Preference, value, choice, and welfare / / Daniel M. Hausman [[electronic resource]] |
Autore | Hausman Daniel M. <1947-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xiv, 153 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
Disciplina | 658.8/343 |
Soggetto topico |
Consumers' preferences
Preferences (Philosophy) Value Rational choice theory |
ISBN |
1-107-23023-3
1-139-21006-8 1-280-56887-9 1-139-22303-8 9786613598479 1-139-05853-3 1-139-22475-1 1-139-21823-9 1-139-21514-0 1-139-22132-9 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Preface; 1: Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons; 1.1. WHAT ARE PREFERENCES?; 1.2. OVERALL AND TOTAL COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 1.3. PREFERENCES, REASONS, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; 1.4. MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING PREFERENCES; 1.5. CONCLUSIONS; Part I: PREFERENCES IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS; 2: Preference Axioms and Their Implications; 2.1. THE AXIOMS OF ORDINAL UTILITY THEORY; 2.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AXIOMS FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF PREFERENCES; 2.3. RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCES
2.4. PREFERENCES AND SELF-INTEREST3: Revealed-Preference Theory; 3.1. ACTUAL REVEALED PREFERENCES AND THE REVELATION THEOREM; 3.2. CRITIQUE OF ACTUAL REVEALED-PREFERENCE THEORY; 3.3. WHY NOT REDEFINE PREFERENCES IN TERMS OF CHOICE?; 3.4. HYPOTHETICAL REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.5. BELIEF-DEPENDENT REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.6. CONCLUSIONS; 4: Preferences, Decision Theory, and Consequentialism; 4.1. TOTAL SUBJECTIVE COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 4.2. USING PREFERENCES TO PREDICT AND EXPLAIN CHOICES: THE STANDARD MODEL; 4.3. EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY; 4.4. WHAT DOES EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY ACCOMPLISH? 4.5. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND STANDARD CHOICE THEORY4.6. ATTRIBUTES AND PREFERENCES; 4.7. CONCLUSIONS; 5: Game Theory and Consequentialism; 5.1. GAMES AND OUTCOMES; 5.2. CONSEQUENTIALISM IN GAME THEORY; 5.3. THE DEFAULT PRINCIPLE; 5.4. CONCLUSIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSEQUENTIALISM; 6: Constraints and Counterpreferential Choice; 6.1. SYMPATHY AND COMMITMENT; 6.2. COMMITMENT AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.3. CONSTRAINTS AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.4. MANY CONCEPTS OF PREFERENCE OR JUST ONE?; 6.5. GAME THEORY AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.6. COMMITMENTS AND INTENTIONS 6.7. CONCLUSIONSPart II: PREFERENCES, WELFARE, AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS; 7: Preference Satisfaction and Welfare; 7.1. WELFARE AND PREFERENCES; 7.2. WHY WELFARE IS NOT PREFERENCE SATISFACTION; 7.3 WELFARE AND LAUNDERED PREFERENCES: THE APPROXIMATION RATIONALE; 7.4. WHY THE APPROXIMATION VIEW FAILS; 7.5. CONCLUSIONS; 8: Preferences in Welfare Economics; 8.1. PREFERENCES AND WELFARE: AN EVIDENTIAL VIEW; 8.2. THE EVIDENTIAL VIEW AND THE SCOPE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; 8.3. PREFERENCE DISTORTIONS AND PATERNALISM; 8.4. CONCLUSIONS; PART III: PSYCHOLOGY, RATIONAL EVALUATION, AND PREFERENCE FORMATION 9: The Psychology of Choice9.1. LOSS AVERSION, FRAMING, AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT; 9.2. REVERSALS, VARIANCE, AND ADAPTATION; 9.3. BELIEF-DESIRE PSYCHOLOGY; 9.4. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING PREFERENCES AND CHOICES; 10: Constructing Preferences; 10.1. HOW PEOPLE EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.2. HOW PEOPLE OUGHT TO EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.3. AN EXAMPLE: HEALTH-STATE VALUES; 10.4. EMOTIONS AND RATIONAL EVALUATION; 10.5. HUME'S CHALLENGE; 10.6. COHERENCE; 10.7. CONCLUSION: THEORIES OF PREFERENCE FORMATION; 11: Conclusions; References; Index |
Altri titoli varianti | Preference, Value, Choice, & Welfare |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910457438103321 |
Hausman Daniel M. <1947-> | ||
Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2012 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Preference, value, choice, and welfare / / Daniel M. Hausman [[electronic resource]] |
Autore | Hausman Daniel M. <1947-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xiv, 153 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
Disciplina | 658.8/343 |
Soggetto topico |
Consumers' preferences
Preferences (Philosophy) Value Rational choice theory |
ISBN |
1-107-23023-3
1-139-21006-8 1-280-56887-9 1-139-22303-8 9786613598479 1-139-05853-3 1-139-22475-1 1-139-21823-9 1-139-21514-0 1-139-22132-9 |
Classificazione | BUS069030 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Preface; 1: Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons; 1.1. WHAT ARE PREFERENCES?; 1.2. OVERALL AND TOTAL COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 1.3. PREFERENCES, REASONS, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; 1.4. MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING PREFERENCES; 1.5. CONCLUSIONS; Part I: PREFERENCES IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS; 2: Preference Axioms and Their Implications; 2.1. THE AXIOMS OF ORDINAL UTILITY THEORY; 2.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AXIOMS FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF PREFERENCES; 2.3. RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCES
2.4. PREFERENCES AND SELF-INTEREST3: Revealed-Preference Theory; 3.1. ACTUAL REVEALED PREFERENCES AND THE REVELATION THEOREM; 3.2. CRITIQUE OF ACTUAL REVEALED-PREFERENCE THEORY; 3.3. WHY NOT REDEFINE PREFERENCES IN TERMS OF CHOICE?; 3.4. HYPOTHETICAL REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.5. BELIEF-DEPENDENT REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.6. CONCLUSIONS; 4: Preferences, Decision Theory, and Consequentialism; 4.1. TOTAL SUBJECTIVE COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 4.2. USING PREFERENCES TO PREDICT AND EXPLAIN CHOICES: THE STANDARD MODEL; 4.3. EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY; 4.4. WHAT DOES EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY ACCOMPLISH? 4.5. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND STANDARD CHOICE THEORY4.6. ATTRIBUTES AND PREFERENCES; 4.7. CONCLUSIONS; 5: Game Theory and Consequentialism; 5.1. GAMES AND OUTCOMES; 5.2. CONSEQUENTIALISM IN GAME THEORY; 5.3. THE DEFAULT PRINCIPLE; 5.4. CONCLUSIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSEQUENTIALISM; 6: Constraints and Counterpreferential Choice; 6.1. SYMPATHY AND COMMITMENT; 6.2. COMMITMENT AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.3. CONSTRAINTS AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.4. MANY CONCEPTS OF PREFERENCE OR JUST ONE?; 6.5. GAME THEORY AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.6. COMMITMENTS AND INTENTIONS 6.7. CONCLUSIONSPart II: PREFERENCES, WELFARE, AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS; 7: Preference Satisfaction and Welfare; 7.1. WELFARE AND PREFERENCES; 7.2. WHY WELFARE IS NOT PREFERENCE SATISFACTION; 7.3 WELFARE AND LAUNDERED PREFERENCES: THE APPROXIMATION RATIONALE; 7.4. WHY THE APPROXIMATION VIEW FAILS; 7.5. CONCLUSIONS; 8: Preferences in Welfare Economics; 8.1. PREFERENCES AND WELFARE: AN EVIDENTIAL VIEW; 8.2. THE EVIDENTIAL VIEW AND THE SCOPE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; 8.3. PREFERENCE DISTORTIONS AND PATERNALISM; 8.4. CONCLUSIONS; PART III: PSYCHOLOGY, RATIONAL EVALUATION, AND PREFERENCE FORMATION 9: The Psychology of Choice9.1. LOSS AVERSION, FRAMING, AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT; 9.2. REVERSALS, VARIANCE, AND ADAPTATION; 9.3. BELIEF-DESIRE PSYCHOLOGY; 9.4. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING PREFERENCES AND CHOICES; 10: Constructing Preferences; 10.1. HOW PEOPLE EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.2. HOW PEOPLE OUGHT TO EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.3. AN EXAMPLE: HEALTH-STATE VALUES; 10.4. EMOTIONS AND RATIONAL EVALUATION; 10.5. HUME'S CHALLENGE; 10.6. COHERENCE; 10.7. CONCLUSION: THEORIES OF PREFERENCE FORMATION; 11: Conclusions; References; Index |
Altri titoli varianti | Preference, Value, Choice, & Welfare |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910778953703321 |
Hausman Daniel M. <1947-> | ||
Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2012 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Preference, value, choice, and welfare / / Daniel M. Hausman |
Autore | Hausman Daniel M. <1947-> |
Edizione | [1st ed.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge ; ; New York, : Cambridge University Press, c2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xiv, 153 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
Disciplina | 658.8/343 |
Soggetto topico |
Consumers' preferences
Preferences (Philosophy) Rational choice theory Value |
ISBN |
1-107-23023-3
1-139-21006-8 1-280-56887-9 1-139-22303-8 9786613598479 1-139-05853-3 1-139-22475-1 1-139-21823-9 1-139-21514-0 1-139-22132-9 |
Classificazione | BUS069030 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Preface; 1: Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons; 1.1. WHAT ARE PREFERENCES?; 1.2. OVERALL AND TOTAL COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 1.3. PREFERENCES, REASONS, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; 1.4. MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING PREFERENCES; 1.5. CONCLUSIONS; Part I: PREFERENCES IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS; 2: Preference Axioms and Their Implications; 2.1. THE AXIOMS OF ORDINAL UTILITY THEORY; 2.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AXIOMS FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF PREFERENCES; 2.3. RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCES
2.4. PREFERENCES AND SELF-INTEREST3: Revealed-Preference Theory; 3.1. ACTUAL REVEALED PREFERENCES AND THE REVELATION THEOREM; 3.2. CRITIQUE OF ACTUAL REVEALED-PREFERENCE THEORY; 3.3. WHY NOT REDEFINE PREFERENCES IN TERMS OF CHOICE?; 3.4. HYPOTHETICAL REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.5. BELIEF-DEPENDENT REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.6. CONCLUSIONS; 4: Preferences, Decision Theory, and Consequentialism; 4.1. TOTAL SUBJECTIVE COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 4.2. USING PREFERENCES TO PREDICT AND EXPLAIN CHOICES: THE STANDARD MODEL; 4.3. EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY; 4.4. WHAT DOES EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY ACCOMPLISH? 4.5. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND STANDARD CHOICE THEORY4.6. ATTRIBUTES AND PREFERENCES; 4.7. CONCLUSIONS; 5: Game Theory and Consequentialism; 5.1. GAMES AND OUTCOMES; 5.2. CONSEQUENTIALISM IN GAME THEORY; 5.3. THE DEFAULT PRINCIPLE; 5.4. CONCLUSIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSEQUENTIALISM; 6: Constraints and Counterpreferential Choice; 6.1. SYMPATHY AND COMMITMENT; 6.2. COMMITMENT AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.3. CONSTRAINTS AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.4. MANY CONCEPTS OF PREFERENCE OR JUST ONE?; 6.5. GAME THEORY AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.6. COMMITMENTS AND INTENTIONS 6.7. CONCLUSIONSPart II: PREFERENCES, WELFARE, AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS; 7: Preference Satisfaction and Welfare; 7.1. WELFARE AND PREFERENCES; 7.2. WHY WELFARE IS NOT PREFERENCE SATISFACTION; 7.3 WELFARE AND LAUNDERED PREFERENCES: THE APPROXIMATION RATIONALE; 7.4. WHY THE APPROXIMATION VIEW FAILS; 7.5. CONCLUSIONS; 8: Preferences in Welfare Economics; 8.1. PREFERENCES AND WELFARE: AN EVIDENTIAL VIEW; 8.2. THE EVIDENTIAL VIEW AND THE SCOPE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; 8.3. PREFERENCE DISTORTIONS AND PATERNALISM; 8.4. CONCLUSIONS; PART III: PSYCHOLOGY, RATIONAL EVALUATION, AND PREFERENCE FORMATION 9: The Psychology of Choice9.1. LOSS AVERSION, FRAMING, AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT; 9.2. REVERSALS, VARIANCE, AND ADAPTATION; 9.3. BELIEF-DESIRE PSYCHOLOGY; 9.4. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING PREFERENCES AND CHOICES; 10: Constructing Preferences; 10.1. HOW PEOPLE EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.2. HOW PEOPLE OUGHT TO EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.3. AN EXAMPLE: HEALTH-STATE VALUES; 10.4. EMOTIONS AND RATIONAL EVALUATION; 10.5. HUME'S CHALLENGE; 10.6. COHERENCE; 10.7. CONCLUSION: THEORIES OF PREFERENCE FORMATION; 11: Conclusions; References; Index |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910809635303321 |
Hausman Daniel M. <1947-> | ||
Cambridge ; ; New York, : Cambridge University Press, c2012 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|