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A companion to Donald Davidson [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Ernie Lepore, Kirk Ludwig
A companion to Donald Davidson [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Ernie Lepore, Kirk Ludwig
Pubbl/distr/stampa Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., : Wiley-Blackwell, c2013
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xiii, 615 p.)
Disciplina 191
Altri autori (Persone) LeporeErnie
LudwigKirk
Collana Blackwell companions to philosophy
ISBN 1-118-32838-8
1-118-32833-7
1-118-32840-X
1-118-32827-2
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. UNINA-9910208837503321
Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., : Wiley-Blackwell, c2013
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
A companion to Donald Davidson / / edited by Ernie Lepore, Kirk Ludwig
A companion to Donald Davidson / / edited by Ernie Lepore, Kirk Ludwig
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., : Wiley-Blackwell, c2013
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xiii, 615 p.)
Disciplina 191
Altri autori (Persone) LeporeErnie
LudwigKirk
Collana Blackwell companions to philosophy
ISBN 1-118-32838-8
1-118-32833-7
1-118-32840-X
1-118-32827-2
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Life and Work -- Life, Early Career, and the First Phrase of Davidson's Work through 1969 -- Second Phrase of Davidson's Work, 1970-1981 -- Third Phase of Davidson's Work from the 1980s On -- Organization and Contents of the Volume -- Bibliography -- Part I: Action Theory -- 1: Action Explanation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Actions and Their Rationalization -- 3. Davidson's Challenge and the Problem of Wayward Causal Chains -- 4. The Logical Connection Argument -- 5. Reasons as Causes? -- 6. The Role of Laws in Action Explanations and the Causal Relevance of Mental Properties -- 7. Singular Causal Statements and Causal Explanations -- 8. Strict Laws, Generalizations, and Causal Concepts -- 9. Causal Powers -- 10. Propositional Attitudes as Causal Powers -- 11. The Explanatory Value of Action Explanations -- Acknowledgements -- References -- 2: Practical Reason -- 1. Three Degrees of Complexity -- 2. The Partitioned Model -- 3. Davidson's View -- 4. Final Thoughts: Why Not Partition? -- References -- 3: Action Individuation -- 1. Modifiers and Multiple Things Done -- 2. Primitive Actions -- 3. The Competition: Actions as Fine Grained -- 4. Preliminary Objections -- 5. "By," Cause, and Time -- 6. Deeper Problems -- 7. Actions as Extended Processes -- Conclusion -- References -- 4: Freedom to Act -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Davidson's Interest in His Work on Freedom -- 3. Davidson's Project and Its Relationship to Moore and Austin -- 4. Methodological Problems for Conditional Analyses -- 5. The Analysis of Freedom to Act and Abilities to Do x -- 6. Subjective Conditions and the Thinness of Davidson's Analysis -- 7. Concluding Discussion: The Challenge for a Causal Theory of Action -- References -- 5: Intention -- 1. The Initial Account -- 2. Agency.
3. Weakness of Will -- 4. Intending -- References -- Part II: Metaphysics -- 6: Event Variables and Their Values -- 1. Quantifying over Events -- 1.1. Implications and logical form -- 1.2. Adverb reduction as conjunction reduction -- 1.3. Enough but not too many -- 2. Events to Quantify Over -- 2.1. Ordering participants -- 2.2. Timing -- 2.3. Intentions -- 2.4. Perspectives and direct objects -- 3. Logical Form and Grammatical Form -- 3.1. Thematic decomposition -- 3.2. Grades of decomposition -- 3.3. Thematic separation -- 3.4. Conclusion -- References -- 7: Causation -- 1. Actions, Reasons, and Causes -- 2. Mental Causes -- 3. Difficulties With This Account -- 4. Another Look at Davidson -- 5. Causation and Mental Causation -- 6. Concluding Remarks -- References -- 8: Davidson's "Method of Truth" in Metaphysics -- References -- 9: The Concept of Truth -- 1. Tarski, Truth, and Meaning -- 2. Satisfaction and Correspondence -- 3. Radical Interpretation and Coherence -- 4. Defining Truth and Deflationism -- 5. Objectivity and Truth -- References -- Part III: Philosophy of Language -- 10: Truth in the Theory of Meaning -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Compositionality -- 3. Criticism of Traditional Approaches -- 4. The Positive Proposal -- 5. Problematic Passages? -- 6. Later Work -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- 11: Parataxis -- 1. Indirect Discourse -- 1.1 Samesaying -- 1.2 Virtues of the paratactic account -- 1.3 Some problems for the paratactic account of indirect speech reports -- 2 Mood and Mood-Setting -- 3. Quotation -- 4. A Parting Shot -- References -- 12: Logical Form -- 1. The Idea of Logical Form and Its Philosophical Significance -- 2. Constraints on Accounts of Logical Form -- 3. Davidson's Account of Logical Form -- 4. Criticisms -- Acknowledgment -- References -- 13: Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity.
1. What Is Radical Interpretation? -- 2. The Role of Radical Interpretation for Meaning Theory -- 3. The Principle of Charity -- 4. The Power of Charity -- 5. The Justification of Charity -- References -- 14: Davidson's Measurement-Theoretic Analogy -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy -- 3. The Inscrutability of Reference -- 4. The General Case -- 5. Instrumentalism or Realism? -- References -- 15: Reference -- 1. Reference in T-Theories -- 1.1. Fitting an infinite capacity in a finite head -- 1.2. Conditions under which reference is required -- 2. The Inscrutability of Reference -- 2.1. Twisted T-theories -- 2.2. The grain of the data -- 2.3. Simplicity -- 2.4. The formulation of inscrutability: relativizations -- 3. Explanations and Reference -- 3.1. Reference-invoking explanations -- 3.2. Explanations involving beliefs about reference? -- References -- 16: Language and Thought -- 1. Davidson's View and Two Others -- 2. Davidson and the View that Thought Precedes Language -- 3. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 17: Conceptual Schemes -- References -- 18: Interpretation and Value -- Interpretation and Value -- 1. The Interpretation Argument -- 2. The Application to Desires and Normative Beliefs -- 3. The Application to Values and Normative Truths -- 4. The Triangulation Argument -- References -- 19: Predication -- References -- 20: Convention and Meaning -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Public Nature of Meaning -- 3. Semantics and Ulterior Purposes -- 4. Word Meaning and Speaker Meaning -- 5. Is There Such a Thing as a Language? -- 6. Radically Interpreting Mrs. Malaprop -- References -- 21: Metaphor and Varieties of Meaning -- Davidson on Metaphor -- 1. "What Metaphors Mean" -- 2. "A Nice Derangement of Metaphors" -- 3. Evaluating a Hybrid Davidsonian View of Metaphor -- Acknowledgment -- References.
22: Davidson and Literary Theory -- Davidson and Literary Theory -- 1. Locating Literary Language -- 1.1. Intention and language -- 1.2. The role of reference in "storytelling" -- 1.3. Triangulation in literary interpretation -- 2. Convention -- 2.1 Metaphor and figuration -- 3. Davidson's Influence on Literary Theory -- 3.1. Intentionalism and anticonventionalism -- 3.2. Metaphor -- 4. Texts -- 5. Sketch of a Davidsonian Account of Texts -- References -- Part IV: Philosophy of Mind -- 23: The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism -- The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism -- 1. Holism and Charity Defended -- 2. How to Formulate Relativism -- 3. The Davidsonian Strategy Against Relativism -- 4. Two Further Issues -- 4.1. Incommensurability in science -- 4.2. Reenvisioning Quine's metaphor of the web of belief -- 24: Anomalous Monism -- 1. Three Principles -- 2. Event Individuation -- 3. An Argument for Monism -- 4. Strict Laws -- 5. Anomalism -- 6. Irreducibility -- 7. Supervenience -- 8. Mental Causation -- References -- 25: Triangular Externalism -- 1. Outlines of Triangular Externalism -- 2. Externalism, Interpretation, and Holism -- 3. Davidson on Other Forms of Externalism -- 4. Triangulation and the Determination of Thought Content -- 5. Triangulation and the Objectivity of Thought -- References -- 26: Triangulation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Triangulation Argument -- 2.1. Primitive triangulation -- 2.2. Linguistic triangulation -- 3. Objections to the Triangulation Argument -- 3.1. Fixing meanings does not require triangulation -- 3.2. Possessing the concept of objective truth does not require linguistic triangulation -- 3.3. Possession of a language and thoughts does not require possession of the concept of objective truth -- 3.4. The account of what makes language and thought possible is circular -- 4.Conclusion -- References.
27: Rationality as a Constitutive Ideal -- 1. Kant, Carnap, and Quine -- 2. Davidsonian Interpretation Theory -- 3. Charity as a Constraint on Interpretation -- 4. Realism, Instrumentalism, and Eliminativism -- 5. Cognitive Science and Radical Interpretation -- 6. Representation and Rationality in Nonlinguistic Creatures -- 7. Davidson's Contributions to the Study of Rationality -- References -- 28: Irrationality -- References -- 29: The Rationality of the Emotions -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Emotions and Cognition -- 3. Emotions and their Causes -- 4. Objections -- 5. Privileged Access to Emotions -- 6. Emotions and Irrationality -- 7. Animal Affects -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Part V: Epistemology -- 30: Davidson and Radical Skepticism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Davidson on Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity -- 3. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism I: The Omniscient Interpreter -- 4. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism II: Triangulation and Content Externalism -- 5. Contra Davidson's Transcendental Antiskepticism -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 31: First-Person Authority -- 1. The Phenomenon of First-Person Authority -- 1.1. Davidson's critique of other accounts of self-knowledge -- 2. Davidson's Explanation of First-Person Authority -- 2.1. The general strategy -- 2.2. Knowledge of meaning: Disquotation -- 2.3. Knowledge of meaning: The determination of meaning -- 2.4. What Davidson's account does not explain -- 2.5. Davidson's dissatisfaction with his account -- 3. First-Person Authority and Semantic Externalism -- References -- 32: Knowledge of Other Minds in Davidson's Philosophy -- 1. The Measure of All Things -- 2. Understanding Others -- References -- Part VI: Influences and Influence -- 33: Quine and Davidson -- 1. Logical Pragmatism -- 2. Naturalism -- 3. Language, Meaning, and Use -- 4. Truth.
5. Meaning and Radical Interpretation.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910824246203321
Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., : Wiley-Blackwell, c2013
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui