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Decision and Game Theory for Security [[electronic resource] ] : 14th International Conference, GameSec 2023, Avignon, France, October 18–20, 2023, Proceedings / / edited by Jie Fu, Tomas Kroupa, Yezekael Hayel
Decision and Game Theory for Security [[electronic resource] ] : 14th International Conference, GameSec 2023, Avignon, France, October 18–20, 2023, Proceedings / / edited by Jie Fu, Tomas Kroupa, Yezekael Hayel
Edizione [1st ed. 2023.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (XXIX, 390 p. 95 illus., 76 illus. in color.)
Disciplina 005.8
Collana Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Soggetto topico Data protection
Computer engineering
Computer networks
Artificial intelligence
Data and Information Security
Computer Engineering and Networks
Artificial Intelligence
ISBN 3-031-50670-7
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Mechanism design and imperfect information -- Observable Perfect Equilibrium -- Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with Small Manipulation Cost -- Rule Enforcing Through Ordering -- Security Games -- Multi-defender Security Games with Schedules -- Asymmetric Centrality Game against Network Epidemic Propagation -- Shades of Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles -- Learning in security games -- Characterizing and Improving the Robustness of Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworks -- Quantisation Effects in Adversarial Cyber-Physical GamesTakuma Adams -- Scalable Learning of Intrusion Responses through Recursive Decomposition -- Cyber deception -- Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach -- Optimal Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense with Deception in Probabilistic Attack Graphs -- The Credential is Not Enough: Combining Honeypots and Fake Credentials for Cyber-Defense -- Economics of security -- Does Cyber-insurance Benefit the Insured or the Attacker? -- A Game of Cyber-Insurance -- Rational Broadcast Protocols against Timid Adversaries -- FlipPath Game to Counter Stealthy Attacks in SDN-based Tactical Networks -- Information and privacy -- Double-sided Information Asymmetry in Double Extortion Ransomware -- Opacity-enforcing active perception and control against eavesdropping attacks -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd -- Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game with Mixed Armament -- Short articles -- Incentive-Based Software Security: Fair Micro-Payments for Writing Secure Code -- Using Game Theory Approach for COVID-19 Risk Analysis and Medical Resource Allocation -- Shapley Value to Rank Vulnerabilities on Attack Graphs: Applications to Cyberdeception -- Solving security models with perfect observability.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910799241903321
Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Decision and Game Theory for Security [[electronic resource] ] : 14th International Conference, GameSec 2023, Avignon, France, October 18–20, 2023, Proceedings / / edited by Jie Fu, Tomas Kroupa, Yezekael Hayel
Decision and Game Theory for Security [[electronic resource] ] : 14th International Conference, GameSec 2023, Avignon, France, October 18–20, 2023, Proceedings / / edited by Jie Fu, Tomas Kroupa, Yezekael Hayel
Edizione [1st ed. 2023.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (XXIX, 390 p. 95 illus., 76 illus. in color.)
Disciplina 005.8
Collana Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Soggetto topico Data protection
Computer engineering
Computer networks
Artificial intelligence
Data and Information Security
Computer Engineering and Networks
Artificial Intelligence
ISBN 3-031-50670-7
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Mechanism design and imperfect information -- Observable Perfect Equilibrium -- Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with Small Manipulation Cost -- Rule Enforcing Through Ordering -- Security Games -- Multi-defender Security Games with Schedules -- Asymmetric Centrality Game against Network Epidemic Propagation -- Shades of Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles -- Learning in security games -- Characterizing and Improving the Robustness of Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworks -- Quantisation Effects in Adversarial Cyber-Physical GamesTakuma Adams -- Scalable Learning of Intrusion Responses through Recursive Decomposition -- Cyber deception -- Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach -- Optimal Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense with Deception in Probabilistic Attack Graphs -- The Credential is Not Enough: Combining Honeypots and Fake Credentials for Cyber-Defense -- Economics of security -- Does Cyber-insurance Benefit the Insured or the Attacker? -- A Game of Cyber-Insurance -- Rational Broadcast Protocols against Timid Adversaries -- FlipPath Game to Counter Stealthy Attacks in SDN-based Tactical Networks -- Information and privacy -- Double-sided Information Asymmetry in Double Extortion Ransomware -- Opacity-enforcing active perception and control against eavesdropping attacks -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd -- Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game with Mixed Armament -- Short articles -- Incentive-Based Software Security: Fair Micro-Payments for Writing Secure Code -- Using Game Theory Approach for COVID-19 Risk Analysis and Medical Resource Allocation -- Shapley Value to Rank Vulnerabilities on Attack Graphs: Applications to Cyberdeception -- Solving security models with perfect observability.
Record Nr. UNISA-996574257403316
Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. di Salerno
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui