Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia |
Autore | Choi Pak-Sing |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (304 pages) |
Disciplina | 381.17 |
Collana | Springer Texts in Business and Economics |
Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Auction theory |
ISBN | 3-030-69575-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Organization of the Book -- How to Use This Book -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1 Second-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #1.1: Second-Price Auction with Complete InformationA -- Exercise #1.2: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #1.3: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information and Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #1.4: Robustness of Equilibrium Bidding in the Second-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #1.5: Efficiency in Second-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #1.6: Bidding Behavior in the English AuctionA -- Exercise #1.7: Expected Revenue in the Second-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #1.8: Second-Price Auctions with Reservation PricesA -- Exercise #1.9: Second-Price Auctions with Entry FeesB -- Exercise #1.10: Asymmetric Bidding Equilibria in the Second-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #1.11: Collusion in Second-Price Auctions, Based on GrahamandMarshall1987A -- Exercise #1.12: Second-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 2 First-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #2.1: First-Price Auction Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #2.2: First-Price Auction with Only Two Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.3: First-Price Auction with N≥2 Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.4: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #2.5: First-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #2.6: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #2.7: Efficiency in First-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #2.8: The First-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.9: The Second-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.10: The kth-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #2.11: Bidding Behavior in the Dutch AuctionA.
3 First-Price Auctions: Extensions -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Direct ProofB -- Exercise #3.2: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Proof Using the First-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #3.3: Expected Payment in the First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #3.4: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-An IntroductionA -- Exercise #3.5: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-General SettingB -- Exercise #3.6: Efficiency with Risk AversionA -- Exercise #3.7: First-Price Auction with Asymmetrically Distributed ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.8: Sequential Version of the First-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #3.9: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-One BidderA -- Exercise #3.10: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-Several BiddersC -- Exercise #3.11: First-Price Auction with Entry FeesC -- Exercise #3.12: First-Price Auction with Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.13: Collusion in First-Price Auctions, Based on McAfeeandMcMillan1992B -- Exercise #3.14: First-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 4 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: All-Pay Auction Under Complete Information, Based on Bayeetal1996B -- Exercise #4.2: Testing a Bidding Function in a First-Price, All-Pay AuctionA -- Exercise #4.3: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #4.4: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #4.5: Efficiency in All-Pay AuctionsA -- Exercise #4.6: Finding the Expected Revenue in the First-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.7: Finding Equilibrium Bids in the Second-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.8: War of AttritionA. Exercise #4.9: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Neutral Bidders, Based on KimandChe2014B -- Exercise #4.10: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Averse Bidders, Based on OrozcoAlemanandMunozGarcia2011B -- 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Third-Price Auction, A Numerical ExampleA -- Exercise #5.2: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.3: Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #5.4: kth-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.5: Efficiency in kth-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #5.6: Lottery Auction, An IntroductionA -- Exercise #5.7: Lottery Auction, A More General ApproachB -- Exercise #5.8: Efficiency in Lottery AuctionsA -- 6 The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Revenue Comparison in Four Auction FormatsA -- Exercise #6.2: Revenue Comparison Between First- and Second-Price AuctionsB -- Exercise #6.3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse BiddersA -- Exercise #6.4: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse SellersB -- Exercise #6.5: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Short ProofB -- Exercise #6.6: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Longer ProofC -- 7 Common-Value Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: The Winner's Curse in Common-Value Auctions-IntroductionA -- Exercise #7.2: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with Two BiddersB -- Exercise #7.3: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with N≥2 BiddersC -- Exercise #7.4: First-Price Auction When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.5: Second-Price Auction When Bidders have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.6: Revenue Comparison in Auctions When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- 8 Multi-Unit Auctions -- Introduction. Exercise #8.1: First-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Discriminatory Auction)A -- Exercise #8.2: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Uniform-Price Auction)A -- Exercise #8.3: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units, Allowing for Different PricesB -- Exercise #8.4: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #8.5: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a Second-Price AuctionA -- 9 Mechanism Design -- Introduction -- Exercise #9.1: Incentives to Truthfully Reveal ValuationsA -- Exercise #9.2: First-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation MechanismB -- Exercise #9.3: Second-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism A -- Exercise #9.4: VCG Mechanism Selling a Single UnitB -- Exercise #9.5: VCG Mechanism Selling Several UnitsB -- Exercise #9.6: VCG Mechanism and the Generalized Second-Price AuctionB -- 10 Procurement Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #10.1: Procurement Auctions Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #10.2: Procurement Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #10.3: Procurement Auctions with External Effects, Based on Choietal2018 C -- Exercise #10.4: Procurement Auctions with Perfect MonitoringB -- Exercise #10.5: Procurement Auctions with Imperfect MonitoringC -- A Game Theory Appendix -- Background -- Dominated Strategies -- Nash Equilibrium -- Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- References -- Index. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910483346303321 |
Choi Pak-Sing
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Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] | ||
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Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Industrial Organization : Practice Exercises with Answer Keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, and Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
Autore | Choi Pak-Sing |
Edizione | [Second edition.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2023] |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (680 pages) |
Disciplina | 354.81150006 |
Collana | Springer Texts in Business and Economics Series |
Soggetto topico | Industrial organization (Economic theory) |
ISBN | 3-031-38635-3 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- 1 Monopoly -- Introduction -- Exercise #1.1: Monopoly with Linear CostsA -- Exercise #1.2: Monopoly with Convex CostsA -- Exercise #1.3: Monopolist with Linear Inverse Demand and Generic Cost FunctionB -- Exercise #1.4: Convex, Concave, and Linear Demand in MonopolyC -- Exercise #1.5: Maximizing Revenue or Maximizing Profit?A -- Exercise #1.6: Learning-by-Doing and Commitment in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.7: Monopolist Serving Two Interdependent MarketsB -- Exercise #1.8: Multiplant Monopolist-IA -- Exercise #1.9: Multiplant Monopolist-IIB -- Exercise #1.10: Ramsey PricingB -- Exercise #1.11: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IA -- Exercise #1.12: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IIA -- Exercise #1.13: Geographical Price DiscriminationB -- Exercise #1.14: Two-Part PricingA -- Exercise #1.15: Monopoly Facing Entry Threats - Based on Tirole1988C -- Exercise #1.16: Multiproduct Monopoly with Economies of ScopeB -- Exercise #1.17: Vertical Differentiation and Natural MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.18: Persuasive Advertising in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.19: Informative Advertising in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.20: Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in Monopoly - Based on Fudenberg2007 and Armstrong2007B -- 2 Simultaneous Quantity Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #2.1: Cournot Duopoly with Symmetric CostsA -- Exercise #2.2: Cournot Duopoly - Necessary and Sufficient ConditionsB -- Exercise #2.3: Cournot Oligopoly with Three Symmetric FirmsA -- Exercise #2.4: Cournot Oligopoly with N≥2 Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #2.5: Comparing Equilibrium and Socially Optimal Outputs Under Cournot CompetitionB -- Exercise #2.6: Cournot Pricing Formula - DerivationA -- Exercise #2.7: Cournot Pricing Formula - ApplicationA -- Exercise #2.8: Cournot Pricing Formula - Parametric ExampleA.
Exercise #2.9: Cournot Duopoly with Asymmetric Marginal CostsA -- Exercise #2.10: Cournot Competition with n Firms Facing Asymmetric CostsC -- Exercise #2.11: Cournot with Only One Firm Benefiting from a Cost AdvantageB -- Exercise #2.12: Social Welfare with Cost-Symmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.13: Cournot Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #2.14: Cournot Competition with N≥2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #2.15: Cournot Competition with N≥2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: MergerB -- Exercise #2.16: Cournot Competition with N≥2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: Merger IncentivesB -- Exercise #2.17: Social Welfare with Cost-Asymmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.18: Entry that Reduces Aggregate OutputA -- Exercise #2.19: Cournot with Asymmetric Fixed CostsB -- Exercise #2.20: Can Fewer Firms Decrease Prices?B -- Exercise #2.21: Cournot with Equity Shares - Based on Reynolds1986B -- Exercise #2.22: Cournot Competition Between a Private and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.23: Cournot Competition Between N Private Firms and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.24: Managerial Incentives in Cournot - Based on Fershtman1987C -- Exercise #2.25: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #2.26: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #2.27: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIIC -- Exercise #2.28: Cournot Competition When Firms Are Asymmetrically Informed of Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #2.29: Nonlinear Pricing in Oligopoly - Based on Harrison2001C -- 3 Simultaneous Price Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Symmetric CostsA. Exercise #3.2: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Asymmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.3: Price Competition with Price-Matching GuaranteesB -- Exercise #3.4: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Symmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.5: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Asymmetric CostsB -- Exercise #3.6: Price Competition with Homogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsC -- Exercise #3.7: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsB -- Exercise #3.8: Entry-Deterring PricesC -- Exercise #3.9: Using Capacity Constraints to Reconcile Bertrand and Cournot ModelsC -- Exercise #3.10: Generalized Hotelling ModelA -- Exercise #3.11: Hotelling Model of Horizontal Product DifferentiationA -- Exercise #3.12: Hotelling with Asymmetric Transportation CostsB -- Exercise #3.13: Socially Optimal Location in Hotelling ModelB -- Exercise #3.14: Hotelling with Non-uniformly Distributed Consumers.C -- Exercise #3.15: Salop Circle of Horizontal Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #3.16: Horizontal Differentiation in Two Dimensions, Based on Irmean1998C -- Exercise #3.17: Vertical Differentiation, Quality Choice, and Price CompetitionB -- Exercise #3.18: Products Horizontally and Vertically DifferentiatedC -- 4 Sequential Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: Stackelberg Competition with Two Symmetric FirmsA -- Exercise #4.2: Stackelberg Competition with Three Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.3: Stackelberg Competition with Two Asymmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.4: Stackelberg Competition, General PresentationC -- Exercise #4.5: Stackelberg Competition Between a Private Leader and a Public FollowerB -- Exercise #4.6: Stackelberg Competition Between a Public Leader and a Private FollowerB -- Exercise #4.7: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information - Uninformed LeaderB. Exercise #4.8: Stackelberg with Demand Shocks, Based on Liu2005B -- Exercise #4.9: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information - Uninformed FollowerC -- Exercise #4.10: Hybrid Competition - Leader Choosing Output and Follower Choosing PriceB -- Exercise #4.11: Stackelberg Competition with m Leaders, Based on Huck2001C -- Exercise #4.12: Sequential Price Competition with Homogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #4.13: Sequential Price Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsB -- Exercise #4.14: Committing in Prices or Quantities, Based on Singh1984B -- Exercise #4.15: Strategic Pre-commitment by Only One Firm Followed by Cournot Competition, Based on Fudenberg1984B -- Exercise #4.16: Strategic Pre-commitment by Only One Firm Followed by Bertrand CompetitionB -- Exercise #4.17: Strategic Pre-commitment by Both FirmsB -- 5 Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #5.2: Regulating a Polluting MonopolyB -- Exercise #5.3: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAA -- Exercise #5.4: Regulating a Natural MonopolistA -- Exercise #5.5: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #5.6: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #5.7: Regulating a Cournot OligopolyA -- Exercise #5.8: Regulating a Polluting Cournot OligopolyB -- Exercise #5.9: Regulating a Polluting Cournot Oligopoly Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAB -- Exercise #5.10: Regulating Polluting Firms That Compete à la StackelbergB -- Exercise #5.11: Endogenous Entry DecisionsB -- Exercise #5.12: Tax Incidence in MonopolyC -- 6 R& -- D Incentives -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Incentives to Innovate Under MonopolyA -- Exercise #6.2: Quantity Competition: More Incentives to Innovate Than Under Monopoly?B. Exercise #6.3: Price Competition: Less Incentives to Innovate Under Monopoly?B -- Exercise #6.4: Larger R& -- D Under Monopoly or Duopoly? Welfare EvaluationC -- Exercise #6.5: More Competitive Industries and R& -- D InvestmentC -- Exercise #6.6: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- DB -- Exercise #6.7: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- D When Firms Compete in PricesB -- Exercise #6.8: Spillover Effects in R& -- D InvestmentB -- Exercise #6.9: Two Firms Sequentially Developing New ProductsB -- Exercise #6.10: Green Innovation, Based on Lambertini2017C -- Exercise #6.11: Incentives to Innovate in Cournot, Based on Delbono1991C -- Exercise #6.12: Cost-Reducing Investments That Accommodate EntryB -- Exercise #6.13: Cost-Reducing Investments That Deter EntryB -- Exercise #6.14: Is Entry Deterrence Profitable?B -- Exercise #6.15: Optimal Patent Length, Based on Takalo2001C -- Exercise #6.16: Optimal Patent Length, An ApplicationB -- 7 Mergers -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: Mergers Between Two FirmsA -- Exercise #7.2: Mergers Between n≥2 Firms, Based on Salant1983B -- Exercise #7.3: Unsustainable MergersA -- Exercise #7.4: Bertrand Mergers with Differentiated ProductsB -- Exercise #7.5: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Symmetric CostsB -- Exercise #7.6: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Asymmetric Costs, Based on Gelves2014C -- Exercise #7.7: Cartels with SynergiesB -- Exercise #7.8: Merger to Gain Economies of ScopeB -- Exercise #7.9: Merger to Gain Stackelberg LeadershipB -- Exercise #7.10: Merger Between a Leader and Follower, Based on Huck2001C -- Exercise #7.11: The ``Tragedy of the Anticommons,'' Heller1998B -- Exercise #7.12: Mergers in Polluting Markets, Based on Fikru2016C -- 8 Collusion -- Introduction -- Exercise #8.1: Collusion with Two Firms Competing à la CournotB. Exercise #8.2: Collusion with n Firms Competing à la CournotC. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910766882903321 |
Choi Pak-Sing
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Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2023] | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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