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Uncertain judgements [[electronic resource] ] : eliciting experts' probabilities / / Anthony O'Hagan ... [et al.]
Uncertain judgements [[electronic resource] ] : eliciting experts' probabilities / / Anthony O'Hagan ... [et al.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa London ; ; Hoboken, NJ, : Wiley, c2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (339 p.)
Disciplina 519.54
Altri autori (Persone) O'HaganAnthony
Collana Statistics in practice
Soggetto topico Probabilities
Statistics
Distribution (Probability theory)
Mathematical statistics
Bayesian statistical decision theory
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-280-64887-2
9786610648870
0-470-03331-2
0-470-03330-4
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Uncertain Judgements; Contents; Preface; 1 Fundamentals of Probability and Judgement; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Probability and elicitation; 1.2.1 Probability; 1.2.2 Random variables and probability distributions; 1.2.3 Summaries of distributions; 1.2.4 Joint distributions; 1.2.5 Bayes' Theorem; 1.2.6 Elicitation; 1.3 Uncertainty and the interpretation of probability; 1.3.1 Aleatory and epistemic uncertainty; 1.3.2 Frequency and personal probabilities; 1.3.3 An extended example; 1.3.4 Implications for elicitation; 1.4 Elicitation and the psychology of judgement
1.4.1 Judgement - absolute or relative?1.4.2 Beyond perception; 1.4.3 Implications for elicitation; 1.5 Of what use are such judgements?; 1.5.1 Normative theories of probability; 1.5.2 Coherence; 1.5.3 Do elicited probabilities have the desired interpretation?; 1.6 Conclusions; 1.6.1 Elicitation practice; 1.6.2 Research questions; 2 The Elicitation Context; 2.1 How and who?; 2.1.1 Choice of format; 2.1.2 What is an expert?; 2.2 The elicitation process; 2.2.1 Roles within the elicitation process; 2.2.2 A model for the elicitation process; 2.3 Conventions in Chapters 3 to 9; 2.4 Conclusions
2.4.1 Elicitation practice2.4.2 Research question; 3 The Psychology of Judgement Under Uncertainty; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Why psychology?; 3.1.2 Chapter overview; 3.2 Understanding the task and the expert; 3.2.1 Cognitive capabilities: the proper view of human information processing?; 3.2.2 Constructive processes: the proper view of the process?; 3.3 Understanding research on human judgement; 3.3.1 Experts versus the rest: the proper focus of research?; 3.3.2 Early research on subjective probability: 'conservatism' in Bayesian probability revision
3.4 The heuristics and biases research programme3.4.1 Availability; 3.4.2 Representativeness; 3.4.3 Do frequency representations remove the biases attributed to availability and representativeness?; 3.4.4 Anchoring-and-adjusting; 3.4.5 Support theory; 3.4.6 The affect heuristic; 3.4.7 Critique of the heuristics and biases approach; 3.5 Experts and expertise; 3.5.1 The heuristics and biases approach; 3.5.2 The cognitive science approach; 3.5.3 'The middle way'; 3.6 Three meta-theories of judgement; 3.6.1 The cognitive continuum; 3.6.2 The inside versus the outside view
3.6.3 The naive intuitive statistician metaphor3.7 Conclusions; 3.7.1 Elicitation practice; 3.7.2 Research questions; 4 The Elicitation of Probabilities; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The calibration of subjective probabilities; 4.2.1 Research methods in calibration research; 4.2.2 Calibration research: general findings; 4.2.3 Calibration research in applied settings; 4.2.4 A case study in probability judgement: calibration research in medicine; 4.3 The calibration of subjective probabilities: theories and explanations; 4.3.1 Explanations of probability judgement in calibration tasks
4.3.2 Theories of the calibration of subjective probabilities
Record Nr. UNINA-9910143589203321
London ; ; Hoboken, NJ, : Wiley, c2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Uncertain judgements [[electronic resource] ] : eliciting experts' probabilities / / Anthony O'Hagan ... [et al.]
Uncertain judgements [[electronic resource] ] : eliciting experts' probabilities / / Anthony O'Hagan ... [et al.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa London ; ; Hoboken, NJ, : Wiley, c2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (339 p.)
Disciplina 519.54
Altri autori (Persone) O'HaganAnthony
Collana Statistics in practice
Soggetto topico Probabilities
Statistics
Distribution (Probability theory)
Mathematical statistics
Bayesian statistical decision theory
ISBN 1-280-64887-2
9786610648870
0-470-03331-2
0-470-03330-4
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Uncertain Judgements; Contents; Preface; 1 Fundamentals of Probability and Judgement; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Probability and elicitation; 1.2.1 Probability; 1.2.2 Random variables and probability distributions; 1.2.3 Summaries of distributions; 1.2.4 Joint distributions; 1.2.5 Bayes' Theorem; 1.2.6 Elicitation; 1.3 Uncertainty and the interpretation of probability; 1.3.1 Aleatory and epistemic uncertainty; 1.3.2 Frequency and personal probabilities; 1.3.3 An extended example; 1.3.4 Implications for elicitation; 1.4 Elicitation and the psychology of judgement
1.4.1 Judgement - absolute or relative?1.4.2 Beyond perception; 1.4.3 Implications for elicitation; 1.5 Of what use are such judgements?; 1.5.1 Normative theories of probability; 1.5.2 Coherence; 1.5.3 Do elicited probabilities have the desired interpretation?; 1.6 Conclusions; 1.6.1 Elicitation practice; 1.6.2 Research questions; 2 The Elicitation Context; 2.1 How and who?; 2.1.1 Choice of format; 2.1.2 What is an expert?; 2.2 The elicitation process; 2.2.1 Roles within the elicitation process; 2.2.2 A model for the elicitation process; 2.3 Conventions in Chapters 3 to 9; 2.4 Conclusions
2.4.1 Elicitation practice2.4.2 Research question; 3 The Psychology of Judgement Under Uncertainty; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Why psychology?; 3.1.2 Chapter overview; 3.2 Understanding the task and the expert; 3.2.1 Cognitive capabilities: the proper view of human information processing?; 3.2.2 Constructive processes: the proper view of the process?; 3.3 Understanding research on human judgement; 3.3.1 Experts versus the rest: the proper focus of research?; 3.3.2 Early research on subjective probability: 'conservatism' in Bayesian probability revision
3.4 The heuristics and biases research programme3.4.1 Availability; 3.4.2 Representativeness; 3.4.3 Do frequency representations remove the biases attributed to availability and representativeness?; 3.4.4 Anchoring-and-adjusting; 3.4.5 Support theory; 3.4.6 The affect heuristic; 3.4.7 Critique of the heuristics and biases approach; 3.5 Experts and expertise; 3.5.1 The heuristics and biases approach; 3.5.2 The cognitive science approach; 3.5.3 'The middle way'; 3.6 Three meta-theories of judgement; 3.6.1 The cognitive continuum; 3.6.2 The inside versus the outside view
3.6.3 The naive intuitive statistician metaphor3.7 Conclusions; 3.7.1 Elicitation practice; 3.7.2 Research questions; 4 The Elicitation of Probabilities; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The calibration of subjective probabilities; 4.2.1 Research methods in calibration research; 4.2.2 Calibration research: general findings; 4.2.3 Calibration research in applied settings; 4.2.4 A case study in probability judgement: calibration research in medicine; 4.3 The calibration of subjective probabilities: theories and explanations; 4.3.1 Explanations of probability judgement in calibration tasks
4.3.2 Theories of the calibration of subjective probabilities
Record Nr. UNINA-9910831049703321
London ; ; Hoboken, NJ, : Wiley, c2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Uncertain judgements : eliciting experts' probabilities / / Anthony O'Hagan ... [et al.]
Uncertain judgements : eliciting experts' probabilities / / Anthony O'Hagan ... [et al.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa London ; ; Hoboken, NJ, : Wiley, c2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (339 p.)
Disciplina 519.54
Altri autori (Persone) O'HaganAnthony
Collana Statistics in practice
Soggetto topico Probabilities
Statistics
Distribution (Probability theory)
Mathematical statistics
Bayesian statistical decision theory
ISBN 9786610648870
9781280648878
1280648872
9780470033319
0470033312
9780470033302
0470033304
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Uncertain Judgements; Contents; Preface; 1 Fundamentals of Probability and Judgement; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Probability and elicitation; 1.2.1 Probability; 1.2.2 Random variables and probability distributions; 1.2.3 Summaries of distributions; 1.2.4 Joint distributions; 1.2.5 Bayes' Theorem; 1.2.6 Elicitation; 1.3 Uncertainty and the interpretation of probability; 1.3.1 Aleatory and epistemic uncertainty; 1.3.2 Frequency and personal probabilities; 1.3.3 An extended example; 1.3.4 Implications for elicitation; 1.4 Elicitation and the psychology of judgement
1.4.1 Judgement - absolute or relative?1.4.2 Beyond perception; 1.4.3 Implications for elicitation; 1.5 Of what use are such judgements?; 1.5.1 Normative theories of probability; 1.5.2 Coherence; 1.5.3 Do elicited probabilities have the desired interpretation?; 1.6 Conclusions; 1.6.1 Elicitation practice; 1.6.2 Research questions; 2 The Elicitation Context; 2.1 How and who?; 2.1.1 Choice of format; 2.1.2 What is an expert?; 2.2 The elicitation process; 2.2.1 Roles within the elicitation process; 2.2.2 A model for the elicitation process; 2.3 Conventions in Chapters 3 to 9; 2.4 Conclusions
2.4.1 Elicitation practice2.4.2 Research question; 3 The Psychology of Judgement Under Uncertainty; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Why psychology?; 3.1.2 Chapter overview; 3.2 Understanding the task and the expert; 3.2.1 Cognitive capabilities: the proper view of human information processing?; 3.2.2 Constructive processes: the proper view of the process?; 3.3 Understanding research on human judgement; 3.3.1 Experts versus the rest: the proper focus of research?; 3.3.2 Early research on subjective probability: 'conservatism' in Bayesian probability revision
3.4 The heuristics and biases research programme3.4.1 Availability; 3.4.2 Representativeness; 3.4.3 Do frequency representations remove the biases attributed to availability and representativeness?; 3.4.4 Anchoring-and-adjusting; 3.4.5 Support theory; 3.4.6 The affect heuristic; 3.4.7 Critique of the heuristics and biases approach; 3.5 Experts and expertise; 3.5.1 The heuristics and biases approach; 3.5.2 The cognitive science approach; 3.5.3 'The middle way'; 3.6 Three meta-theories of judgement; 3.6.1 The cognitive continuum; 3.6.2 The inside versus the outside view
3.6.3 The naive intuitive statistician metaphor3.7 Conclusions; 3.7.1 Elicitation practice; 3.7.2 Research questions; 4 The Elicitation of Probabilities; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The calibration of subjective probabilities; 4.2.1 Research methods in calibration research; 4.2.2 Calibration research: general findings; 4.2.3 Calibration research in applied settings; 4.2.4 A case study in probability judgement: calibration research in medicine; 4.3 The calibration of subjective probabilities: theories and explanations; 4.3.1 Explanations of probability judgement in calibration tasks
4.3.2 Theories of the calibration of subjective probabilities
Record Nr. UNINA-9911020096703321
London ; ; Hoboken, NJ, : Wiley, c2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui