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Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, March 5–8, 2024, Proceedings, Part II / / edited by Christina Pöpper, Lejla Batina
| Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, March 5–8, 2024, Proceedings, Part II / / edited by Christina Pöpper, Lejla Batina |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2024.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (523 pages) |
| Disciplina | 005.8 |
| Collana | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Soggetto topico |
Data protection
Data structures (Computer science) Information theory Operating systems (Computers) Application software Cryptography Data encryption (Computer science) Data and Information Security Data Structures and Information Theory Operating Systems Computer and Information Systems Applications Cryptology Security Services |
| ISBN | 3-031-54773-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Abstracts of Keynote Talks -- Applying Machine Learning to Securing Cellular Networks -- Real-World Cryptanalysis -- CAPTCHAs: What Are They Good For? -- Contents - Part II -- Post-quantum -- Automated Issuance of Post-Quantum Certificates: A New Challenge -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 TLS Version 1.3 -- 2.2 ACMEv2 Characteristics -- 2.3 Post-Quantum Cryptography -- 3 Quantum Threat and PQC Adoption -- 3.1 Quantum Threats in ACME -- 3.2 Integrating PQC Algorithms -- 3.3 Impacts of PQC in ACME -- 4 Proposed ACME Challenge -- 4.1 Design Details -- 4.2 Issuance and Renewal Timings -- 4.3 Discussion -- 5 Final Remarks and Future Work -- A ACME's HTTP-01 Challenge -- B POST Request Example -- References -- Algorithmic Views of Vectorized Polynomial Multipliers - NTRU Prime -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Contributions -- 1.2 Code -- 1.3 Structure of This Paper -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Polynomials in NTRU Prime -- 2.2 Cortex-A72 -- 2.3 Modular Arithmetic -- 3 Fast Fourier Transforms -- 3.1 The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) for Polynomial Rings -- 3.2 Cooley-Tukey FFT -- 3.3 Bruun-Like FFTs -- 3.4 Good-Thomas FFTs -- 3.5 Rader's FFT for Odd Prime p -- 3.6 Schönhage's and Nussbaumer's FFTs -- 4 Implementations -- 4.1 The Needs of Vectorization -- 4.2 Good-Thomas FFT in ``BigSmall'' Polynomial Multiplications -- 4.3 Good-Thomas, Schönhage's, and Bruun's FFT -- 4.4 Good-Thomas, Rader's, and Bruun's FFT -- 5 Results -- 5.1 Benchmark Environment -- 5.2 Performance of Vectorized Polynomial Multiplications -- 5.3 Performance of Schemes -- A Detailed Performance Numbers -- References -- Efficient Quantum-Safe Distributed PRF and Applications: Playing DiSE in a Quantum World -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Works and Our Contributions -- 2 Preliminaries and Background -- 2.1 Notation.
2.2 Some Terminologies and Definitions -- 2.3 Distributed PRF (DPRF) -- 2.4 (t, T)-Threshold Secret Sharing -- 3 Our Contribution: Proposed Distributed PRF -- 3.1 Underlying Quantum-Safe PRF -- 3.2 Proposed (T, T)-Distributed PRF -- 3.3 Generalised (t, T)-Threshold PRF -- 3.4 Choice of Parameters -- 3.5 Proposed PQDPRF vs. the Lattice-Based DPRF in ch3libert2021adaptively -- 4 Application -- 4.1 An Overview of the DiSE Protocol -- 4.2 Our Improved PQ-DiSE Protocol -- 5 Experimental Result -- 6 Conclusion and Future Work -- A Generalised (t, T)-Threshold PRF -- A.1 Proof of Correctness and Consistency -- A.2 Proof of Security -- References -- On the Untapped Potential of the Quantum FLT-Based Inversion -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Background -- 1.2 Our Contribution -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Binary Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem -- 2.2 Quantum Computation in F2n -- 2.3 Shor's Algorithm for Solving the Binary ECDLP -- 3 Our Method -- 3.1 Register-Bounded Addition Chain -- 3.2 Modified Quantum Point Addition Algorithm -- 3.3 Depth Reduction of Quantum Multiple Squaring Circuits -- 3.4 Proposed Inversion Algorithm -- 4 Comparison -- 4.1 Our Choice of Register-Bounded Addition Chains -- 4.2 Quantum Resources Trade-Off in Our Proposed Inversion Algorithm -- 4.3 Comparison with Previous Methods in Shor's Algorithm -- References -- Breaking DPA-Protected Kyber via the Pair-Pointwise Multiplication -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contribution -- 1.2 State of the Art -- 2 Notation and Preliminaries -- 2.1 Kyber -- 2.2 Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) -- 2.3 Online Template Attacks -- 3 Our Attack -- 3.1 Attack Steps-Extracting the Key via q+q Templates -- 3.2 Attack on DPA-Protected Kyber -- 4 Simulations -- 4.1 Implementation of Pair-Point Multiplication -- 4.2 Hamming Weight Model -- 4.3 Simulations of Gaussian Noise -- 5 Experimental Evidence. 5.1 Attack Analysis -- 6 Possible Countermeasures -- A Kyber Algorithms -- B Montgomery Reduction -- C Details on Noiseless and Noisy Simulations -- D Comparison -- References -- Cryptographic Protocols II -- The Key Lattice Framework for Concurrent Group Messaging -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Work -- 1.2 Technical Overview -- 2 General Definitions and Notation -- 3 Key Lattice -- 3.1 Key Evolution -- 3.2 The Key Graph -- 3.3 Instantiation -- 3.4 Key Lattice as a Key Management Technique -- 4 Group Key Agreement -- 5 Group Randomness Messaging -- 5.1 Instantiation -- 6 Group Messaging -- 6.1 Security Definition -- 6.2 GM from GRM and GKA -- 6.3 Concrete Costs -- 6.4 Main Theorem -- References -- Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption from Standard Lattice Assumptions -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption -- 2.2 Homomorphic Signatures -- 3 IB-ME: Generic Construction -- 3.1 IB-ME Achieving Enhanced Privacy -- 3.2 Achieving Authenticity -- 3.3 Security Analysis -- 4 Instantiations from Lattice Assumptions -- 5 Conclusions -- A Reusable Computational Extractors -- B Identity-Based Encryption -- C Indistinguishable from Random Privacy vs Enhanced Privacy -- References -- Decentralized Private Stream Aggregation from Lattices -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contributions -- 1.2 Related Work -- 1.3 Organization -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Lattices -- 2.2 Learning with Errors -- 2.3 Pseudorandom Functions -- 3 Decentralized Private Stream Aggregation -- 3.1 Our Construction -- 3.2 Aggregator Obliviousness -- 3.3 Parameters -- 3.4 Decentralized Setup -- 3.5 Client Failures -- 3.6 Optimizing Peer-to-Peer Communication -- 3.7 Dynamic Join and Leave -- 4 DPSA in the Standard Model -- 5 Conclusion -- A Private Stream Aggregation -- B Games for the Proof of Theorem 1 -- References -- Wireless and Networks. A Security Analysis of WPA3-PK: Implementation and Precomputation Attacks -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) -- 2.2 WPA3 Public Key (WPA3-PK) -- 2.3 Generation of the WPA3-PK Password -- 2.4 Security Guarantees Provided by WPA3-PK -- 3 Implementation and Network-Based Attacks -- 3.1 Bad Randomness Leaks the Password -- 3.2 Network-Based Attacks -- 4 Precomputation Attacks and Rainbow Tables -- 4.1 Background on Time-Memory Trade-Off Attacks -- 4.2 Motivation: SSID Reuse -- 4.3 Baseline Precomputation Attack Against WPA3-PK -- 4.4 Improved Analysis of the Baseline Precomputation Attack -- 4.5 Rainbow Tables for WPA3-PK -- 4.6 Rainbow Table: Performance Experiments -- 5 Multi-network Password Collisions -- 5.1 Constructing Password Collisions -- 5.2 Public Key Embedding and Trailing Data -- 5.3 Accepting Trailing Data Inside the Public Key -- 5.4 Multi-network Password Collisions -- 6 Defenses and Discussion -- 6.1 Handling Bad Randomness: Encrypting the Public Key -- 6.2 Preventing Network-Layer Attacks -- 6.3 Mitigating Time-Memory Trade-Off Attacks -- 6.4 Preventing Password Collisions: Committing to an SSID Length -- 7 Related Work -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- When and How to Aggregate Message Authentication Codes on Lossy Channels? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 MAC Aggregation on Lossy Channels -- 2.1 Message Authentication Codes -- 2.2 MAC Aggregation to Combat Bandwidth Scarcity -- 2.3 Introducing Existing MAC Aggregation Schemes -- 2.4 Interplay of Lossy Channels and MAC Aggregation -- 3 Synthetic Measurements -- 3.1 Simulation Setup -- 3.2 Influence of Channel Quality on Goodput -- 3.3 Influence of Payload Length on Goodput -- 3.4 Optimal Packet Lengths for Authenticated Data -- 4 MAC Aggregation in Real-World Scenarios -- 4.1 Description of the Scenarios. 4.2 Evaluating MAC Aggregation in Realistic Scenarios -- 5 Beyond Goodput as Evaluation Metric -- 5.1 Average Delay Until Authentication -- 5.2 Performance and Memory Overhead -- 5.3 Resilience to Adversarial Interference -- 6 Guidelines on Employing MAC Aggregation -- 6.1 When to Use MAC Aggregation on Lossy Channels? -- 6.2 How to Employ MAC Aggregation on Lossy Channels? -- 6.3 Selecting an MAC Aggregation Scheme -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- DoSat: A DDoS Attack on the Vulnerable Time-Varying Topology of LEO Satellite Networks -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 2.1 LEO Satellite Network -- 2.2 Denial-of-Service Attack -- 2.3 LSN Simulation -- 3 DoSat Attack -- 3.1 Threat Model -- 3.2 Feasibility Analysis -- 3.3 DoSat Overview -- 3.4 Attack Mechanism -- 4 Simulation and Evaluation -- 4.1 Simulation Setup -- 4.2 Network Setup -- 4.3 Evaluation Metrics -- 4.4 Results -- 5 Mitigations -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- DDoSMiner: An Automated Framework for DDoS Attack Characterization and Vulnerability Mining -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 2.1 TCP-Based DDoS Attacks -- 2.2 DDoS Mining/Exploit Schemes -- 2.3 Exploration TCP Stack with Symbolic Execution -- 3 Threat Model and Problem Definition -- 3.1 Threat Model -- 3.2 Problem Definition -- 4 Workflow of DDoSMiner -- 4.1 Generation of Attack Call Flow Graph -- 4.2 Selective Symbolic Execution -- 5 Evaluation -- 5.1 Experiment Configuration -- 5.2 Attack Call Flow Graph Analysis -- 5.3 Symbol Execution Experiment Setup -- 5.4 Symbolic Execution Results -- 5.5 Evasion Evaluation Against IDS -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 Limitations and Future Work -- A Visualization and Analysis of System Calls -- B The Kernel Address Corresponding to the Full Drop Nodes for Six Categories of Attacks -- References -- Privacy and Homomorphic Encryption. Memory Efficient Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning Based on Homomorphic Encryption. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910842279903321 |
| Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, March 5–8, 2024, Proceedings, Part III / / edited by Christina Pöpper, Lejla Batina
| Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, March 5–8, 2024, Proceedings, Part III / / edited by Christina Pöpper, Lejla Batina |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2024.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (476 pages) |
| Disciplina | 005.8 |
| Collana | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Soggetto topico |
Data protection
Data structures (Computer science) Information theory Operating systems (Computers) Application software Cryptography Data encryption (Computer science) Data and Information Security Data Structures and Information Theory Operating Systems Computer and Information Systems Applications Cryptology Security Services |
| ISBN | 3-031-54776-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Abstracts of Keynote Talks -- Applying Machine Learning to Securing Cellular Networks -- Real-World Cryptanalysis -- CAPTCHAs: What Are They Good For? -- Contents - Part III -- Blockchain -- Mirrored Commitment: Fixing ``Randomized Partial Checking'' and Applications -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Notation -- 2 Chaumian Randomized Partial Checking (RPC) Mix Net -- 2.1 Protocol Description -- 2.2 RPC Audit -- 2.3 Attacks on RPC -- 3 Mirrored Randomized Partial Checking (mRPC) -- 3.1 Protocol Description -- 3.2 mRPC Audit -- 3.3 Attack Examples on mRPC -- 3.4 Security of mRPC -- 4 Privacy Guarantees of RPC and mRPC -- 4.1 Constant Number of Mix-Servers -- 4.2 Mixing Time -- 5 Application: CryptoCurrency Unlinkability -- 6 Conclusions -- A Proofs -- A.1 Proof of Lemma 4 -- A.2 Proof of Lemma 6 -- A.3 Proof of Lemma 7 -- References -- Bitcoin Clique: Channel-Free Off-Chain Payments Using Two-Shot Adaptor Signatures -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contributions -- 1.2 Related Work -- 2 Preliminaries -- 3 Model -- 3.1 Blockchain and Transaction Model -- 3.2 Commit-Chain Model -- 3.3 Communication and Adversarial Assumptions -- 3.4 Security and Performance Guarantees -- 4 Protocol Overview -- 5 Bitcoin Clique Protocol -- 6 Future Work -- A Bitcoin Clique Healing -- A.1 Healing Extension Details -- A.2 Discussion and Future Work -- References -- Programmable Payment Channels -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contributions -- 1.2 Related Work -- 2 Preliminaries -- 3 Programmable Payment Channels -- 3.1 Defining FPPC -- 3.2 PPC Preliminaries -- 3.3 Ideal Functionality FPPC -- 3.4 Concrete Implementation of FPPC -- 3.5 Lightweight Applications of Programmable Payments -- 3.6 Implementation and Evaluation -- 4 State Channels from FPPC -- 4.1 Modifying FPPC to Capture State Channels -- 4.2 Defining FSC.
4.3 Implementing FSC in theFPPC-Hybrid World -- 5 Conclusions -- References -- Fair Private Set Intersection Using Smart Contracts -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Other Coin-Compensated PSI -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Preliminaries and Notations -- 4 Fair PSI Using Smart Contracts -- 4.1 Smart Contract as the TTP in Optimistic Mutual PSI -- 4.2 Security Model -- 4.3 Ideal Functionality for Coin-Compensated PSI -- 5 A Coin-Compensated Fair SC-Aided PSI -- 5.1 Security Analysis -- 6 Improving the Efficiency of -- 6.1 Our Technique for Optimizing the Protocol -- 6.2 Overview of * -- 6.3 Security Analysis -- 7 Complexity Analysis -- 8 Implementation -- 8.1 Evaluation -- 9 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Powers-of-Tau to the People: Decentralizing Setup Ceremonies -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 2.1 Multiparty Setup Ceremonies -- 2.2 Setup Ceremonies in Practice -- 2.3 Proof Systems with Transparent Setup -- 3 A Powers-of-Tau System: Definitions -- 4 Powers-of-Tau Setup with Full Data On-Chain -- 4.1 Security -- 5 Powers-of-Tau Setup Protocol with Data Off-Chain -- 5.1 Off-Chain Setup Using a Transparent Succinct Proof -- 5.2 Off-Chain Setup Using AFGHO Commitments On-Chain -- 6 Implementation and Evaluation on Ethereum -- 7 Concluding Discussion and Open Problems -- 7.1 Incentives for Participation -- 7.2 Verifying Participation -- 7.3 Sequential Participation and Denial-of-Service -- 7.4 Verification with General-Purpose Roll-Ups -- 7.5 Protocol-Specific ZK Rollups via Proof Batching -- 7.6 Protocol-Specific Optimistic Verification and Checkpointing -- 7.7 Fully Off-Chain Verification via IVC/PCD -- 7.8 Forking/Re-starting -- A Proof of Theorem 2 -- B Inner-Pairing Product Arguments for Sect.5.2 -- C Off-Chain Setup from IPP Arguments with a Smaller Setup -- D Powers-of-Tau with a Punctured Point -- References. Smart Infrastructures, Systems and Software -- Self-sovereign Identity for Electric Vehicle Charging -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 E-mobility -- 2.2 Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) -- 3 Related Work -- 4 System Model and Requirement Analysis -- 4.1 Scope -- 4.2 Attacker Model -- 4.3 Functional Requirements -- 4.4 Security and Privacy Requirements -- 5 SSI Concept -- 5.1 Concept Overview -- 5.2 Provisioning DID Creation -- 5.3 Contract Credential Installation -- 5.4 Charging Process and Credential Validation -- 5.5 Integration into ISO 15118-20 -- 6 Implementation -- 7 Evaluation -- 7.1 Performance Measurements -- 7.2 Security and Privacy Analysis with Tamarin -- 7.3 Discussion of Requirements -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- ``Hello? Is There Anybody in There?'' Leakage Assessment of Differential Privacy Mechanisms in Smart Metering Infrastructure -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Differential Privacy -- 2.2 Statistical t-test Analysis -- 3 System and Threat Model -- 3.1 Threat Surfaces -- 3.2 Capabilities of the Adversary -- 3.3 Goal of the Adversary -- 4 Formal Analysis of Leakage Due to Privacy-Utility Trade-Off in Smart Metering Systems -- 5 Proposed Attack Methodology -- 5.1 Precomputation Phase -- 5.2 t-test Based Attack Methodology -- 6 Evaluation of the Proposed Attack Methodology -- 6.1 Experimental Setup -- 6.2 Experimental Evaluation -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion and Future Work -- References -- Security Analysis of BigBlueButton and eduMEET -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 WebRTC -- 2.2 WebRTC Architectures in Conferencing Systems -- 3 Analysis Method -- 3.1 High-Level Analysis -- 3.2 Source Code Supported Security Analysis -- 4 Architectures of the Analyzed Open-Source Conferencing Systems (RQ1) -- 4.1 Shared Architecture -- 4.2 Implementation of BigBlueButton -- 4.3 Implementation of eduMEET. 5 Features and User Roles (RQ2) -- 5.1 Comparison of Features -- 5.2 User Roles -- 6 Attacker Model -- 7 Evaluation (RQ3) -- 7.1 BigBlueButton -- 7.2 eduMEET -- 7.3 Responsible Disclosure -- 8 Discussion -- 8.1 BigBlueButton -- 8.2 eduMEET -- 8.3 Limitations -- 9 Related Work -- 10 Conclusions and Future Work -- A Appendix -- A.1 eduMEET -- A.2 Status of Fixes in BigBlueButton -- References -- An In-Depth Analysis of the Code-Reuse Gadgets Introduced by Software Obfuscation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Code Obfuscation -- 2.2 Code-Reuse Attack -- 3 Code-Reuse Gadgets Introduced by Obfuscation -- 3.1 Benchmark and Obfuscation Selection -- 3.2 Gadget Measurement -- 4 Study Results -- 4.1 Gadget Quantity -- 4.2 Gadget Exploitability -- 4.3 Gadget Quality -- 4.4 Code-Reuse Attack Risk -- 5 The Anatomy of the Obfuscations and Gadgets -- 5.1 Instructions Substitution -- 5.2 Control Flow Flattening -- 5.3 Bogus Control Flow -- 5.4 Virtualization -- 5.5 Just-In-Time Dynamic -- 5.6 Self-modification -- 5.7 Encode Components -- 6 Mitigation -- 6.1 Strategy -- 6.2 Evaluation -- 7 Related Work -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- ProvIoT: Detecting Stealthy Attacks in IoT through Federated Edge-Cloud Security -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Fileless Attacks on IoT Devices -- 2.2 System Provenance and Graph Learning -- 3 Threat Model -- 4 System Overview -- 4.1 Local Brain -- 4.2 Cloud Brain -- 5 Federated Detection -- 5.1 Graph Building and Path Selection -- 5.2 Document Embedding Model -- 5.3 Federated Autoencoder -- 6 Implementation -- 7 Evaluation -- 7.1 Dataset -- 7.2 Experimental Protocol -- 7.3 IoT Malware Detection -- 7.4 APT Detection -- 7.5 Federated Learning Benefits -- 7.6 ProvIoT Overhead -- 8 Limitations -- 9 Related Work -- 10 Discussion and Future Work -- 11 Conclusion -- A Appendix -- A.1 IoT Workload. -- A.2 Dataset Statistics. A.3 APT Scenarios -- References -- Attacks -- A Practical Key-Recovery Attack on LWE-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Schemes Using Rowhammer -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Paper Organization -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Learning with Errors (LWE) Problem and Its Variants -- 2.2 LPR Public-Key Encryption -- 2.3 Kyber -- 2.4 Saber -- 2.5 Related Works -- 3 Our Attack Using Binary Decision Tree on the LPR-Based Schemes -- 3.1 Implementing a Parallel Plaintext Checking (PC) Oracle -- 3.2 Generic Attack Model Using PC Oracle -- 3.3 Model for Kyber and Saber -- 3.4 Comparing Our Attack with the State-of-the-Art -- 4 Realization of the Fault Model -- 4.1 Nature of the Fault in the Attack -- 4.2 Our Target Devices -- 4.3 Probabilities of Incorporating Precise Fault Using Random Rowhammer -- 5 Discussion and Future Direction -- 5.1 Shuffling and Masking: -- 5.2 Extension of Our Attack on Other PQC Schemes -- 5.3 Combining of Lattice Reduction Techniques with Our Attack -- 5.4 Possible Countermeasures -- References -- A Side-Channel Attack on a Higher-Order Masked CRYSTALS-Kyber Implementation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Previous Work -- 3 Background -- 3.1 Notation -- 3.2 Kyber Algorithm -- 4 Adversary Model -- 5 Attack Description -- 5.1 Profiling Stage -- 5.2 Attack Stage -- 6 Experimental Setup -- 7 Leakage Analysis -- 7.1 Unprotected Message Encoding -- 7.2 Masked Message Encoding -- 7.3 Finding New Leakage Points -- 8 Neural Network Training -- 8.1 Trace Acquisition and Pre-processing -- 8.2 Network Architecture and Training Parameters -- 9 New Chosen Ciphertext Construction Method -- 9.1 Constructing Chosen Ciphertexts -- 9.2 Selecting Optimal Mapping -- 10 Experimental Results -- 10.1 Message Recovery Attack -- 10.2 Secret Key Recovery Attack -- 11 Countermeasures -- 12 Conclusion -- References. Time Is Money, Friend! Timing Side-Channel Attack Against Garbled Circuit Constructions. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910842289103321 |
| Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, March 5–8, 2024, Proceedings, Part I / / edited by Christina Pöpper, Lejla Batina
| Applied Cryptography and Network Security : 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, March 5–8, 2024, Proceedings, Part I / / edited by Christina Pöpper, Lejla Batina |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2024.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (509 pages) |
| Disciplina | 005.8 |
| Collana | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Soggetto topico |
Data protection
Data structures (Computer science) Information theory Operating systems (Computers) Application software Cryptography Data encryption (Computer science) Data and Information Security Data Structures and Information Theory Operating Systems Computer and Information Systems Applications Cryptology Security Services |
| ISBN | 3-031-54770-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Abstracts of Keynote Talks -- Applying Machine Learning to Securing Cellular Networks -- Real-World Cryptanalysis -- CAPTCHAs: What Are They Good For? -- Contents - Part I -- Contents - Part II -- Contents - Part III -- Cryptographic Protocols -- CryptoZoo: A Viewer for Reduction Proofs -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 State-Separating Proofs -- 4 A Proof Viewer for SSPs -- 4.1 Proof Viewing Concepts -- 4.2 Implementation Considerations -- 5 Case Study: IND-CPA Vs. Simulation-Based Security -- 6 Case Study: Constant-Depth GGM Tree -- 7 Case Study: Yao's Garbling Scheme -- 8 Comparison -- 8.1 Yao's Garbling Scheme -- 8.2 SSP Proofs of TLS 1.3 -- 8.3 SSP Proofs of the MLS Key Schedule -- 8.4 Formal Verification Tools for SSPs -- 9 Conclusion and Future Work -- References -- Element Distinctness and Bounded Input Size in Private Set Intersection and Related Protocols -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work and Background -- 2.1 Private Set Intersection (PSI) -- 2.2 PSI Variants -- 2.3 PSI with Restrictions -- 2.4 PSI with Multiset Input -- 2.5 Zero-Knowledge Proofs -- 2.6 Homomorphic Encryption -- 3 Proving Element Distinctness -- 3.1 Puzzle-Based PoED Construction -- 3.2 Analysis of PoED-Puzzle Protocol -- 4 PSI with Element Distinctness Check -- 4.1 Adversary Model -- 4.2 Definition of AD-PSI -- 4.3 A Construction for AD-PSI Based on PoED-puzzle -- 4.4 Alternative AD-PSI and Modified Construction -- 5 AD-PSI Variants -- 5.1 PSI-CA with Element Distinctness (AD-PSI-CA) -- 5.2 PSI-X with Element Distinctness (AD-PSI-X) -- 5.3 PSI-DT with Element Distinctness (AD-PSI-DT) -- 6 Completing Bounded-Size-Hiding-PSI -- 7 Authorized PSI with Element Distinctness -- 7.1 AD-APSI Definition -- 7.2 AD-APSI Construction -- 7.3 Security Analysis -- 8 Conclusion -- A Security Proof for AD-PSI-puzzle -- B AD-PSI Variants.
C Security Proof for AD-APSI -- References -- A New Approach to Efficient and Secure Fixed-Point Computation -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Work -- 1.2 Construction Blueprint -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 UC Functionalities -- 3 Truncation -- 3.1 RNS in MPC -- 3.2 Fixed-Point Arithmetic -- 4 The Construction -- 4.1 Preprocessing -- 4.2 Lifting -- 4.3 Probabilistic Truncation -- 4.4 Error Reduction -- 5 Efficiency -- 5.1 Implementation -- 5.2 Comparison with Related Techniques -- References -- Auditable Attribute-Based Credentials Scheme and Its Application in Contact Tracing -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 3 Auditable Attribute-Based Credentials Scheme -- 3.1 Auditable Public Keys -- 3.2 Formal Definitions of Auditable ABC -- 3.3 Our Constructions and Analysis -- 4 Application: Contact Tracing -- 4.1 An Auditable ABC-Based Construction -- 4.2 Security and Analysis -- 4.3 Implementation -- 5 Conclusion -- A The Necessity of Enhancing Contact Tracing Systems -- B The SPS-EQ Scheme from ch4spseqspspkc2022 -- C Extending the BLS Signature ch4bls01 with APK -- References -- Verification Protocol for Stable Matching from Conditional Disclosure of Secrets -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contribution -- 1.2 Applications -- 1.3 Organization -- 2 Related Works -- 2.1 Stable Matching -- 2.2 Conditional Disclosure of Secrets -- 2.3 Multi-client Verifiable Computation -- 3 Preliminaries -- 3.1 Stable Matching -- 3.2 Conditional Disclosure of Secrets -- 3.3 Multi-client Verifiable Computation -- 3.4 Secret Sharing -- 4 Proposed CDS Schemes -- 4.1 CDS Scheme for Unstable Matching -- 4.2 CDS Scheme for Stable Matching -- 4.3 Possible Improvements -- 5 Verification Protocol for Stable Matching -- 6 Implementation -- 7 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Non-malleable Fuzzy Extractors -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Results -- 1.2 Related Work -- 2 Preliminaries. 2.1 (Keyless) Fuzzy Extractors -- 2.2 Non-malleable Codes -- 3 Non-malleable Fuzzy Extractors -- 4 Construction -- 5 Fuzzy Tamper-Resilient Security -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Upgrading Fuzzy Extractors -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contribution -- 1.2 Related Work -- 1.3 Discussion and Future Work -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Entropy Definitions -- 2.2 Obfuscation Definitions -- 2.3 Fuzzy Extractors -- 3 Weakly-Private Fuzzy Extractors -- 3.1 Weakly Private FE from FE and MBCC Obfuscation -- 3.2 Weakly Private FE from Secure Sketch and MBCC Obfuscation -- 4 Robustness -- 5 Reuse -- A Privacy vs FE Security -- B Reusability from Composable MBCC Obfuscation -- References -- X-Lock: A Secure XOR-Based Fuzzy Extractor for Resource Constrained Devices -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Works -- 3 Background -- 4 X-Lock: Construction Details -- 5 X-Lock: Algorithm Analysis -- 5.1 Security Analysis -- 5.2 Bias and Correlation Analysis -- 5.3 Costs Analysis -- 6 Implementation and Comparison -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Encrypted Data -- Efficient Clustering on Encrypted Data -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Works -- 3 Background -- 3.1 Approximate Homomorphic Encryption CKKS -- 3.2 Newton's Method -- 4 System Architecture and Threat Model -- 4.1 System Architecture -- 4.2 Threat Model -- 4.3 Security -- 5 Fully Privacy-Preserving Clustering Scheme Based on FHE -- 5.1 Preliminaries -- 5.2 Ciphertext Comparison -- 5.3 Ciphertext Division -- 5.4 Converting the One-Hot Vectors to Label in Plaintexts -- 5.5 The Complete Algorithm for Privacy-Preserving Clustering -- 5.6 Security Proof -- 6 An Optimized Algorithm -- 6.1 Block Clustering Scheme -- 6.2 Block Clustering Scheme with Cluster Selection -- 7 Experiment Results -- 7.1 Experiment Setup -- 7.2 Clustering Accuracy -- 7.3 Run Time -- 7.4 Performance of Block Clustering Scheme with Cluster Selection. 8 Conclusions -- References -- Generic Construction of Forward Secure Public Key Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 PAEKS -- 2.2 0/1 Encodings -- 3 Definition of FS-PAEKS -- 4 Our Generic Construction of FS-PAEKS -- 5 Security Analysis -- 6 Vulnerability of the Jiang Et Al. FS-PAEKS Scheme -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Encryption Mechanisms for Receipt-Free and Perfectly Private Verifiable Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Our Contributions -- 1.2 Our Techniques -- 1.3 Related Work -- 1.4 Overview of Paper -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Assumptions and Primitives -- 2.2 Traceable Receipt-Free Encryption (TREnc) -- 2.3 Commitment Consistent Encryption (CCE) -- 3 The Construction of Our Scheme -- 3.1 Description -- 3.2 Verification Equations -- 3.3 Security Analysis -- 3.4 Efficiency -- 4 Application to E-Voting -- 4.1 Voting Scheme with a Homomorphic Tally -- 4.2 Voting Scheme with a Mixnet Tally -- 5 Conclusion -- A Scheme Description for Complex Ballots -- B Deferred Proofs -- B.1 Correctness -- B.2 Strong Randomizability -- B.3 TCCA Security -- B.4 Traceability -- B.5 Verifiability -- References -- Two-Party Decision Tree Training from Updatable Order-Revealing Encryption -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Work -- 1.2 Our Contribution -- 1.3 Outline -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 The Universal Composability Model -- 2.2 Order-Revealing Encryption -- 2.3 Decision Tree Training -- 3 Updatable Order-Revealing Encryption -- 4 Secure Decision Tree Training -- 4.1 Variations of the Training Process -- 4.2 Graceful Degradation Using Enclaves -- 5 Analysis of the Leakage -- 5.1 Leakage for Random Message Selection -- 5.2 Additional Leakage for Malicious Message Selection -- 5.3 Transformation for Non-uniform Distributions -- 6 Implementation and Evaluation -- 6.1 Evaluation of the Updatable ORE Scheme. 6.2 Evaluation of the Protocol -- 7 Conclusion -- A A Brief Introduction to the UC Framework -- References -- KIVR: Committing Authenticated Encryption Using Redundancy and Application to GCM, CCM, and More -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Research Challenges -- 1.2 Contributions -- 1.3 Organization -- 2 Preliminaries -- 3 Committing Security with Plaintext Redundancy -- 3.1 Plaintext with Redundancy -- 3.2 Definitions for Committing Security with Redundancy -- 4 KIVR Transform -- 4.1 Specification of KIVR -- 4.2 Security of KIVR -- 5 Committing Security of KIVR with CTR-Based AE -- 5.1 Specification of CTR-Based AE -- 5.2 CMT-4-Security of KIVR[CTRAE] -- 6 Proof of Theorem 1 -- 6.1 Tools -- 6.2 Symbol Definitions -- 6.3 Deriving the CMT-4-Security Bound -- 6.4 Bounding Pr[(C,T)=(C,T) coll] -- 7 Committing Security of KIVR with GCM, GCM-SIV, and CCM -- 7.1 Specifications of GCM, GCM-SIV, and CCM -- 7.2 CMT-4-Security of KIVR[GCM], KIVR[GCM-SIV], and KIVR[CCM] -- 7.3 Tightness of the CMT-4-Security of KIVR[GCM] and KIVR[GCM-SIV] -- 7.4 On the Tightness of CMT-4-Security of KIVR[CCM] -- 8 Committing Security of KIVR with CTR-HMAC -- 8.1 Specification of CTR-HMAC -- 8.2 CMT-4-Security Bound of KIVR[CTR-HMAC] -- 8.3 Tightness of the CMT-4-Security of KIVR[CTR-HMAC] -- 9 Conclusion -- A Multi-user Security for AE -- B Multi-user PRF Security -- C mu-AE Security of AE Schemes with KIVR -- D Proof of Theorem 2 for KIVR[GCM-SIV] -- E Proof of Theorem 3 -- References -- Signatures -- Subversion-Resilient Signatures Without Random Oracles -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Subversion-Resilient Signatures with Watchdogs -- 1.2 Technical Challenges -- 1.3 Our Contributions -- 1.4 Alternative Models -- 2 Model and Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notation and Model -- 2.2 Subversion-Resilience -- 2.3 Achieving Subversion-Resilience -- 2.4 Assumptions -- 2.5 Pseudorandom Functions. 3 Subversion-Resilient One-Way Functions. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910842286403321 |
| Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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