Cyber-Security for Smart Grid Control : Vulnerability Assessment, Attack Detection, and Mitigation |
Autore | Sreejith Amulya |
Edizione | [1st ed.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Singapore : , : Springer, , 2024 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (153 pages) |
Altri autori (Persone) | Shanti SwarupK |
Collana | Transactions on Computer Systems and Networks Series |
ISBN |
9789819713028
9789819713011 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- About the Authors -- Nomenclature -- Constants -- Indices -- Matrices -- Variables -- Part I Cyber-Physical Smart Grid Systems -- 1 Smart Grid Cyber-Physical System: An Overview -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Smart Grid Cyber-Physical System -- 1.2.1 Smart Power Grids -- 1.2.2 Cyber-Physical Systems -- 1.3 Issues in Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Systems -- 1.4 Attacks on Smart Grid Systems -- 1.5 Defense in Depth Security Approach -- 1.6 Cyber-Security in Smart Grid Control -- References -- 2 Smart Grid Control -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Smart Grid Control and Cyber-Security -- 2.2.1 Smart Grid Control -- 2.2.2 Cyber-Security in Smart Grid Control -- 2.3 Frequency Control -- 2.4 Load Frequency Control Modeling -- 2.5 State-Space Representations -- 2.5.1 Nonlinearities Modeling in MA-LFC -- 2.6 Load Frequency Control Cyber-Physical System -- 2.7 Summary -- References -- Part II Attacks in Smart Grid Control Vulnerability Assessment -- 3 Attack Modeling for Smart Grid Control -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Smart Grid Attack Modeling Overview -- 3.3 Multi-area Load Frequency Control (MA-LFC) -- 3.3.1 MA-LFC Modeling -- 3.4 Attack Modeling for MA-LFC -- 3.5 Stealth/Undetectable Attacks -- 3.6 Multiple-Attack Model -- 3.6.1 Scaling Attack -- 3.6.2 Ramp Attack -- 3.6.3 False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) -- 3.6.4 Zero-Day Attacks -- 3.7 Attack Impact Analysis for IEEE 39-Bus New England Test System LFC -- 3.7.1 Example 3.1: Single Attack Dynamics -- 3.7.2 Example 3.2: Multiple-Attack Dynamics -- 3.8 Future Scope -- 3.8.1 Research Gap -- 3.8.2 Research Directions -- 3.9 Summary -- References -- 4 Vulnerability Assessment for Multi-area Load Frequency Control -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Data Penetration Testing -- 4.3 Cascading Outage Model -- 4.4 Vulnerability Assessment -- 4.4.1 Identification of Threats and Vulnerabilities.
4.4.2 Quantifying Risk -- 4.4.3 Prioritizing the Risk -- 4.5 Detailed Risk Quantification Methodology -- 4.5.1 Stage 1: Initiating Event Identification -- 4.5.2 Stage 2: Determination of Required Change in Generation -- 4.5.3 Stage 3: Optimal Attack Vector and Risk Calculation -- 4.6 Case Study: Vulnerability Assessment for 9-Bus and 39-Bus New England Systems -- 4.6.1 Example 4.1: VA on 9-Bus System -- 4.6.2 Example 4.2: Vulnerability Assessment for 39-Bus New England System -- 4.7 Summary -- References -- 5 MITRE ATT& -- CK for Smart Grid Cyber-Security -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Understanding MITRE ATT& -- CK -- 5.2.1 Evolution of MITRE ATT& -- CK -- 5.2.2 Relevance of MITRE ATT& -- CK in Smart Grid Cyber-Security -- 5.3 Mapping Threats to Smart Grids -- 5.3.1 Mapping Attacks to the MITRE Framework -- 5.4 Using MITRE ATT& -- CK for Smart Grid Defense -- 5.4.1 Tactic/Technique-Based Mitigation -- 5.4.2 Customized Mitigation Strategies -- 5.4.3 Incident Response Playbooks -- 5.4.4 Continuous Monitoring and Testing -- 5.4.5 Vendor and Technology Collaboration -- 5.4.6 Documentation and Compliance -- 5.5 MITRE ATT& -- CK for Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing (VAPT) -- 5.5.1 Mapping of Exploits to MITRE ATT& -- CK -- 5.6 Analyze the Likelihood, Impact, and Risk Scores -- 5.6.1 Substation Attack Trees -- 5.6.2 Impact Scores -- 5.6.3 Likelihood Scores -- 5.6.4 Risk Scores -- 5.7 Case Study: MITRE ATT& -- CK for Substation VA -- 5.7.1 Attack Penetrates to Final Node -- 5.7.2 Attack Stops at Capture Packets -- 5.8 Summary -- References -- Part III Attack Detection and Mitigation -- 6 Signal Processing-Based Attack Detection -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Multi-level Attack Detection -- 6.3 Singular Spectral Analysis (SSA)-Based Attack Detection -- 6.4 Process Level Single Variate Attack Detection. 6.4.1 Signal Subspace Determination -- 6.4.2 Signal Subspace Projection -- 6.4.3 Detection Phase -- 6.4.4 Selection of Parameters -- 6.5 Multivariate SSA for Control Center Level Detection -- 6.5.1 Extension in Training Phase -- 6.5.2 Extension in Detection Phase -- 6.6 Performance Analysis of Detection Algorithm -- 6.6.1 Performance Enhancement of Detection Algorithm -- 6.7 Multi-level Attack Detection Results -- 6.7.1 Example 6.1: Multi-level Attack Detection on 39-Bus System -- 6.7.2 RTU/IED Level Detection Results -- 6.7.3 Control Center Level Detection Results -- 6.8 Hypothesis Testing-Based Attack Detection -- 6.9 SSA Hoeffding Test-Based Hypothesis Testing -- 6.10 Adaptive Threshold Selection -- 6.11 Adaptive Attack Detection Results -- 6.11.1 Example 6.2: Adaptive Attack Detection -- 6.11.2 Performance Under Load Variations -- 6.11.3 Comparison with Existing Detection Strategies -- 6.11.4 Scalability Evaluation -- 6.12 Summary -- References -- 7 Machine Learning-Based Attack Detection -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Machine Learning in Smart Grid Attack Detection -- 7.3 Support Vector Data Description Based Online Attack Detection -- 7.3.1 Normal Data Description in SVDD -- 7.3.2 Distance Tracking and Detection -- 7.3.3 Optimization-Based Parameter Selection -- 7.4 Simulation Results and Discussions -- 7.4.1 Example 7.1: SVDD Detection for Attacks -- 7.4.2 Data Preparation -- 7.4.3 Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Based Parameter Selection -- 7.4.4 Detection Results -- 7.4.5 Comparison with Other Classifiers -- 7.4.6 Summary of Results -- 7.5 Summary -- References -- 8 Attack Mitigation and Recovery in Smart Grid Control -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Attack Mitigation in Smart Grids -- 8.2.1 Estimation-Based Mitigation -- 8.2.2 Attack Elimination Using Robust Control -- 8.2.3 Bypass LFC -- 8.3 Adaptive Control-Based Attack Mitigation. 8.4 Attack Mitigation for 39-Bus 3 Area System -- 8.4.1 Example 8.1: Single Step Load Change Results -- 8.4.2 Example 8.2: New England ISO Load Data Results -- 8.5 IoT-Based Hardware Model -- 8.6 Research Scope -- 8.6.1 Research Gap -- 8.6.2 Research Directions -- 8.7 Summary -- References -- Appendix A Test Systems Data -- A.1 IEEE 9-Bus System -- A.2 39-Bus New England Test System -- A.3 IEEE 300-Bus System -- Appendix B Detailed Equations for Cascading Outage Model -- Appendix C Information Theory and Hypothesis Testing -- C.1 Hoeffding Test -- C.2 Neyman-Pearson Theorem -- C.2.1 Neyman-Pearson Lemma -- Appendix D Proofs of Theorems -- D.1 Theorem 3.1 -- D.2 Theorem 6.1 -- D.3 Theorem 6.2. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910865240003321 |
Sreejith Amulya | ||
Singapore : , : Springer, , 2024 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Design and Development of Model Predictive Primary Control of Micro Grids : Simulation Examples in MATLAB / / by Puvvula Vidyasagar, K. Shanti Swarup |
Autore | Vidyasagar Puvvula |
Edizione | [1st ed. 2023.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Singapore : , : Springer Nature Singapore : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (170 pages) : illustrations |
Disciplina | 621.31 |
Collana | Springer Tracts in Electrical and Electronics Engineering |
Soggetto topico |
Electric power production
Control engineering Electrical Power Engineering Mechanical Power Engineering Control and Systems Theory |
ISBN | 981-19-5852-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Chapter 1. Micro-grid Introduction and Overview -- Chapter 2. An Overview of Micro-grid Control -- Chapter 3. Mathematical Modelling of a Micro-grid -- Chapter 4. Introduction to Model Predictive Control -- Chapter 5. LTI-MPC for the Micro-grid Control -- Chapter 6. LTV-MPC with Extended “TAIL” -- Chapter 7. Special functions in the MPC formulation -- Chapter 8. Auxiliary Requirements for Real-time Implementation -- Chapter 9. Conclusion and Future Scope. . |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910637716103321 |
Vidyasagar Puvvula | ||
Singapore : , : Springer Nature Singapore : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Market Operation for Reactive Power Ancillary Service : Design and Analysis with GAMS Code / / by Devika Jay, K. Shanti Swarup |
Autore | Jay Devika |
Edizione | [1st ed. 2024.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Singapore : , : Springer Nature Singapore : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XI, 130 p. 46 illus., 23 illus. in color.) |
Disciplina | 621.31 |
Collana | Springer Tracts in Electrical and Electronics Engineering |
Soggetto topico |
Electric power production
Power electronics Artificial intelligence Game theory Electrical Power Engineering Power Electronics Artificial Intelligence Game Theory |
ISBN | 981-9969-52-2 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Introduction to Electricity Markets -- Energy and Ancillary Service Markets -- Reactive Power Ancillary Service Markets -- Network Partitioning Techniques -- Market Mechanisms for Reactive Power Ancillary Service. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910799238803321 |
Jay Devika | ||
Singapore : , : Springer Nature Singapore : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|