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Modern energy market manipulation / / by Andrew N. Kleit
| Modern energy market manipulation / / by Andrew N. Kleit |
| Autore | Kleit Andrew N. |
| Edizione | [First edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Bingley, UK : , : Emerald Publishing Limited, , [2019] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (240 pages) |
| Disciplina | 333.79 |
| Soggetto topico |
Energy industries - Corrupt practices
Fraud |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-78743-919-4
1-78743-385-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Modern Energy Market Manipulation -- Contents -- About the Author -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- References -- Chapter 1: What is Manipulation? What is Not Manipulation? -- I. Introduction -- II. A Commodity Market -- A. Selling to the Commodity Market -- B. Buying from the Exchange -- C. Challenges for the Exchange -- D. Challenges for the Commodity Trader -- III. Defining Manipulation -- IV. Speculation, Arbitrage, and Market Power -- References -- Chapter 2: Economic Theories of Manipulation -- I. Introduction -- II. Two (Relatively) Early Works -- III. Pirrong Creates a Field -- IV. Works by Ledgerwood and Coauthors -- V. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Some Historical Manipulation Cases, or Understanding Why the Hunt Brothers Did Not Manipulate the Silver Market -- I. Introduction -- II. General Foods v. Brannan (1948) -- III. Great Western v. Brannan (1953) -- 4. H. W. Miller and Company v. Benson (1958) -- V. Volkart Brothers (1962) -- 6. Cargill v. Harden (1971) -- VII. The Hunt Brothers Silver Escapade -- VIII. Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Chapter 4: DiPlacido: the CFTC Confuses Manipulation and Hedging -- I. Introduction -- II. The Parties and the Procedure -- B. The Process at an Administrative Agency -- C. Weaknesses of the Procedure -- III. The Contending Theories -- A. Options and How to Hedge with Them -- B. The Manipulation Theory -- C. The Available Evidence -- IV. The CFTC's Path to a Manipulation Finding -- A. Showing an Artificial Price -- B. Violating Bids: The Crux of the CFTC's Decision -- 1. Motives for Violating Bidders -- 2. Were Bidders Violated, and If So, So What? -- C. Misconstruing Henner -- D. Motive Is Not Necessary -- or Misconstruing Cargill -- V. The Bad Words -- VI. Final Thoughts: Deference Does Not Seem to be Appropriate -- References.
Chapter 5: Introduction to Electricity Markets -- I. Introduction -- II. Restructured Electricity Markets -- B. Regional Transmission Organizations -- III. The Three-node Model -- B. Supply and Demand -- IV. Other Markets -- A. Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets -- B. Financial Transmission Rights -- C. Ancillary Markets -- V. Some Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Chapter 6: Were California's Electricity Markets Manipulated, and by Whom? -- I. Introduction -- II. Electricity Restructuring in California -- A. Price Caps and Finger Pointing -- III. ENRON -- B. ENRON in the California Crisis -- IV. Congestion-Related Strategies -- A. Load Shifting -- B. Death Star and Cut Schedules -- V. An Ancillary Market Strategy - "Get Shorty" -- VI. Why were Real-Time Prices Higher than Day-Ahead Prices? -- VII. Interpreting Price Arbitrage Strategies -- A. "Ricochet" -- 2. Economic Analysis of Ricochet -- B. Overgeneration and Fat Boy -- VIII. Gaming -- IX. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7: Deutsche Bank: What should the Legal Rule for Trading Financial Transmission Rights be? -- I. Introduction -- II. The Prosecution's Case -- B. The Proceedings and FERC Staff's Arguments -- III. Deutsche Bank's Arguments -- A. Deutsche Bank's Motivation -- B. Why Did Deutsche Bank Lose Money? -- C. "Degenerate Pricing" and "Artificial" Prices -- D. Other Issues -- IV. The Available Legal Standards -- A. Stand-Alone Profitability: Ex Ante or Ex Post? -- B. Per Se Illegality -- C. The Original Intent Rule -- D. Subsequent FERC Cases -- V. Why Bring this Case? Why Fight this Case? -- VI. Conclusion: What is the Legal Rule for FTRs? -- References -- Chapter 8: Amaranth and Brian Hunter: You Certainly Look Guilty -- I. Introduction -- II. What was Amaranth? -- III. Proceedings -- IV. The Staff's Case and Hunter's Rebuttals -- B. A Side Excursion on Put Options. C. Now Back to Our Story -- V. The Battle of the Economists -- B. Lies, Damn Lies, and Econometrics -- 2. Kaminski's Analysis -- C. Quinn and Fischel for the Defense -- VI. The Commission Decision -- VII. Settlements and Jurisdiction -- VIII. Searching for Manipulation in All the Wrong Places? -- IX. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 9: BP America: Let the Best Story Win! -- I. Introduction -- II. The Parties and the Proceedings -- III. Framing the Open -- IV. Arbitrage and Early Trading -- V. Other Trading Strategies -- VI. Scienter -- VII. Manipulation and the Theory of the Firm -- B. Incentive of an Individual Trader -- C. Firm Compliance -- VIII. Other Issues -- IX. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 10: Barclays: The Defendant Meets Mr. Kafka -- I. Introduction -- II. The Process -- III. The Show Cause Order -- B. Scienter - The Bad Words -- C. The Damages Amount and Other Open Questions -- IV. The Exchange Between Barclays and Staff -- B. The Staff Response - Giving away the bad words Argument -- V. Ferc's Penalty Order - How Can Defendants Defend Themselves? -- VI. Dean Hubbard's Statement -- VII. The District Court's Decision on Discovery -- VIII. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 11: Rumford and Silkman: Money for Nothing, Kicks for Free -- I. Introduction -- II. Demand Response Policy -- III. The Parties and the Process -- IV. The Show Cause Orders -- V. The Defense of Rumford and Silkman -- A. DALRP was a Poor Policy -- B. The Rules of the DALRP were Unclear -- C. Scienter -- VI. The Commission's Penalty Order and Afterwards -- VII. Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Chapter 12: Powhatan: What is Manipulation? -- I. Introduction -- II. Those Transmission Losses -- III. The Participants and the Proceedings -- IV. The Show Cause Order -- B. The Manipulation Analysis -- C. Scienter -- V. Powhatan's Response: The Cavalcade of Stars. A. Taking Advantage of a Loophole is not Illegal, and Arguably was of Assistance to PJM -- B. Powhatan's Trades were not Riskless, and Therefore were not wash Trades -- C. Return to Death Star, Fraud, and "Well Functioning Markets" -- VI. Staff's Rebuttal and the Commission's Initial Decision -- B. The Commission's Penalty Order -- VII. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 13: Some Final Thoughts -- Name Index -- Subject Index. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910466533703321 |
Kleit Andrew N.
|
||
| Bingley, UK : , : Emerald Publishing Limited, , [2019] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Modern energy market manipulation / / by Andrew N. Kleit (Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA)
| Modern energy market manipulation / / by Andrew N. Kleit (Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA) |
| Autore | Kleit Andrew N. |
| Edizione | [First edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London, England : , : Emerald Publishing Limited, , [2019] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (240 pages) |
| Disciplina | 333.79 |
| Soggetto topico |
Energy industries - Corrupt practices
Fraud Business & Economics - Economics - General Economics |
| ISBN |
1-78743-919-4
1-78743-385-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Prelims -- Chapter 1 What is manipulation? What is not manipulation? -- Chapter 2 Economic theories of manipulation -- Chapter 3 Some historical manipulation cases, or understanding why the Hunt brothers did not manipulate the silver market -- Chapter 4 DiPlacido: the CFTC confuses manipulation and hedging -- Chapter 5 Introduction to electricity markets -- Chapter 6 Were California's electricity markets manipulated, and by whom? -- Chapter 7 Deutsche Bank: what should the legal rule for trading financial transmission rights be? -- Chapter 8 Amaranth and Brian Hunter: you certainly look guilty -- Chapter 9 BP America: let the best story win! -- Chapter 10 Barclays: the defendant meets Mr. Kafka -- Chapter 11 Rumford and Silkman: money for nothing, kicks for free -- Chapter 12 Powhatan: what is manipulation? -- Chapter 13 Some final thoughts -- Name index -- Subject index. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910793378803321 |
|
Kleit Andrew N.
|
||
| London, England : , : Emerald Publishing Limited, , [2019] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Modern energy market manipulation / / by Andrew N. Kleit (Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA)
| Modern energy market manipulation / / by Andrew N. Kleit (Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA) |
| Autore | Kleit Andrew N. |
| Edizione | [First edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London, England : , : Emerald Publishing Limited, , [2019] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (240 pages) |
| Disciplina | 333.79 |
| Soggetto topico |
Energy industries - Corrupt practices
Fraud Business & Economics - Economics - General Economics |
| ISBN |
1-78743-919-4
1-78743-385-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Prelims -- Chapter 1 What is manipulation? What is not manipulation? -- Chapter 2 Economic theories of manipulation -- Chapter 3 Some historical manipulation cases, or understanding why the Hunt brothers did not manipulate the silver market -- Chapter 4 DiPlacido: the CFTC confuses manipulation and hedging -- Chapter 5 Introduction to electricity markets -- Chapter 6 Were California's electricity markets manipulated, and by whom? -- Chapter 7 Deutsche Bank: what should the legal rule for trading financial transmission rights be? -- Chapter 8 Amaranth and Brian Hunter: you certainly look guilty -- Chapter 9 BP America: let the best story win! -- Chapter 10 Barclays: the defendant meets Mr. Kafka -- Chapter 11 Rumford and Silkman: money for nothing, kicks for free -- Chapter 12 Powhatan: what is manipulation? -- Chapter 13 Some final thoughts -- Name index -- Subject index. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910827437503321 |
|
Kleit Andrew N.
|
||
| London, England : , : Emerald Publishing Limited, , [2019] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||