| Autore |
Gautier Luis
|
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa |
Cham : , : Springer International Publishing AG, , 2024
|
| Descrizione fisica |
1 online resource (262 pages)
|
| Altri autori (Persone) |
FikruMahelet G
|
| Collana |
Natural Resource Management and Policy Series
|
| ISBN |
9783031635496
9783031635489
|
| Formato |
Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione |
eng
|
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Part I Merger Incentives in Pollution-Intensive Industries -- 1 Merger Incentives and the Natural Environment -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Merger Rationale -- 1.3 Mergers and the Environment -- 1.3.1 Conceptual Framework -- 1.3.2 Empirical Evidences -- 1.3.3 Conclusion -- 1.4 Organization of This Book -- References -- 2 Mergers in Cournot Markets with Environmental Externality and Product Differentiation -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Model -- 2.2.1 Pre-merger Equilibrium -- 2.2.2 Post-merger Equilibrium -- 2.2.3 Comparing Pre- and Post-merger Outcomes -- 2.2.4 Merger Profitability -- 2.3 Merged Entity and Cleaner Technology -- 2.3.1 Post-merger Pollution Intensity Is Not Higher -- 2.3.2 Post-merger Pollution Intensity Is Higher -- 2.4 Merged Entity and Modified Product -- 2.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications -- Appendix -- Pre-merger Welfare Maximization -- Post-merger Welfare Maximization -- References -- 3 The Impact of Foreign Emission Tax on Domestic Merger Profitability -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Model Set-up -- 3.2.1 Post-Merger Market -- 3.2.2 Pre-Merger Market -- 3.3 Merger Profitability -- 3.3.1 Output and Price Effects -- 3.3.2 Tax Payment Effects -- 3.3.3 Additional Effects -- 3.4 Conclusion -- Appendix -- Derivation of Eq.(3.22) -- Derivation of Definitions 3.2 and 3.3 -- References -- 4 Electric Utility Mergers in the Presence of Distributed Renewable Energy -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Theoretical Foundation and Market Equilibrium -- 4.2.1 Model Set-up and Assumptions -- 4.2.2 Pre-Merger Equilibrium -- 4.2.3 Post-Merger Equilibrium -- 4.3 Profitability of Electric Utility Mergers -- 4.3.1 Profitability -- 4.3.2 Variability in Renewable Energy Production -- 4.4 Model Implementation Using Stylized Data -- 4.4.1 Initial Values -- 4.4.2 Results from a Monte Carlo Analysis.
4.5 Conclusion -- Appendix -- Recent Merger Deals -- General Framework -- Comparative Statics of the Post-merger Equilibrium -- Profitability -- Variability-Derivation of -- References -- 5 An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Environmental Policy on M& -- A Activities -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Data and Methods -- 5.3 Results and Discussion -- 5.4 Conclusion -- References -- Part II Welfare Implication of Mergers -- 6 Welfare Impact of New Firm Acquisition -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Welfare Impact of Horizontal Mergers: A Review -- 6.2.1 The Role of Market Share on Welfare Analysis -- 6.2.2 The Role of Product Differentiation on WelfareAnalysis -- 6.2.3 The Role of Firm Entry on Welfare Analysis -- 6.2.4 The Role of Strategic Policies on Welfare Analysis -- 6.2.5 The Role of Industry Specific Parameters on Welfare Analysis -- 6.2.6 The Empirical Evidence on Welfare Impact of M& -- As -- 6.2.7 Start-Up Acquisitions -- 6.3 New Firm Acquisitions -- 6.3.1 Model and Assumptions -- 6.3.2 Profitable Acquisition of New Firms -- 6.3.3 Welfare Impacts of New Firm Acquisition -- 6.3.4 Discussion and Policy Implications -- 6.3.5 Numerical Illustrations -- 6.4 Conclusion -- Appendix -- Comparative Statics -- Proof of Corollary 6.1 -- Proof of Proposition 6.1 -- Symmetric Costs, Range of m and k* -- References -- 7 Merger-Induced Welfare Gains in the Presence of Environmental Externality and Product Differentiation -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Increases in Merger-Induced Welfare Gains -- 7.2.1 Model Set-Up and Assumptions -- 7.2.2 Output of Insiders Pre- and Post-merger -- 7.2.3 Conditions for Merger-Induced Welfare Gains -- 7.3 Conclusions -- Appendix -- Proof of Proposition 7.1 -- Analytical Proof -- Illustrations -- Proof of Proposition 7.3 -- References -- 8 Are Big Mergers Welfare Enhancing When There Is Environmental Externality?.
8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Model -- 8.2.1 General Set-Up -- 8.2.2 Comparative Statics with Linear Demand -- 8.2.3 Production Effects -- 8.3 Welfare Effects -- 8.3.1 The Welfare Function -- 8.3.2 Welfare Effects with Small Pollution Intensity -- 8.3.3 Welfare Effects with Large Pollution Intensity -- 8.3.4 Emission Tax and Antitrust Decisions -- 8.4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks -- 8.4.1 Policy Implications -- 8.4.2 The Role of International Externalities -- 8.4.3 Limitations and Questions for Future Work -- Appendix -- Comparative Statics -- Proof to Proposition 8.1 -- Derivation of Figs. 8.2 and 8.3 -- Proof of Lemma 8.1 -- Maximizing Welfare with Respect to Emission Tax -- The Sign of Profit Change in Eq. (8.18) -- The Role of International Externalities from Sect. 8.4.2 -- Figure 8.5 and 8.6-Welfare and the International Externality -- References -- Part III Environmental Policy in the Presence of Mergers -- 9 Merger Control and Environmental Policy -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.1.1 Merger Control Policy -- 9.1.2 Environmental Policies -- 9.2 Integrating Environmental and Merger Aspects -- 9.3 Conclusion -- References -- 10 Environmental Taxation and Mergers in Oligopoly Markets with Product Differentiation -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Model -- 10.2.1 Pre-merger Market -- 10.2.2 Post-merger Market -- 10.2.3 Welfare and Optimal Tax -- 10.3 Comparing Optimal Policy Pre- and Post-merger -- 10.4 The Case of an End-of-the-Pipe Cost Function -- 10.4.1 The Role of Pollution Intensity -- 10.4.2 The Role of Product Differentiation and Competition -- 10.5 Conclusion -- Appendix -- References -- 11 Cross-Country Emission Tax Effect of Mergers -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Model -- 11.2.1 Profit Maximization -- 11.2.2 Comparative Statics -- 11.3 Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Outcomes -- 11.3.1 Non-cooperative Emission Tax.
11.3.2 Cooperative Emission Tax -- 11.4 Size of the Merger and Taxation -- 11.5 Discussion and Conclusion -- Appendix -- Comparative Statics -- Welfare Evaluated at the Nash Equilibrium -- References -- 12 The Design of Emission Taxes in Markets with New Firm Acquisitions -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 The Model -- 12.2.1 Equilibrium -- 12.2.2 Comparative Statics -- 12.3 Welfare Maximization and Optimal Emission Tax -- 12.3.1 Impact of Acquisitions on the Second-Best Emission Tax -- 12.3.2 Discussion and Comparison with Previous Studies -- 12.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications -- Appendix -- Comparative Statics -- Derivation of Fig.12.2 -- Illustration of the Condition in Lemma 12.1 and the Case Where Abatement Effects Are Large -- References -- 13 An Analytical Approach for Policy Coordination -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The Model -- 13.2.1 Noncooperative Equilibrium -- 13.2.1.1 Merger Control Authority (MCA) -- 13.2.1.2 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) -- 13.2.2 Cooperative Equilibrium -- 13.3 Conclusion -- References -- Index.
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| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910878063503321 |
Info
Handbook of Merger Control and Environmental Policy : Theory and Applications
