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Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
| Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi |
| Autore | Felsenthal Dan S |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2017.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2017 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (VIII, 88 p.) |
| Disciplina | 515.8 |
| Collana | SpringerBriefs in Economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Economics
Welfare economics Political science - Philosophy International Political Economy Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Political Philosophy |
| ISBN | 3-319-51061-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Non-Monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview -- Descriptions of the Voting Methods to be Analyzed -- Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules -- Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates -- Eight Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Variable Electorates -- Practical Significance and Open Problems. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910164160303321 |
Felsenthal Dan S
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| Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2017 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
| Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi |
| Autore | Felsenthal Dan S |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2018.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2018 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XV, 134 p.) |
| Disciplina | 324.6 |
| Collana | SpringerBriefs in Economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Welfare economics
Elections Political science - Philosophy Economics Democracy Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Electoral Politics Political Philosophy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods |
| ISBN | 3-319-74033-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910299657503321 |
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Felsenthal Dan S
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| Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2018 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain : An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
| Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain : An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi |
| Autore | Felsenthal Dan S |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2019.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2019 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (100 pages) |
| Disciplina | 324.9 |
| Collana | SpringerBriefs in Economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Welfare economics
Elections Political science - Philosophy Economics Democracy Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Electoral Politics Political Philosophy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods |
| ISBN | 3-030-12627-7 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- Summary. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910337671103321 |
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Felsenthal Dan S
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| Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2019 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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