Info
- Utilizzare la checkbox di selezione a fianco di ciascun documento per attivare le funzionalità di stampa, invio email, download nei formati disponibili del (i) record.
The conflict over Kosovo : why Milosevic decided to settle when he did / / Stephen T. Hosmer
| The conflict over Kosovo : why Milosevic decided to settle when he did / / Stephen T. Hosmer |
| Autore | Hosmer Stephen T |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, Calif. : , : Rand, , 2001 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxxi, 155 pages) : illustrations, charts |
| Disciplina | 949.7103 |
| Collana | Project Air Force series on Operation Allied Force |
| Soggetto topico | Kosovo War, 1998-1999 |
| ISBN | 0-8330-3238-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected He probably also worried about threat of future invasion He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover Concluding observations |
| Altri titoli varianti | Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910219991403321 |
Hosmer Stephen T
|
||
| Santa Monica, Calif. : , : Rand, , 2001 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Operations against enemy leaders [[electronic resource] /] / Stephen T. Hosmer
| Operations against enemy leaders [[electronic resource] /] / Stephen T. Hosmer |
| Autore | Hosmer Stephen T |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, CA, : Rand, 2001 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (178 p.) |
| Disciplina | 327.1273 |
| Soggetto topico |
Insurgency
Coups d'état Assassination |
| ISBN |
1-282-28301-4
9786612283017 0-8330-3234-8 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
PREFACE; TABLE; SUMMARY; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; ABBREVIATIONS; Chapter One INTRODUCTION; OBJECTIVES OF LEADERSHIP ATTACKS; STUDY APPROACH; SOURCES; ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT; Chapter Two ATTACKING LEADERS DIRECTLY; ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING DIRECT ATTACKS; CONSTRAINTS ON LEADERSHIP ATTACKS; SITUATIONS IN WHICH DIRECT ATTACKS ARE LIKELY TO BE SANCTIONED; ASSESSING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF DIRECT ATTACKS; DIRECT ATTACKS RARELY PRODUCE WANTED POLICY CHANGES; DIRECT ATTACKS OFTEN FAIL TO DETER UNWANTED ENEMY BEHAVIOR; DIRECT ATTACKS CAN SOMETIMES PRODUCE HARMFUL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
DIRECT ATTACKS FREQUENTLY FAIL TO NEUTRALIZE THEIR INTENDED TARGETSPREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR ATTACKS ON ENEMY LEADERS; Chapter Three FACILITATING COUPS OR REBELLIONS; ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING SUPPORT TO COUPS OR REBELLIONS; A POOR SUCCESS RATE WITH COUPS AND REBELLIONS; SUPPORT OF REBELLION TO CHANGE HOSTILE POLICY; WHY U.S. ADVERSARIES HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO OVERTHROW AND INTIMIDATE; COERCIVE AND DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DIRECT ATTACKS, COUPS, AND REBELLIONS; PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT TO COUPS AND REBELLIONS; Chapter Four TAKING DOWN REGIMES WITH EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCE RATIONALE FOR MAINTAINING CAPABILITIES TO TAKE DOWN ENEMY REGIMESPOTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON CONDUCTING TAKEDOWNS; PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT TO EXTERNAL OVERTHROW; ENHANCING THE THREAT OF EXTERNAL OVERTHROW; Chapter Five CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS; REMOVING ENEMY LEADERS WILL BE NEITHER EASY NOR ALWAYS BENEFICIAL; WHEN LEADERSHIP ATTACKS ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE SANCTIONED; PREREQUISITES OF THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AIR POWER IN DIRECT ATTACKS, COUPS, REBELLIONS, AND TAKEDOWNS; THE DETERRENT AND COERCIVE EFFECTS OF THREATS TO REMOVE LEADERS; BIBLIOGRAPHY |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910220137503321 |
|
Hosmer Stephen T
|
||
| Santa Monica, CA, : Rand, 2001 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak [[electronic resource] /] / Stephen T. Hosmer
| Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak [[electronic resource] /] / Stephen T. Hosmer |
| Autore | Hosmer Stephen T |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, CA, : Rand Corporation, 2007 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (177 p.) |
| Disciplina | 956.7044/3409567 |
| Soggetto topico | Iraq War, 2003-2011 |
| ISBN |
1-281-18102-1
9786611181024 0-8330-4260-2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; The Weak Iraqi Resistance; The Iraqi Failure to Exploit More-Effective Defensive Options; Sources; Organization of the Monograph; Chapter Two - Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations; Saddam Was the Only Decision maker Who Mattered; Saddam's Decision making Was Seriously Flawed; Saddam Had a Record of Strategic Blunders; Saddam Made Several Strategic Miscalculations in 2003; The Consequences of Saddam's Strategic Misjudgments
Chapter Three - Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses Against External Attack Saddam's Personal Security Measures Were Extreme; Iraq's Forces Were Shaped to Forestall Coups, Uprisings; The Consequences of Saddam's Fixation on Internal Security; Chapter Four - Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed; Saddam's Military Strategy Was Flawed; Iraqi Defensive Operations Were Poorly Managed and Executed; Iraqis Had to Operate with Reduced Inventories of Old Equipment; Chapter Five - Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Prewar Motivation and Morale Were Poor Most Iraqis Saw Defeat as Inevitable; Lack of Belief in the Justness and Necessity of the Cause; The Previous Barriers to Desertion Eroded; Air Attacks Had a Devastating Effect on the Iraqi Capability and Will to Fight; Why the Fedayeen Saddam, Ba'athist Militia, and Foreign Jihadists Were Motivated to Fight; The Effects of PSYOPS; The Effects of the Capture of Baghdad; Chapter Six - Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Overwhelming Advantage; Iraqi Forces Could Not Withstand the Weight and Accuracy of Coalition Firepower The Coalition Could Attack Iraqi Forces at Standoff Distances and at Night Coalition Armor Dominated in the Ground Fighting; The Speed of U.S. Maneuvers Surprised and Demoralized the Iraqi Defenders; Chapter Seven - Concluding Observations; The Coalition's Success Was Achieved Rapidly and at a Low Cost; But Decision makers Should Be Careful About the Lessons They Draw from OIF; OIF Set the Stage for the Insurgency That Followed; How OIF May Influence the Behavior of the United States' Future Adversaries; Bibliography |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910220082003321 |
|
Hosmer Stephen T
|
||
| Santa Monica, CA, : Rand Corporation, 2007 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||