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The 2008 battle of Sadr City : reimagining urban combat / / David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon
| The 2008 battle of Sadr City : reimagining urban combat / / David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, California : , : RAND, , [2013] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (165 p.) |
| Disciplina | 956.7044/34 |
| Altri autori (Persone) |
MarkelM. Wade
ShannonBrian |
| Soggetto topico |
Sadr City, Battle of, Baghdad, Iraq, 2008
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Campaigns - Iraq - Baghdad Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Urban warfare Counterinsurgency - Iraq - Baghdad |
| ISBN |
0-8330-8419-4
0-8330-8031-8 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Key Individuals; Chapter One: Introduction; Background to the Study; Methodology; Monograph Organization; Chapter Two: Setting Conditions for the 2008 Battle; The Surge and the Baghdad Security Plan; Regaining Control of Baghdad and Isolating Sadr City; Summary and Conclusion; Chapter Three: Conditions on the Eve of the Battle of Sadr City; Political and Strategic Context; Physical and Human Terrain; The Combatants; Jaish al-Mahdi; Iraqi Security Forces; U.S. Forces
Pre-Deployment Training: Getting Ready for a FightThe COIN Academy: Emphasizing Restraint; A Change in Context; Summary and Conclusions; Chapter Four: The Battle Begins; JAM's Initial Onslaught; Stopping JAM; Seizing the Initiative: Operation Striker Denial; Neutralizing Enemy Rocket Attacks with Aerial ISR and Strike Assets; The First Attempt to Control Launch Sites Through Active Patrolling; Augmented U.S. Forces Seize Launch Sites South of Route Gold; The Iraqi Army Attacks to Secure Route Gold; Summary and Conclusions; Chapter Five: Defeating JAM: Operation Gold Wall The Decision to Build a WallGoing After JAM Leaders: The MND-B ""Deep Fight""; Summary and Conclusions; Chapter Six: Exploiting the Success of Battle; The Two Components of Exploitation; Maintaining the Pressure; Exploiting Success Through Reconstruction; Summary and Conclusions; Chapter Seven: Assessing the Outcome of the Battle; Sadr City in the Aftermath of the 2008 Battle; Why Coalition Forces Prevailed; Summary and Conclusions; Chapter Eight: Reimagining Urban Combat; Key Insights from the Fight Protecting the Population Requires a Balance Between Offensive, Defensive, and Stability OperationsPersistent ISR, Technical Intelligence, and Precision-Strike Capabilities Enable the Attacker to Seize the Initiative; Technical Capabilities Must Enable Decentralized Decision Making and Small Unit Initiative; Isolating the Enemy Enables the Counterinsurgent to Seize the Initiative; Ground Maneuver Remains Indispensable for Shaping the Battle and Achieving Decision; Heavy Armored Forces Have Enduring Utility in Counterinsurgency and Urban Operations Integrating SOF into Conventional Operations Achieves SynergySnipers Remain an Important Enabler in Urban Operations; Enduring Success Depends on Capable Indigenous Security Forces; Urban Counterinsurgency Requires Forces to Transition Rapidly Between Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations; Reimagining Urban Operations as Wide-Area Security Missions; Final Thoughts; Appendix: Analysis of Contemporary Arabic Language Sources on the Battle of Sadr City; Bibliography; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910219974103321 |
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
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| Santa Monica, California : , : RAND, , [2013] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
The 2008 battle of Sadr City [[electronic resource] /] / David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon
| The 2008 battle of Sadr City [[electronic resource] /] / David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica Calif., : RAND, 2011 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (35 p.) |
| Disciplina | 956.7044/342 |
| Altri autori (Persone) |
MarkelM. Wade
ShannonBrian |
| Collana | Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) |
| Soggetto topico |
Sadr City, Battle of, Baghdad, Iraq, 2008
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Campaigns - Iraq - Baghdad Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Urban warfare Counterinsurgency - Iraq - Baghdad |
| ISBN |
1-280-12683-3
9786613530691 0-8330-5814-2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | The 2008 battle of Sadr City -- Background -- Methodology -- Setting conditions -- The area of operations -- Mission: stop the rockets and defeat criminal militias in Sadr City -- The ground fight in Sadr City: heavy armor matters -- The counter rocket fight -- Exploitation -- Key insights from the fight -- Reimagining urban operations as wide area security missions. |
| Altri titoli varianti | Two-thousand-eight battle of Sadr City |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910219978103321 |
|
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
||
| Santa Monica Calif., : RAND, 2011 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Fast tanks and heavy bombers : innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 / / David E. Johnson
| Fast tanks and heavy bombers : innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 / / David E. Johnson |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 1998 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (304 p.) |
| Disciplina | 355/.07/097309041 |
| Collana | Cornell studies in security affairs |
| Soggetto topico | Weapons systems - United States |
| ISBN |
0-8014-6710-1
1-322-50420-2 0-8014-6711-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I. Soldiers and Machines: 1917-1920 -- 1. America, the Army, and the Great War -- 2. The Tank Corps -- 3. The Air Service -- 4. The Army in the Aftermath of the Great War -- Part II. Inertia and Insurgency: 1921-1930 -- 5. Peace and Quiet -- 6. Infantry Tanks -- 7. The Failed Revolution and the Evolution of Air Force -- 8. The War Department -- Part III. Alternatives and Autonomy: 1931-1942 -- 9. From Domestic Depression to International Crusade -- 10. Alternatives for Armor -- 11. Autonomous Air Power -- 12. A Crisis in the War Department -- Part IV. Dying for Change: 1942-1945 -- 13. The Arsenal of Attrition -- 14. Armored Bludgeon -- 15. Air Force Triumphant -- 16. Coequal Land Power and Air Power -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Primary Sources -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910791086903321 |
|
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
||
| Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 1998 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Fast tanks and heavy bombers : innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 / / David E. Johnson
| Fast tanks and heavy bombers : innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 / / David E. Johnson |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 1998 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (304 p.) |
| Disciplina | 355/.07/097309041 |
| Collana | Cornell studies in security affairs |
| Soggetto topico | Weapons systems - United States |
| ISBN |
0-8014-6710-1
1-322-50420-2 0-8014-6711-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I. Soldiers and Machines: 1917-1920 -- 1. America, the Army, and the Great War -- 2. The Tank Corps -- 3. The Air Service -- 4. The Army in the Aftermath of the Great War -- Part II. Inertia and Insurgency: 1921-1930 -- 5. Peace and Quiet -- 6. Infantry Tanks -- 7. The Failed Revolution and the Evolution of Air Force -- 8. The War Department -- Part III. Alternatives and Autonomy: 1931-1942 -- 9. From Domestic Depression to International Crusade -- 10. Alternatives for Armor -- 11. Autonomous Air Power -- 12. A Crisis in the War Department -- Part IV. Dying for Change: 1942-1945 -- 13. The Arsenal of Attrition -- 14. Armored Bludgeon -- 15. Air Force Triumphant -- 16. Coequal Land Power and Air Power -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Primary Sources -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910810049703321 |
|
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
||
| Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 1998 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson
| Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxxv, 227 pages) |
| Disciplina | 956.9204/524095694 |
| Soggetto topico |
Asymmetric warfare
Lebanon War, 2006 Gaza War, 2008-2009 |
| ISBN | 0-8330-5853-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; S.1. Levels of Adversaries and Their Associated Military Capabilities, with Examples; S.1. Air and Ground Power Across the Levels of Adversary Capabilities; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Purpose; Methodology; Monograph Organization; CHAPTER TWO: The Second Lebanon War; 2.1. Map of Southern Lebanon; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2006; What's in It for Us? The Problems with "Lessons Learned" from Lebanon; The IDF in Transition
Confronting Protracted Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism Complex Concepts for Complex Problems: Systemic Operational Design; The IDF and Standoff Fires; Systemic Operational Design and Standoff Fires in Action: Defeating the Intifada; The Israeli Elite's Misperceptions About the Security Environment; IDF Deficiencies on the Eve of the Second Lebanon War; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hezbollah; Terrain; Hezbollah's Preparation of the Battlefield; Hezbollah: A Hybrid Adversary; 2.1. Hezbollah Rockets, 2006; 2.2. A Concealed Hezbollah Rocket System; 2.2. Other Hezbollah Weapons How the Second Lebanon War Unfolded Israel's Strategy in Lebanon; The Air War; 2.3. Map of Lebanese Targets Attacked by Israel; The Initial Ground War; Losing Support for the War; One Final Offensive; 2.4. Ground Scheme of Maneuver: Operation Changing Direction; 2.5. Final IDF Positions and Hezbollah Rocket-Launching Sites; The End of the War; Shortfalls Identified in the Second Lebanon War; Standoff Fires Are Critical, but Not Sufficient, to Achieving Objectives; The Short-Range Rocket Challenge; 2.6. The Changing Nature of Israeli Targets Civil-Military Issues, Unclear Objectives, and a Lack of Jointness Hezbollah Presented the IDF with a New Type of Adversary; CHAPTER THREE: Operation Cast Lead; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2008; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hamas; Terrain; Hamas' Preparation of the Battlefield; 3.1. The Gaza Strip; Hamas: A Hybrid Opponent, but Not Hezbollah; The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades; Internal Security Forces; Hamas' Weapons; 3.1. Hamas Rockets; How Operation Cast Lead Unfolded; The Air Campaign; The Ground Campaign 3.2. The IDF Ground Campaign in Operation Cast Lead Hamas' Military Strategy During Operation Cast Lead; The End of Operation Cast Lead; Insights from Operation Cast Lead; Unresolved Problems in Determining Strategic "Ends"; Significant Improvement in the Military "Means"; Military Lessons Learned from Operation Cast Lead; Military Operations "Amongst the People"; Joint Fire and Maneuver Against Hybrid Opponents; Air-Ground Integration; 3.3. IDF Air Control Organizations; Operation Cast Lead Was Not a Robust Hybrid Case CHAPTER FOUR: The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force |
| Record Nr. | UNISA-996320210503316 |
|
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
||
| Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. di Salerno | ||
| ||
Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson
| Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxxv, 227 pages) |
| Disciplina | 956.9204/524095694 |
| Soggetto topico |
Asymmetric warfare
Lebanon War, 2006 Gaza War, 2008-2009 |
| ISBN | 0-8330-5853-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; S.1. Levels of Adversaries and Their Associated Military Capabilities, with Examples; S.1. Air and Ground Power Across the Levels of Adversary Capabilities; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Purpose; Methodology; Monograph Organization; CHAPTER TWO: The Second Lebanon War; 2.1. Map of Southern Lebanon; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2006; What's in It for Us? The Problems with "Lessons Learned" from Lebanon; The IDF in Transition
Confronting Protracted Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism Complex Concepts for Complex Problems: Systemic Operational Design; The IDF and Standoff Fires; Systemic Operational Design and Standoff Fires in Action: Defeating the Intifada; The Israeli Elite's Misperceptions About the Security Environment; IDF Deficiencies on the Eve of the Second Lebanon War; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hezbollah; Terrain; Hezbollah's Preparation of the Battlefield; Hezbollah: A Hybrid Adversary; 2.1. Hezbollah Rockets, 2006; 2.2. A Concealed Hezbollah Rocket System; 2.2. Other Hezbollah Weapons How the Second Lebanon War Unfolded Israel's Strategy in Lebanon; The Air War; 2.3. Map of Lebanese Targets Attacked by Israel; The Initial Ground War; Losing Support for the War; One Final Offensive; 2.4. Ground Scheme of Maneuver: Operation Changing Direction; 2.5. Final IDF Positions and Hezbollah Rocket-Launching Sites; The End of the War; Shortfalls Identified in the Second Lebanon War; Standoff Fires Are Critical, but Not Sufficient, to Achieving Objectives; The Short-Range Rocket Challenge; 2.6. The Changing Nature of Israeli Targets Civil-Military Issues, Unclear Objectives, and a Lack of Jointness Hezbollah Presented the IDF with a New Type of Adversary; CHAPTER THREE: Operation Cast Lead; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2008; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hamas; Terrain; Hamas' Preparation of the Battlefield; 3.1. The Gaza Strip; Hamas: A Hybrid Opponent, but Not Hezbollah; The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades; Internal Security Forces; Hamas' Weapons; 3.1. Hamas Rockets; How Operation Cast Lead Unfolded; The Air Campaign; The Ground Campaign 3.2. The IDF Ground Campaign in Operation Cast Lead Hamas' Military Strategy During Operation Cast Lead; The End of Operation Cast Lead; Insights from Operation Cast Lead; Unresolved Problems in Determining Strategic "Ends"; Significant Improvement in the Military "Means"; Military Lessons Learned from Operation Cast Lead; Military Operations "Amongst the People"; Joint Fire and Maneuver Against Hybrid Opponents; Air-Ground Integration; 3.3. IDF Air Control Organizations; Operation Cast Lead Was Not a Robust Hybrid Case CHAPTER FOUR: The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910141284703321 |
|
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
||
| Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||