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| Autore: |
Herrera Dappe Matías
|
| Titolo: |
Off the books : understanding and mitigating the fiscal risks of infrastructure
|
| Pubblicazione: | New York : , : World Bank Publications, , 2023 |
| ©2023 | |
| Edizione: | 1st ed. |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (179 pages) |
| Disciplina: | 363 |
| Soggetto topico: | Infrastructure (Economics) - Finance |
| Capitalism | |
| Altri autori: |
FosterVivien
MusacchioAldo
Ter-MinassianTeresa
|
| Nota di contenuto: | Front Cover -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- About the Authors -- Main Messages -- Abbreviations -- Overview: Key Findings and Policy Recommendations -- What are the main sources of fiscal risks from infrastructure? -- Off-budget modalities drain public finances more often and on a larger scale than usually assumed -- Inefficiencies in public provision lead to fiscal surprises in the near, medium, and long term -- When it rains, it pours: Fiscal risks from infrastructure during bad times -- Implementing a reform agenda can create sustainable fiscal space for infrastructure -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 1: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Fiscal Risks from Infrastructure -- Main Messages -- Introduction -- Fiscal Risks from Infrastructure -- In Sum -- References -- Chapter 2: Fiscal Risks Associated with Direct Public Provision of Infrastructure -- Main Messages -- Introduction -- Near-Term Risk of OVERSPENDING on Infrastructure Projects -- Medium-Term Risk of Unanticipated Capital Expenditure on Infrastructure -- Long-Term Risks of Economic Underperformance from the Squeezing of Public Spending on Infrastructure -- In Sum -- Note -- References -- Chapter 3: Fiscal Risks and Costs of State-Owned Enterprises -- Main Messages -- Introduction -- Size, Performance, and Cost Structure as Sources of Fiscal Risk in SOEs -- Performance of SOEs versus Performance of Similar Private Firms -- SOEs and Fiscal Risk: Slow Drip or Tail Risk? -- Predicting Fiscal Risks -- Capacity of SOEs to Deal with Shocks -- In Sum -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: Fiscal Risks and Costs of Public-Private Partnerships -- Main Messages -- Introduction -- Guarantees -- Renegotiation of PPPs -- Early Termination of PPPs -- Frameworks for Managing Fiscal Risks from PPPs -- In Sum -- Notes -- References. |
| Chapter 5: A Reform Agenda to Create Sustainable Fiscal Space for Infrastructure -- Main Messages -- Introduction -- Integrated Management of Fiscal Resources and Risks -- Efficient Direct Public Provision of Infrastructure -- Effective Fiscal and Corporate Governance of SOEs -- A Robust PPP Framework -- In Sum -- Notes -- References -- Appendix A: Main Data Sources Used in the Report -- Appendix B: The World Bank Infrastructure SOEs Database -- Appendix C: Methodology Used to Compare the Performance of SOEs and Similar Private Firms -- Appendix D: Big Bang versus Frequent Small-Drip Events -- Appendix E: Methodology Used to Compare SOEs That Suffered a Negative Shock as a Result of the Decline in Oil and Gas Prices with a Control Group of SOEs -- Appendix F: Methodology for Estimating Fiscal Risks from Early Termination -- Boxes -- Box O.1 Sectoral features affecting the size and profile of fiscal risks from SOEs -- Box O.2 Sectoral features affecting the size and profile of fiscal risks from PPPs -- Box 2.1 Using data envelopment analysis to assess the efficiency of spending -- Box 3.1 Sensitivity of profitability of infrastructure SOEs in Indonesia and Kenya to changes in fuel costs and demand -- Box 3.2 A taxonomy of fiscal injections to SOEs -- Box 3.3 Predicting fiscal injections to SOEs -- Box 4.1 Termination clauses of PPPs favorable to the private party -- Box 4.2 Countries included in the analysis -- Box 5.1 Calculating the costs of quasi-fiscal operations -- Box 5.2 What is the PFRAM? -- Figures -- Figure O.1 Share of capital spending on infrastructure in developing countries, by modality, 2009-18 -- Figure O.2 Sources of fiscal costs and risks associated with provision of infrastructure -- Figure O.3 Distribution of fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs. | |
| Figure O.4 Average annual fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs, 2008-19, by country -- Figure BO.1.1 Fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs by sector, 2009-18 -- Figure BO.1.2 Size distribution of fiscal injections in the transport and power sectors -- Figure BO.1.3 Return on average assets of infrastructure SOEs, with and without adjustment for operations subsidies, by sector -- Figure O.5 Costs of renegotiation of PPPs in Chile and Peru -- Figure O.6 Number of early terminations of PPPs in developing countries, 1990-2020 -- Figure O.7 Fiscal risks from early termination of PPPs in selected countries -- Figure BO.2.1 Fiscal risks from early termination of electricity and transport PPPs -- Figure O.8 Share of capital spending in the power and transport sectors, by modality, 2009-18 -- Figure O.9 Increase in fiscal risks from early termination of PPPs associated with a profound macro-financial shock -- Figure O.10 Building blocks of a reform agenda to mitigate fiscal risks from infrastructure -- Figure 1.1 Sources of fiscal costs and risks associated with the provision of infrastructure -- Figure 2.1 Fiscal risks associated with direct public provision of infrastructure -- Figure 2.2 Budget execution rates for public investment in infrastructure, 2010-18 -- Figure 2.3 Productivity and technological and efficiency change in road expenditure -- Figure 2.4 Distribution of governance scores for quality of public investment management of infrastructure projects across 33 developing countries -- Figure 2.5 Capital bias in public expenditure on roads, 2006-18 -- Figure 2.6 Historic infrastructure spending and projected infrastructure investment financing gap, by region -- Figure 2.7 Government budgetary expenditure on infrastructure, by country income level and sector, 2010-20. | |
| Figure 2.8 GDP per capita and total infrastructure expenditure per capita in low- and middle-income countries, 2006-20 -- F igure 3.1 Shares of spending by infrastructure SOEs, 2009-18 -- Figure 3.2 Fiscal risks from infrastructure SOEs -- Figure 3.3 Average operating expenses of infrastructure SOEs in selected countries -- Figure 3.4 Assets of infrastructure SOEs in selected countries -- Figure 3.5 Return on average assets of infrastructure SOEs, with and without adjustment for operations subsidies, by sector -- Figure 3.6 Percent of infrastructure SOEs generating losses before receiving subsidies, by sector, 2009-18 -- Figure 3.7 Costs of infrastructure SOEs, by type of cost and sector -- Figure 3.8 Employment costs as a share of revenues by fully owned and partially privatized infrastructure SOEs, by sector -- Figure 3.9 Adjusted net income as percent of GDP in the power and railway sectors, by country -- Figure 3.10 Comparison of size and performance of infrastructure SOEs and similar private firms using matching techniques -- Figure 3.11 Average fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs, by sector -- Figure 3.12 Fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs, at the sectoral and country level -- Figure 3.13 Average fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs in 2009-18, by country and type of support -- Figure 3.14 Average fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs in 2009-18, by sector -- Figure 3.15 Predicted fiscal injections to infrastructure SOEs based on estimated Z″ scores -- Figure 3.16 Impact of a negative macroeconomic shock on infrastructure SOEs -- Figure 4.1 Total investment in PPPs in the developing world, 1990-2021 -- Figure 4.2 Share of capital spending through PPPs, 2009-18 -- Figure 4.3 Fiscal risks from PPPs -- Figure 4.4 Actual and expected payments for minimum revenue guarantees in Chile, as percent of GDP, 2003-21. | |
| Figure 4.5 Fiscal costs of minimum revenue guarantees of road PPPs as percent of GDP in Türkiye, 2017-21 -- Figure 4.6 Costs of renegotiation of PPPs in Chile, 1997-2020 -- Figure 4.7 Annual fiscal costs of renegotiation of PPPs in Peru, 2006-20 -- Figure 4.8 Number of renegotiated fixed- and variable-term contracts in Chile during construction and costs of renegotiations, before and after the 2010 reform -- Figure 4.9 Renegotiation costs in Chile during first six years of operation, before and after the 2010 reform, by sector -- Figure 4.10 Number of early terminations of PPPs in developing countries, 1990-2020 -- Figure 4.11 Impact of sector, type, and size of project on probability of early termination of PPPs -- Figure 4.12 Impact of contract features on probability of early termination of PPPs -- Figure 4.13 Impact of country-level characteristics and shocks on probability of early termination of PPPs -- Figure B4.2.1 Size of PPP portfolios as a percent of GDP in selected developing countries, as of the end of 2021 -- Figure 4.14 Fiscal risks from early termination of PPPs as a percent of GDP in selected countries -- Figure 4.15 Cumulative low, medium, and high fiscal risks from early termination of PPP portfolio as a percent of GDP in selected countries, 2022-26 -- Figure 4.16 Fiscal risks from early termination of PPP portfolio as a percent of government revenue in selected countries -- Figure 4.17 Increase in fiscal risks from early termination of PPP portfolio associated with a profound macro-financial shock -- Figure 4.18 Percent of countries with systems for budgeting, reporting, and accounting for PPP liabilities -- Figure 4.19 Percent of countries requiring approval by ministry of finance or other third-party government entity over the PPP project lifecycle. | |
| Figure 4.20 Percent of countries requiring assessment of selected aspect of PPP projects during planning and using established methodology for assessment. | |
| Sommario/riassunto: | Developing countries face massive infrastructure needs, but public spending on infrastructure is inadequate, and public investment has been declining in recent years. Rising debt levels and tightening fiscal and monetary conditions are putting further pressure on the funds available for infrastructure, heightening the importance of increasing the efficiency of infrastructure spending. This publication shows that however governments deliver infrastructure-- through direct public provision, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or public-private partnerships (PPPs), the risk of fiscal surprises is high in both good times and bad. As a result, infrastructure service delivery often ends up costing significantly more than expected, eroding limited fiscal space for productive spending. This book makes a unique contribution by quantifying the magnitude and prevalence of fiscal risks from electricity and transport infrastructure and identifying their root causes across a range of low- and middle-income countries. Drawing on important new sources of evidence and compiling many others, the analysis sheds light on how much is at stake in the good governance of infrastructure sectors. It allows policy makers to weigh the magnitudes of different types of risks and examine how they vary across contexts. Off the Books shows how a deeper understanding of the fiscal risks of infrastructure can help policy makers target reforms to areas where they can be expected to have the greatest impact. It lays out a reform agenda for mitigating the fiscal risks associated with infrastructure based on building government capacity; adopting integrated public investment management and integrated fiscal risk management; improving fiscal and corporate governance of SOEs; and ensuring robust PPP preparation, procurement, and contract management. The book will be of enormous value to policy makers, practitioners, and academics who have an interest in infrastructure and fiscal policy. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Off the books ![]() |
| ISBN: | 9781464819384 |
| 9781464819377 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910838329303321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |