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Economic Regulation of Urban and Regional Airports : Incentives, Efficiency and Benchmarking / / edited by Peter Forsyth, Jürgen Müller, Hans-Martin Niemeier, Eric Pels
Economic Regulation of Urban and Regional Airports : Incentives, Efficiency and Benchmarking / / edited by Peter Forsyth, Jürgen Müller, Hans-Martin Niemeier, Eric Pels
Edizione [1st ed. 2023.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (453 pages)
Disciplina 387.71
Collana Advances in Spatial Science, The Regional Science Series
Soggetto topico Regional economics
Space in economics
Transportation
Industrial organization
Transportation engineering
Traffic engineering
Regional and Spatial Economics
Transportation Economics
Industrial Organization
Transportation Technology and Traffic Engineering
ISBN 9783031203411
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Background -- 1.2 Part I: The Need for Economic Regulation -- 1.3 Part I: Systems of Regulation -- 1.4 Part II: Benchmarking -- 1.5 Part III: Regulation in Practice: Facts and Systems of Regulation -- References -- Part I: Theoretical Background: Market Power and Regulation -- Chapter 2: How Strong Is Airport Competition: Is There a Case for Regulation? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Competition and the Case for Regulation -- 2.2.1 Market Power and the Classic Case for Regulation -- 2.2.2 The Allocative Efficiency Argument -- 2.2.3 Regulation, Competition and Public Airports -- 2.2.4 Alternative Arguments for Regulation: Transaction Costs and Opportunistic Behaviour -- 2.2.5 Distribution, Regulation and Competition -- 2.3 Airport Competition: A Brief Overview -- 2.3.1 Privatization and Incentives for Profit -- 2.3.2 Types of Airports and Sources of Competition -- 2.4 Substitutability of Airports -- 2.4.1 Demand Side and Supply Side Substitution -- 2.4.2 Provision of Infrastructure for O& -- D and Transfer Passengers and for Cargo: The Definition of Catchment Areas -- 2.4.3 High-Speed Rail Competition -- 2.4.4 Bundling: Aviation-Related Services and Market Power -- 2.5 Countervailing Power -- 2.5.1 Are There Alternative Airports Available? -- 2.5.2 Are Airline Markets Competitive, Contestable or Concentrated? -- 2.5.3 Countervailing Power and Subsidies -- 2.5.4 Countervailing Power and Passenger Interests -- 2.5.5 Competition and Countervailing Power: A Summary -- 2.6 Some Evidence of the Use of Market Power -- 2.6.1 Airport Charging Behaviour -- 2.6.2 The Presence of Price Discrimination -- 2.7 Studies of Competition and Market Power: A Brief Review -- 2.7.1 Airport Competition in the UK Market -- 2.7.2 The Productivity Commission Inquiries -- 2.7.3 Assessing Market Power at Amsterdam Airport.
2.7.4 The Two ACI Studies by Copenhagen Economics Studies and OXERA -- 2.8 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 3: European Hub Airport Competition: An Assessment of Market Concentration in the Local Catchment and in the Transfer ... -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 European Hub Airport Market Development -- 3.3 Review of Hub Airport Competition -- 3.4 Competition in the Local Catchment -- 3.5 Competition in the Transfer Market -- 3.6 Discussion and Implications for Economic Regulation -- Appendix -- References -- Chapter 4: The Transactions Costs Foundation for Public Utility Regulation and Its Application to the Regulation of Airports -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Transaction Cost Economics and Competition Policy -- 4.2.1 Relationship-Specific Investment and Hold-Up -- 4.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics and Competition Policy -- 4.2.2.1 Ownership Solutions to the Monopoly Problem -- 4.2.2.2 Contractual Solutions to the Monopoly Problem -- 4.2.3 Public Policies Towards Natural Monopoly -- 4.3 Transaction Cost Economics and Airport Regulation -- 4.3.1 Protecting Sunk-Specific Investment in the Air Transport Sector -- 4.3.1.1 Ownership Solutions to the Airport Monopoly Problem -- 4.3.1.2 Contractual Solutions to the Airport Monopoly Problem -- 4.3.2 Implications of the Transaction Cost Approach to Airport Regulation -- 4.4 Comments and Discussion -- 4.4.1 The Public Interest Is Broader than the Interests of Airports and Airlines -- 4.4.2 Airports and Airlines May Exercise Market Power in Other Ways -- 4.4.3 Why Do We Observe Arms-Length Regulation of a Government-Owned Facility? -- 4.4.4 Why Do We Not See Independent Dispute Resolution in Practice? -- 4.4.5 Potential Reform of Airport Regulation -- 4.5 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 5: Cost-Based Versus Incentive Regulation for Airports -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 ROR-Regulation.
5.2.1 Technical Illustration of the Averch-Johnson Effect -- 5.2.2 Rate-of-Return Regulation Gives Improper Incentive -- 5.3 Incentive Regulation -- 5.3.1 Price Cap Regulation -- 5.3.1.1 Cost-Minimizing Behavior and Rents -- 5.3.2 Other Forms of Regulation -- 5.4 Airport Regulation -- 5.4.1 Double Marginalization -- 5.4.2 Policy Competition -- 5.4.3 Slot-Controlled Airports -- 5.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 6: Airport Privatization and Regulation: Effects on Airport Charge, Capacity, and Social Welfare -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Basic Model -- 6.2.1 Consumers -- 6.2.2 Airlines -- 6.2.3 Non-Aeronautical Service Market -- 6.2.4 Airport´s Profit and Social Welfare -- 6.3 Welfare Maximization vs. Public Airport -- 6.4 Privatization of Aeronautical and Non-Aeronautical Services -- 6.4.1 No Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.4.2 Price-Cap Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.4.3 Cost-Based Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.5 Numerical Results -- 6.5.1 Welfare Maximization vs. Public Airport -- 6.5.2 Privatization -- 6.5.3 Price-Cap vs. Cost-Based Regulation -- 6.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to the Base Case -- 6.5.4.1 Smaller Cost Differences Between Public and Private Operations -- 6.5.4.2 Higher Time Cost -- 6.5.4.3 Higher Regulatory Waste -- 6.5.4.4 Higher Degrees of Airline Competition and Competition Among Non-Aeronautical Shops -- 6.5.4.5 Higher Internalization Rate of Profit from Non-Aeronautical Service -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix 1 -- Appendix 2 -- Appendix 3 -- Appendix 4 -- Appendix 5 -- Appendix 6 -- Appendix 7 -- Appendix 8 -- Appendix 9 -- References -- Chapter 7: Light-Handed Regulation of Airports: The Way to Go? -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The History of and Rationale for Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.3 What Is Light-Handed Regulation? -- 7.3.1 The Ex Post Nature -- 7.3.2 Upward Price Flexibility.
7.3.3 The Ability of Parties to Negotiate -- 7.3.4 The Probability of Sanction -- 7.3.5 Other Characteristics -- 7.3.5.1 Formal or Informal -- 7.3.5.2 Independent and Dependent Regulators -- 7.3.5.3 Monitoring/Benchmarking -- 7.3.5.4 Review Criteria -- 7.3.6 LHR: Content or Process? -- 7.4 Models of Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.4.1 The Review/Sanction Model -- 7.4.2 The Negotiate/Arbitrate Model -- 7.5 The Working of Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.6 LHR and Performance -- 7.6.1 Expectations -- 7.6.1.1 Use of Market Power -- 7.6.1.2 Productive Efficiency -- 7.6.1.3 Service Quality -- 7.6.1.4 Non-Aeronautical Revenue -- 7.6.1.5 Investment -- 7.6.2 LHR in Practice -- 7.6.2.1 Use of Market Power -- 7.6.2.2 Productive Efficiency -- 7.6.2.3 Non-Aeronautical Revenues -- 7.6.2.4 Investment -- 7.7 Light-Handed Regulation: A Model to Follow? -- 7.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 8: Optimising Investment in Regulated Airports -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Regulating Airport Investment -- 8.2.1 Privatisation and Investments -- 8.2.2 Investment Dynamics -- 8.2.3 Conflicting Goals and Complexities -- 8.3 Efficiency and Distributional Objectives in Regulating Airports -- 8.3.1 Short-Run Optimisation: Use of Fixed Capacity -- 8.3.2 Regulating Quality -- 8.3.3 Achieving Productive Efficiency in the Short Run -- 8.3.4 Long-Run Optimisation: Achieving Efficient Investment in Capacity -- 8.3.5 Productive Efficiency in the Long Run -- 8.3.6 Distributional Objectives -- 8.4 Instruments of Regulation -- 8.4.1 Price Regulation -- 8.4.2 Cost-Based Regulation -- 8.4.3 Incentive Regulation -- 8.4.4 Light-Handed Regulation -- 8.4.5 Airport Slots -- 8.4.6 Conditional Triggers -- 8.5 Regulating Airport Investments: Assessing the Options -- 8.6 Improving Regulation Via More Sophisticated Approaches -- 8.6.1 Introducing Quality Incentives -- 8.6.2 Introducing Slots.
8.6.3 Introducing Conditional Triggers -- 8.6.4 Systems of Regulation: A Revised Comparison -- 8.6.5 Summary -- 8.7 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 9: European Airport Reform: Slots and the Implicit Contract Between Airlines and Airports -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Outline of the European Airport System -- 9.2.1 Some Facts about the System -- 9.2.2 Aspects of Performance -- 9.2.2.1 Allocative Efficiency in the Short Run -- 9.2.2.2 Cost Efficiency -- 9.2.2.3 Provision of Capacity -- 9.2.2.4 Options for Commercial Activities -- 9.2.2.5 Connectivity and Regional Aspects -- 9.2.2.6 Quality -- 9.2.2.7 Environmental Externalities -- 9.2.3 Institutions -- 9.2.3.1 Ownership -- 9.2.3.2 Competition -- 9.2.3.3 Regulation -- 9.2.3.4 The Slot System -- 9.2.3.5 The Planning Environment -- 9.2.4 Interest Groups -- 9.2.4.1 Passengers and Shippers -- 9.2.4.2 Airlines -- 9.2.4.3 Airports -- 9.2.4.4 Governments and Regulators -- 9.2.4.5 Local Communities -- 9.3 How Well Are European Airports Performing? -- 9.3.1 Allocative Efficiency -- 9.3.2 Cost Efficiency -- 9.3.3 Provision of Capacity -- 9.3.4 Other Aspects -- 9.4 Implicit Airline-Airport Contracts -- 9.4.1 Airports with Adequate Capacity -- 9.4.2 Busy Airports -- 9.4.3 Options for Reform -- 9.5 Conclusions -- References -- Part II: Benchmarking -- Chapter 10: Efficiency Assessment of Airports and the Impact of Regulation on Performance -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Airport Efficiency Estimation -- 10.2.1 Total Factor Productivity -- 10.2.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis -- 10.2.3 Data Envelopment Analysis -- 10.2.4 Comparing Index Number TFP, SFA and DEA -- 10.3 Impact of Regulation on Airport Performance -- 10.4 Conclusions and Future Directions -- References -- Chapter 11: Methodology Choices for Benchmarking Airports -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Link Between the Use and Format of Benchmarking -- 11.2.1 Assess Managerial or Firm Performance.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910720061703321
Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Autore Wolf Hartmut
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Taylor and Francis, 2016
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (464 pages) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina 387.7
Altri autori (Persone) ForsythP (Peter)
Soggetto topico Airlines - Deregulation
ISBN 1-4724-0128-X
1-317-10542-7
1-4094-5091-0
1-315-59230-4
1-317-10543-5
9781315592305
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto pt. A. Liberalization and airline competition -- pt. B. Liberalization and low cost airline competition -- pt. C. Liberalization and airline cooperation -- pt. D. Liberalization and infrastructure -- pt. E. Liberalization and public policy.
Record Nr. UNINA-9911140726703321
Wolf Hartmut  
Taylor and Francis, 2016
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2016
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (464 pages) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina 387.7
Altri autori (Persone) ForsythP (Peter)
Soggetto topico Airlines - Deregulation
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-317-10542-7
1-4094-5091-0
1-315-59230-4
1-317-10543-5
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto pt. A. Liberalization and airline competition -- pt. B. Liberalization and low cost airline competition -- pt. C. Liberalization and airline cooperation -- pt. D. Liberalization and infrastructure -- pt. E. Liberalization and public policy.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910466627803321
London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2016
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2016
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (464 pages) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina 387.7
Altri autori (Persone) ForsythP (Peter)
Soggetto topico Airlines - Deregulation
ISBN 1-4724-0128-X
1-317-10542-7
1-4094-5091-0
1-315-59230-4
1-317-10543-5
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto pt. A. Liberalization and airline competition -- pt. B. Liberalization and low cost airline competition -- pt. C. Liberalization and airline cooperation -- pt. D. Liberalization and infrastructure -- pt. E. Liberalization and public policy.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910796465503321
London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2016
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Liberalization in aviation : competition, cooperation and public policy / / edited by Peter Forsyth. [et al.]
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2016
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (464 pages) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina 387.7
Altri autori (Persone) ForsythP (Peter)
Soggetto topico Airlines - Deregulation
ISBN 1-4724-0128-X
1-317-10542-7
1-4094-5091-0
1-315-59230-4
1-317-10543-5
9781315592305
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto pt. A. Liberalization and airline competition -- pt. B. Liberalization and low cost airline competition -- pt. C. Liberalization and airline cooperation -- pt. D. Liberalization and infrastructure -- pt. E. Liberalization and public policy.
Record Nr. UNINA-9911093966803321
London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2016
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui