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Hold your nose and vote [[electronic resource] ] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / / prepared by Marco Pani
| Hold your nose and vote [[electronic resource] ] : why do some democracies tolerate corruption? / / prepared by Marco Pani |
| Autore | Pani Marco |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | [Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (34 p.) |
| Collana | IMF working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Political corruption
Democracy |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-4623-3559-4
1-4527-5814-X 9786612843037 1-4518-7230-5 1-282-84303-6 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910464234303321 |
Pani Marco
|
||
| [Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Hold Your Nose and Vote : : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? / / Marco Pani
| Hold Your Nose and Vote : : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? / / Marco Pani |
| Autore | Pani Marco |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (34 p.) |
| Collana | IMF Working Papers |
| Soggetto topico |
Political corruption
Democracy Budgeting Public Finance Taxation Political Economy Criminology Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General National Budget Budget Systems Corporate crime white-collar crime Public finance & taxation Political economy Budgeting & financial management Expenditure Tax incentives Budget planning and preparation Expenditures, Public Economics Budget |
| ISBN |
1-4623-3559-4
1-4527-5814-X 9786612843037 1-4518-7230-5 1-282-84303-6 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910788339703321 |
|
Pani Marco
|
||
| Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Hold Your Nose and Vote : : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? / / Marco Pani
| Hold Your Nose and Vote : : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? / / Marco Pani |
| Autore | Pani Marco |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (34 p.) |
| Disciplina | 332.152 |
| Collana | IMF Working Papers |
| Soggetto topico |
Political corruption
Democracy Budgeting Public Finance Taxation Political Economy Criminology Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General National Budget Budget Systems Corporate crime white-collar crime Public finance & taxation Political economy Budgeting & financial management Expenditure Tax incentives Budget planning and preparation Expenditures, Public Economics Budget |
| ISBN |
1-4623-3559-4
1-4527-5814-X 9786612843037 1-4518-7230-5 1-282-84303-6 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; References |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910825900703321 |
|
Pani Marco
|
||
| Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||