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Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: The Role of Representation in Visual Perception: An Introduction -- 1.1 The Question of the Role of Representation -- 1.2 Cognitive and Contextual Influences on Perceptual Representation -- 1.3 What Do Perceptual Representations Represent? -- 1.4 Against Representation: Direct Relational Views -- 1.5 Revisiting Sense-Datum Theories and Other Indirect Representational Views -- 1.6 The Role of Enactive and Embodied Representations in Perception -- References -- Part I: Cognitive and Contextual Influences on Perceptual Representation -- Chapter 2: Joint Perception Needs Representations -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.1.1 Problem 1: Do We See Things in the Same Way? -- 2.1.2 Problem 2: How Can We Ever Look at the Same Thing? -- 2.1.3 New Problem: Is My Perception Different Because We Both Perceive Together? -- 2.2 Joint Perception from the Armchair: Joint Visibility -- 2.3 Joint Perception from the Armchair: The Role of Representations -- 2.3.1 Can Representations Explain Joint Perception? -- 2.3.2 Joint Visibility Without Representations? -- 2.4 Joint Perception: Empirical Evidence -- 2.4.1 Perceptual Processing Is Faster During Joint Perception -- 2.4.2 Visual Perspective Is Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.3 Perceptual Categorisation Is Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.4 Perceptual Detection Is Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.5 Higher-Level Properties Also Are Different During Joint Perception -- 2.4.6 Interim Summary -- 2.5 Does Social Sensitivity Require Representations? -- 2.6 Conclusion - Representing the World Jointly -- References -- Chapter 3: The Role of Long-Term Memory in Visual Perception -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Role of Schematic Memory in Perception -- 3.3 Template Tuning and Expertise -- 3.4 The Role of Episodic Memory Activation in Visual Discrimination.
3.5 Consequences for Theories of Visual Perception -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Attention and Representational Precision -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Spatial Resolution, Precision and Range Content -- 4.3 Spatial Attention and Featural Precision -- 4.4 Precise Inattentive Representations -- 4.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 5: Uncertainty in Blurry Vision -- 5.1 Characteristics of Blurry Vision -- 5.1.1 Borderline Elements -- 5.1.2 Boundarylessness -- 5.1.3 Filled-in Contents -- 5.2 Criticisms of Some Extant Accounts of Blurry Experience -- 5.2.1 Misrepresentations of Fuzziness -- 5.2.2 Failure to Represent -- 5.2.3 Indeterminate Representation -- 5.2.4 Inconsistent Representations -- 5.2.5 Hybrid Views -- 5.3 Uncertain Perceptual Attitudes in Blurry Vision -- 5.3.1 Attitudes and Manners of Representation -- 5.3.2 Unclarity and Uncertainty -- 5.4 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: What Do Perceptual Representations Represent? -- Chapter 6: Representation, Attention, and Perceptual Learning -- 6.1 The Basics of the Debate -- 6.2 The Goldilocks Test -- 6.3 The New Attention Shift Strategy -- 6.3.1 Perceptual Learning -- 6.3.2 The Challenge to the Rich Content View from Perceptual Learning -- 6.4 Representing High-Level Properties Through Perceptual Learning -- 6.4.1 Recognition Does Not Require Cognition -- 6.4.2 Attentional Weights Can Come to Carry Information About High-Level Properties -- 6.4.3 Perceptual Category Detectors Represent High-Level Properties -- 6.4.4 High-Level Properties vs. Mere Appearance Properties -- 6.4.5 Lucky Patterns -- 6.5 Revisiting Dretske´s Goldilocks Test -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7: Singular Contents (With and Without Objects) -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Background -- 7.3 The Puzzle of Singular Experience -- 7.4 Phenomenal Intentionality -- 7.5 Self-Ascriptivism.
7.6 Singular Phenomenal and Derived Contents -- 7.7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 8: Kaplanianism -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Kaplanianism -- 8.3 Overcoming the Problems of Representationalism -- 8.3.1 The Problem of Generic Hallucination -- 8.3.2 The Particularity Problem -- 8.3.3 The Problem of Phenomenal Externalism -- 8.3.4 The Inverted Earth Problem -- 8.3.5 The Cosmic Swampbrain Problem -- 8.4 Overcoming the Problems of the Internal Physical State View -- 8.4.1 The Problem of Essential External Directedness -- 8.4.2 The Problem of Conscious Causation -- 8.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 9: Reliable Color Misrepresentation and Color Vision -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Tracking Theories of Mental Representation -- 9.3 Occasional and Reliable Misrepresentation -- 9.4 Color Vision, Measuring Devices, and Selective Pressure -- 9.5 The Evolution of Human Vision -- 9.6 Color Misrepresentation -- 9.7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 10: Subjective Factors in the Perception of Size -- 10.1 Some Representational Approaches to Size Perception -- 10.2 Two Comparative Examples -- 10.3 Indexing as a Representationalist Response -- 10.4 Representationalism and Phenomenal Variation -- References -- Part III: Against Representation: Direct Relational Views -- Chapter 11: Naïve Realism as Psychosemantics -- References -- Chapter 12: The Epistemic Value of Cognitive Contact with Reality -- References -- Chapter 13: How to Be a Direct Realist -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Resisting Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 13.2.1 Scientific Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 13.2.2 Philosophical Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 13.3 Resisting Disjunctivism -- 13.4 Direct Realism and Neo-Pyrrhonism -- 13.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 14: Get Acquainted with Naïve Idealism -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Idealism -- 14.3 Perception.
14.4 Acquaintance with the World -- 14.4.1 Idealist Acquaintance -- 14.4.2 Naïve Realist Acquaintance -- 14.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 15: What Does Phenomenal Particularity Commit Us to? -- 15.1 The Perception Argument -- 15.2 Dividing Phenomenal Character -- 15.3 Divided Phenomenal Characters and Naive Realism -- 15.4 Particularity with Introspective Knowability? -- 15.5 What Is Included in Phenomenal Character? -- References -- Part IV: Revisiting Indirect Realist Theories Including Sense-Datum Theories -- Chapter 16: Spatial Representational Theories of Visual Perception -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Section 1 The Nature of Representation -- 16.3 Section 2 The Object of Visual Perception -- 16.4 Section 3 Issues Concerning the ``Theory-Ladennness´´ of Visual Perception -- 16.5 Section 4 Phenomenal Visual Space and Spatial Representational Realism -- 16.6 Section 5 Linguistic and Epistemological Lessons -- References -- Chapter 17: Information Flow, Representation, and Awareness -- 17.1 Overview -- 17.2 Varieties of Information -- 17.3 Inherent Information Flow -- 17.4 Inherent Information as Representation -- 17.5 The Information Content of Awareness -- 17.6 The Problem of Representing Scale -- 17.7 The Problem of Representing Space and Time -- 17.8 Robotic Interlude -- 17.9 Phenomenal Character and Representational Properties as Awareness of a Controlled Internal Model -- 17.10 The Internal Neural Model of the World -- 17.11 The Internal Model Is Both the Content and the Medium of Our Perceptual Awareness -- 17.12 Wait, That´s Not What I Meant! -- 17.12.1 Representation -- 17.12.2 Cognitive Penetration -- 17.12.2.1 Discussion of the Result -- 17.12.3 Adverbialism -- 17.12.3.1 Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Character -- 17.12.4 Direct vs. Indirect Realism -- 17.12.4.1 Justification of Perceptual Belief -- 17.13 Summary -- References.
Chapter 18: Seeing Matters: The Remarkable Relevance of the Object-Representation Relationship to Science and to Society! -- 18.1 The Basic Issue: Distal Object, Conscious-Experiential Representation -- 18.2 Rules of Engagement, Reasons for Engagement! -- 18.3 New Symbol-Based Notation: Conscious Experience Distinguished from Object -- 18.4 Direct Realism, Symbolically Stated -- 18.5 Simple Physics-Based Arguments Against Direct Realism -- 18.5.1 Energy Conservation -- 18.5.2 Experiential Geometry -- 18.5.3 Speech Acts: How Does Conscious-Experiential Information `Get Into´ Brain-Dynamics? -- 18.6 A Directist Concern: Knowing the World -- 18.7 Indirect Realism, Symbolically Stated: New Symbolism for Encoding -- 18.8 Dynamically-Conventional Physics Denies Scientifically-Reliable Report of Experience -- 18.9 But We Know We Can Report on Our Conscious Experiences! -- 18.10 Impossibility of a Dynamically-Conventional Experimental Science of Conscious Experience -- 18.11 From Experimental Report, to States of Consciousness, to Definitions of Consciousness! -- 18.12 Physics, Revisited: Dynamically-Conventional Science Can´t Be (Conventionally) Reliable -- 18.13 Is Reality Dynamically Conventional? An Experimental Question! -- 18.14 Experimental Traction on the Direct/Indirect Debate?! -- 18.15 From the Foundations of Science to the Foundations of Society -- References -- Chapter 19: On the Analysis of Brentano´s Intentional Inexistence in Light of the Historical Background -- References -- Part V: The Roles of Enactive and Embodied Representations in Perception -- Chapter 20: Seeing What to Do: Embodied Instructive Representations in Vision -- 20.1 Desiderata -- 20.1.1 D1. Perceptual-Cognitive Grasp -- 20.1.2 D2. Success & -- Failure -- 20.1.3 D3. Phenomenology -- 20.1.4 D4. Directness -- 20.1.5 D5. Animals -- 20.2 Orthodox Representationalism &.
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Attention, cooperation, purpose : an approach to working in groups using insights from Wilfred Bion / / by Robert French
