Consciousness as a Scientific Concept [[electronic resource] ] : A Philosophy of Science Perspective / / by Elizabeth Irvine

• Autore: Irvine Elizabeth
• Pubblicazione: Dordrecht : , : Springer Netherlands : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2013
• Edizione: 1st ed. 2013.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (186 p.)
• Disciplina: 128.2
• Soggetto topico: Philosophy of mind; Philosophy and science; Psychology—Methodology; Psychological measurement; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science; Psychological Methods/Evaluation
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: 1. Introduction: The Science of Consciousness -- 2. Subjective Measures of Consciousness -- 3. Measures of Consciousness and the Method of Qualitative Differences -- 4. Dissociations and Consciousness -- 5. Converging on Consciousness -- 6. Mechanisms of Consciousness and Scientific Kinds -- 7. Content-Matching: The case of Sensory memory and phenomenal consciousness -- 8. Content-Matching: The contents of what? -- 9. Scientific Eliminativism: Why there can be no Science of Consciousness -- 10. Conclusion -- Appendix: Dice Game.-.
• Sommario/riassunto: The source of endless speculation and public curiosity, our scientific quest for the origins of human consciousness has expanded along with the technical capabilities of science itself and remains one of the key topics able to fire public as much as academic interest. Yet many problematic issues, identified in this important new book, remain unresolved. Focusing on a series of methodological difficulties swirling around consciousness research, the contributors to this volume suggest that ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, not a wholly viable scientific concept. Supporting this ‘eliminativist‘ stance are assessments of the current theories and methods of consciousness science in their own terms, as well as applications of good scientific practice criteria from the philosophy of science. For example, the work identifies the central problem of the misuse of qualitative difference and dissociation paradigms, often deployed to identify measures of consciousness. It also examines the difficulties that attend the wide range of experimental protocols used to operationalise consciousness—and the implications this has on the findings of integrative approaches across behavioural and neurophysiological research. The work also explores the significant mismatch between the common intuitions about the content of consciousness, that motivate much of the current science, and the actual properties of the neural processes underlying sensory and cognitive phenomena. Even as it makes the negative eliminativist case, the strong empirical grounding in this volume also allows positive characterisations to be made about the products of the current science of consciousness, facilitating a re-identification of target phenomena and valid research questions for the mind sciences.
• Titolo autorizzato: Consciousness as a Scientific Concept
• ISBN: 1-283-93596-1; 94-007-5173-7
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910438329003321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Studies in Brain and Mind, . 1573-4536 ; ; 5