.1 Defining constitutional interpretation -- 2.2 Classifying interpretive theories -- 2.2.1 Monist and pluralistic theories -- 2.2.2 Other classifications of interpretive theories -- 2.3 Main interpretive theories -- 2.3.1 Interpretive modalities -- 2.3.2 Substantive interpretation -- 2.3.3 Other interpretive aids: judicial doctrines, constructions, standards, tests and legal maxims -- 2.4 Conclusion.
Chapter 3: An 'Instrument of Government' or 'Instrument of Courts'?: The impact of political systems on constitutional interpretation and the case of populism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Do political systems generate their own rules of constitutional interpretation? -- 3.2.1 Hypotheses -- 3.2.2 Written rules on constitutional interpretation - in the liberal world and beyond -- 3.3 Populist constitutionalism and constitutional interpretation - instruments and limits -- 3.4 Escalating or de-escalating populism: the role of courts in constitutional interpretation -- 3.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 4: Can there be autochthonous methods of constitutional interpretation? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Substantive constitutional provisions -- 4.3 Interpretations of substantive provisions -- 4.4 Methods of constitutional interpretation -- 4.5 Conclusion -- Part II: Constitutional interpretation and populism in Europe -- Chapter 5: Formalism and judicial self-restraint as tools against populism?: Considerations regarding recent developments of the Austrian Constitutional Court -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Populism in Austria -- 5.2.1 Populism - what kind of populism? -- 5.2.2 The Austrian Freedom Party and the rise of populism in Austria -- 5.2.2.1 Jörg Haider and the Austrian Freedom Party (1986-2000) -- 5.2.2.2 The European scandal: the Freedom Party in Austrian government - part I (2000-2006) -- 5.2.3 Recent development: the Freedom Party in Austrian government - part II (2017-2019) -- 5.3 The Kurz Governments -- 5.3.1 Kurz I (2017-2019) -- 5.3.2 Kurz II (2020-) -- 5.4 Changing approaches of the Austrian Constitutional Court -- 5.4.1 Judicial approaches towards populism -- 5.4.2 Promoting Rights in a European Context (1970-2008) -- 5.4.3 The Slovenian Minority Case Law -- 5.4.4 Protecting Rights in a European Context (2008-2020) -- 5.4.5 Surveillance Case Law.
5.5 Conclusion - The Austrian Constitutional Court maintains its own approach -- Chapter 6: The Czech Constitutional Court in times of populism: From judicial activism to judicial self-restraint -- 6.1 The legal design of the Czech Constitutional Court and the rise of populism in Czech politics -- 6.2 The two decades of expansion of the powers of the Constitutional Court and the decade of slow retreat -- 6.3 Review of the constitutionality of legislation -- 6.4 Activism of the Constitutional Court in relation to the general judiciary (constitutional complaints) -- 6.5 The personal homogeneity of the first Constitutional Court and the heterogeneity of the second and third court? -- 6.6 Conclusions -- Chapter 7: Popular initiatives, populism and the Croatian Constitutional Court -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Popular initiative as the means of fostering populist claims -- 7.3 The game becomes serious: the introduction of the constitutional identity concept -- 7.4 Proportionality in action -- 7.5 Back to the linguistic approach -- 7.6 Systemic interpretation in play -- 7.7 The story continues: recent failed attempts -- 7.8 Conclusion -- Chapter 8: Constitutional identity as a populist notion?: The Council of State and the forging of the Greek constitutional identity through the crisis -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The forging of the Greek constitutional identity through the crisis -- 8.3 Understanding the Court's use of the notion of constitutional identity -- 8.4 Lessons to be drawn from the Greek experience -- 8.5 Epilogue -- Chapter 9: Constitutional interpretation under the new Fundamental Law of Hungary -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The new methods of constitutional interpretation -- 9.2.1 The Constitutional Court -- 9.2.2 The collection of the principles and methods of constitutional interpretation laid down in the Fundamental Law.
9.3 A new populist set of the methods of interpretation, or the reformulation of the classical methods? -- 9.4 The use of binding interpretative methods in constitutional jurisprudence -- 9.4.1 The application of the new methods of interpretation -- 9.4.2 Cases advancing populist constitutionalism (favouring the populist agenda) and the use of the new methods of interpretation in these specific cases -- 9.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 10: The populist reforms in Italy and the instrument of the constitutionally conforming interpretation -- 10.1 Could the Italian context be defined as populist? -- 10.2 The so-called ' decreti sicurezza ' and the containment of illegal migrants -- 10.3 The application of the constitutionally conforming interpretation -- 10.4 The (missing) intervention of the Constitutional Court on the Security Decrees -- 10.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 11: Whatever works: Constitutional interpretation in Poland in times of populism -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Preliminaries -- 11.3 Change or continuity? -- 11.3.1 The limits of judicial power -- 11.3.2 The preferred methods of constitutional interpretation -- 11.3.3 The approach to earlier findings -- 11.3.4 The approach to international law and EU law -- 11.4 Why cherry picking? -- 11.4.1 Pragmatism -- 11.4.2 Ideology -- 11.4.3 Reputation -- 11.4.4 Rhetoric -- 11.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 12: Non sequiturs in constitutional adjudication: Populism or epistemic deficit? -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Romania's political landscape: populist or not? -- 12.3 Discourses of constitutionalism in the Romanian context -- 12.4 Interpreting the Constitution -- 12.4.1 Decision no. 358/2018 - a problematic constitutional intervention -- 12.4.1.1 The political background -- 12.4.1.2 The legal background -- 12.4.1.3 A formalist result -- 12.4.2 Other constitutional 'mischiefs'.
12.5 Populism or epistemic deficit? -- 12.6 Conclusions -- Chapter 13: Constitutional interpretation and populism in contemporary Spain -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The political and social context of Spain -- 13.3 Populist challenges to constitutional jurisprudence -- 13.4 The health crisis and the constitutional interpretation -- 13.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 14: Populism, UK sovereignty, the rule of law and Brexit -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 The Brexit referendum and populist politics -- 14.3 Brexit: parliamentary procedure and constitutional conventions -- 14.4 Brexit and the Courts -- 14.5 The interpretation of prerogative powers: Miller 1 - can the government trigger Article 50 by making use of prerogative powers? -- 14.6 Prerogative powers: Miller 2 - can the courts review the exercise of the prerogative to prorogue Parliament? -- 14.7 Has Brexit resulted in new constitutional theories or doctrines? -- 14.8 Conclusions -- Part III: An outlook -- Chapter 15: Born populist: The Trump administration, the courts and the Constitution of the United States -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 The populist jurisprudence of Antonin Scalia -- 15.3 Originalism and American right-wing populism -- 15.4 Judicial populism before (and a bit after) the rise of right-wing populism -- 15.5 Populist pasts and presents -- Chapter 16: Constitutional interpretation: What can Europeans learn from US debates? -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 What is a constitution? -- 16.3 The limits of interpretability -- 16.4 Methods of interpretation -- 16.5 Imitative constitutionalism -- 16.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 17: Populist and non-democratic reading of the Constitution: Sad lessons from Latin America -- 17.1 Foreword -- 17.2 Thesis and main inferences -- 17.3 Analysis -- 17.3.1 Brief methodological remarks -- 17.3.2 Starting points -- 17.3.3 What kind of foundations?.
17.3.4 Which rights are meant to be constitutional rights?.
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Populist challenges to constitutional interpretation in Europe and beyond / / edited by Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz and Zoltán Szente
