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The logic of strategy [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
The logic of strategy [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
Pubbl/distr/stampa New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (208 p.)
Disciplina 160
Altri autori (Persone) BicchieriCristina
JeffreyRichard C
SkyrmsBrian
Soggetto topico Game theory
Strategy (Philosophy)
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-280-47038-0
0-19-535365-X
0-585-35740-4
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Introduction: What Is the Logic of Strategy?; Contributors; 1. Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfacual Reasoning in Games; 2. Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utility; 3. Solutions Based on Ratiftability and Sure Thing Reasoning; 4. Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals; 5. Aumann's ""No Agreement"" Theorem Generalized; 6. Rational Failures of the KK Principle; 7. How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?; 8. Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma; 9. Can Free Choice Be Known?
10. Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Record Nr. UNINA-9910455723403321
New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
The logic of strategy [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
The logic of strategy [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
Pubbl/distr/stampa New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (208 p.)
Disciplina 160
Altri autori (Persone) BicchieriCristina
JeffreyRichard C
SkyrmsBrian
Soggetto topico Game theory
Strategy (Philosophy)
ISBN 0-19-773080-9
1-280-47038-0
0-19-535365-X
0-585-35740-4
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Introduction: What Is the Logic of Strategy?; Contributors; 1. Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfacual Reasoning in Games; 2. Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utility; 3. Solutions Based on Ratiftability and Sure Thing Reasoning; 4. Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals; 5. Aumann's ""No Agreement"" Theorem Generalized; 6. Rational Failures of the KK Principle; 7. How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?; 8. Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma; 9. Can Free Choice Be Known?
10. Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Record Nr. UNINA-9910778719103321
New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
The logic of strategy / / edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
The logic of strategy / / edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
Pubbl/distr/stampa New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (208 p.)
Disciplina 160
Altri autori (Persone) BicchieriCristina
JeffreyRichard C
SkyrmsBrian
Collana Oxford scholarship online
Soggetto topico Game theory
Strategy (Philosophy)
ISBN 0-19-773080-9
1-280-47038-0
0-19-535365-X
0-585-35740-4
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Introduction: What Is the Logic of Strategy?; Contributors; 1. Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfacual Reasoning in Games; 2. Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utility; 3. Solutions Based on Ratiftability and Sure Thing Reasoning; 4. Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals; 5. Aumann's ""No Agreement"" Theorem Generalized; 6. Rational Failures of the KK Principle; 7. How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?; 8. Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma; 9. Can Free Choice Be Known?
10. Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Record Nr. UNINA-9910814289603321
New York, : Oxford University Press, 1999
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui