top

  Info

  • Utilizzare la checkbox di selezione a fianco di ciascun documento per attivare le funzionalità di stampa, invio email, download nei formati disponibili del (i) record.

  Info

  • Utilizzare questo link per rimuovere la selezione effettuata.
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops [[electronic resource] ] : Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC, Bol, Brač, Croatia, May 5, 2023, Revised Selected Papers / / edited by Aleksander Essex, Shin'ichiro Matsuo, Oksana Kulyk, Lewis Gudgeon, Ariah Klages-Mundt, Daniel Perez, Sam Werner, Andrea Bracciali, Geoff Goodell
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops [[electronic resource] ] : Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC, Bol, Brač, Croatia, May 5, 2023, Revised Selected Papers / / edited by Aleksander Essex, Shin'ichiro Matsuo, Oksana Kulyk, Lewis Gudgeon, Ariah Klages-Mundt, Daniel Perez, Sam Werner, Andrea Bracciali, Geoff Goodell
Autore Essex Aleksander
Edizione [1st ed. 2024.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (516 pages)
Disciplina 005.824
Altri autori (Persone) MatsuoShin'ichiro
KulykOksana
GudgeonLewis
Klages-MundtAriah
PerezDaniel
WernerSam
BraccialiAndrea
GoodellGeoff
Collana Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Soggetto topico Cryptography
Data encryption (Computer science)
Cryptology
ISBN 3-031-48806-7
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro -- VOTING 2023 Preface -- VOTING 2023 Organization -- CoDecFin 2023 4th Workshop on Coordination of Decentralized Finance -- CoDecFin 2023 Organization -- DeFi 2023 Preface -- DeFi 2023 Organization -- WTSC 2023 7th International Workshop on Trusted Smart Contracts -- WTSC 2023 Organization -- Contents -- Voting -- Belenios with Cast as Intended -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Protocol Description -- 2.1 Participants and Setup -- 2.2 Voting Phase -- 2.3 Tally Phase -- 2.4 Usability Considerations -- 3 Security Analysis -- 3.1 ProVerif -- 3.2 How to Overcome ProVerif's Limitations? -- 3.3 Security Analysis and Result -- 4 Efficiency Considerations -- References -- On the Auditability of the Estonian IVXV System -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 E-Voting in Estonia -- 1.2 The IVXV System -- 2 Scope, Methodology, and Contributions -- 3 Flaw in Individual Verifiability -- 3.1 Attack 1: Discarding a Vote -- 3.2 Attack 2: Changing a Vote with Knowledge of the Private Key -- 3.3 Attack 3: Changing a Vote Without Knowledge of the Private Key -- 3.4 Computational Condition for Precision Attacks -- 3.5 Solution -- 3.6 Why wasn't This Already Noted? -- 4 Analysis with Regards to Haines and Roenne 2021 -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Coercion-Resistant Cast-as-Intended Verifiability for Computationally Limited Voters -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 On the Limitations of the Coercion and of Voters' Capabilities -- 1.2 Related Work -- 1.3 Contributions and Organization of the Paper -- 2 Definitions -- 2.1 Cast-as-Intended Verifiability -- 2.2 Coercion-Resistance -- 3 A Construction for Limited Voters -- 3.1 The Protocol (for ElGamal Ciphertexts) -- 3.2 Cast-as-Intended Verifiability of the Proposed Protocol -- 3.3 Coercion-Resistance of the Proposed Protocol -- 4 Discussion and Conclusions -- 4.1 Practical Considerations.
4.2 Comparison with Bingo Voting: On the Necessity of OED -- References -- Private Internet Voting on Untrusted Voting Devices -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Election Model and Voting Procedure -- 1.2 Contribution and Overview -- 2 Cryptographic Background -- 2.1 ElGamal Encryptions -- 2.2 BLS Signatures -- 2.3 Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs -- 2.4 Verifiable Mix-Nets -- 3 Protocol Description -- 3.1 Election Parameters -- 3.2 Protocol Parties and Communication -- 3.3 General Protocol Idea -- 3.4 Pre-election Phase -- 3.5 Election Phase -- 3.6 Post-election Phase -- 4 Security Discussion -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Overstatement-Net-Equivalent Risk-Limiting Audit: ONEAudit -- 1 Introduction: Efficient Risk-Limiting Audits -- 2 Testing Net Overstatement Does Not Require CVRs Linked to Ballot Cards -- 2.1 Warmup: 2-Candidate Plurality Contest -- 2.2 Numerical Example -- 2.3 The General Case -- 3 Auditing Using Batch Subtotals -- 3.1 Numerical Case Studies -- 4 Auditing Heterogenous Voting Systems -- 5 Sample Sizes for Contest-Level ONE CLCA Vs. BPA -- 5.1 Theory -- 5.2 Numerical Comparison -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) -- 3 Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Winners -- 4 Risk-Limiting Audits for Ranked Pairs Elections -- 4.1 Assertions and Assorters for Transitive Inferences -- 4.2 Correctness of Audit Assertions -- 5 RLAs for Minimax Elections -- 6 Smith -- 7 Kemeny-Young -- 8 Other Condorcet Methods -- 9 Results -- 9.1 IRV vs Ranked Pairs -- 9.2 Elections Without a Condorcet Winner -- 10 Conclusion -- References -- COBRA: Comparison-Optimal Betting for Risk-Limiting Audits -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Notation -- 2.1 Population and Parameters -- 2.2 Audit Data -- 2.3 Risk Measurement via Betting Supermartingales -- 3 Oracle Betting.
3.1 Error-Free CVRs -- 3.2 Betting with CVR Error -- 3.3 Relation to ALPHA -- 4 Betting in Practice -- 4.1 Fixed Betting -- 4.2 Adaptive Betting -- 4.3 Diversified Betting -- 5 Numerical Evaluations -- 5.1 Oracle Simulations -- 5.2 Practical Simulations -- 6 Extensions -- 6.1 Betting While Sampling Without Replacement -- 6.2 Other Social Choice Functions -- 6.3 Batch-Level Comparison Audits -- 7 Conclusions -- References -- CoDecFin -- Shaping Cryptocurrency Gatekeepers with a Regulatory ``Trial and Error'' -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Exchanges as Gatekeepers of Illicit Financial Proceeds -- 2.2 The Current Risks of Terrorist Financing -- 3 Regulation Beyond the ``Wait and See'' Approach -- 3.1 The Inconsistency in Terms and Definitions -- 3.2 International and European Approaches to AML/CFT -- 4 Repercussions of the Ongoing ``Trial and Error'' Phase -- 4.1 The Lack of Consensus and Legal Uniformity -- 4.2 Enforcement Issues with Texts and Actual Compliance -- 4.3 The Sunrise Issue -- 4.4 The Burden of Compliance on Small/Medium Exchanges -- 5 The Future of Policymaking -- 5.1 Common Regulatory Practices in Need of Change -- 5.2 The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation -- 5.3 The Transfer of Funds Regulation -- 5.4 The Role of Law Enforcement -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- A First Dive into OFAC in DeFi Space -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Scope of Jurisdiction -- 2.1 Towards Chain -- 2.2 Towards Cryptocurrency -- 2.3 Towards DApp -- 3 Discussion -- References -- Proposal of Principles of DeFi Disclosure and Regulation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Benefits, Advantages, and Possibilities of DeFi -- 3 Challenges, Risks, and Questions Related to DeFi -- 3.1 Lack of AML/KYC -- 3.2 Hacking -- 3.3 Is It Really ``Decentralized''? -- 3.4 Is It Really ``Traceable''?, Is It ``Accessible to All''? -- 3.5 Market Manipulation and Difficulties in Investigation.
3.6 Does It Really Contribute to ``Financial Inclusion''? -- 3.7 Operational Risk in DeFi -- 3.8 Characteristics of Procyclicality and the Potential for Systemic Risk Associated with It -- 3.9 Lack of Ability to Address Risks Associated with Information Asymmetry -- 4 Implications for Regulatory Consideration -- 4.1 Innovation Trilemma -- 4.2 Perspectives on Whether Financial Regulations Should Be Applied -- 4.3 Need for Regulation for Providers of Financial Functions -- 4.4 How to Ensure AML/CFT -- 5 Proposal of Principles of DeFi Disclosure and Regulation -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs - An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Methodology and Dataset -- 3.1 Data Collection -- 3.2 Dataset -- 4 Distribution of Voting Power -- 5 Structure of Voting Power Delegation -- 6 Governance Participation -- 7 Pointless Governance Transactions -- 8 Monetary Price of Governance -- 8.1 Price of Governance Transactions -- 8.2 Price of Transfer Overhead -- 9 Conclusion -- A Short Description of Analyzed DAOs -- B Computing the Cost of Governance -- C Computing the Overhead Cost of Governance -- References -- An Intrinsic Mechanism Deciding Hash Rates from Bitcoin Price -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Rational Choice of Hash Rates -- 2.1 Model of Blockchain Network -- 2.2 Single-Period Mining -- 2.3 Multi-period Mining and Dynamic Programming -- 2.4 Myopic Decision of Hash Rates with Isoelastic Utility Functions -- 2.5 Mean-Variance Approximation and Miners' Hash Rates -- 2.6 Rational Network Hash Rate in Blockchain Network -- 3 Conclusion -- References -- Stablecoins: Past, Present, and Future -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Where They Came from and Why -- 3 Current State of Stablecoins -- 4 Stablecoin Classification -- 5 The Collapse of Luna -- 6 Future Directions -- 7 Conclusion.
FTX Collapse: A Ponzi Story -- 1 Introduction -- 2 What is Ponzi? -- 3 The FTX Collapse -- 4 Future Directions -- 5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Policy Design of Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Embedding AML/CFT Compliance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Proposed CBDC Model Structure and Associated AML/CFT Limitations -- 3 Total Cost Structure of CBDC -- 4 Current AML/CFT Mechanism -- 4.1 Stakeholders -- 4.2 Process -- 4.3 Cost Structures and Incentives -- 4.4 Professional Resources in AML/CFT Measures -- 5 AML/CFT Mechanisms in Retail CBDC Projects -- 6 Feasibility of the AML/CFT System Associated with CBDC -- 6.1 Tiered System Based on the Level of Assurance -- 6.2 Collective Customer Due Diligence -- 6.3 Automated Analysis and Evaluation -- 6.4 Judgment and Reporting -- 7 Conclusion -- Appendix A. Generalized AML/CFT Process -- Appendix B. High Performing FIU (Israel, Italy, and Spain) -- Appendix C. Compliance Cost of the Financial Institutions -- Appendix D. Compliance Cost of the Financial Institutions -- Appendix E. Number of Certified Anti-money Laundering Specialists Graduate List (Top 15 Countries/Regions) -- Appendix F. Current AML/CFT Measures in Two-Tiered Retail CBDC -- References -- DeFi -- Uniswap Liquidity Provision: An Online Learning Approach -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Uniswap Overview -- 2.1 Uniswap v3 - Concentrated Liquidity -- 3 Online Learning Model -- 3.1 Reward Function -- 4 Static Strategies -- 4.1 n= -- 4.2 n < -- -- 5 Adaptive Strategy -- 6 Conclusions -- A Reward Function Derivation -- A.1 Trading Fees -- A.2 Change in Value -- A.3 Total Reward -- B Proofs for Section4 -- B.1 Lemma 1 -- B.2 Lemma 2 -- B.3 Theorem 1 -- C Analysis of Algorithm 1 -- References -- Extended Abstract: The Effect of Trading Fees on Arbitrage Profits in Automated Market Makers -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Model -- 3 Results.
4 Conclusion.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910767524503321
Essex Aleksander  
Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops [[electronic resource] ] : Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC, Bol, Brač, Croatia, May 5, 2023, Revised Selected Papers / / edited by Aleksander Essex, Shin'ichiro Matsuo, Oksana Kulyk, Lewis Gudgeon, Ariah Klages-Mundt, Daniel Perez, Sam Werner, Andrea Bracciali, Geoff Goodell
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops [[electronic resource] ] : Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC, Bol, Brač, Croatia, May 5, 2023, Revised Selected Papers / / edited by Aleksander Essex, Shin'ichiro Matsuo, Oksana Kulyk, Lewis Gudgeon, Ariah Klages-Mundt, Daniel Perez, Sam Werner, Andrea Bracciali, Geoff Goodell
Autore Essex Aleksander
Edizione [1st ed. 2024.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (516 pages)
Disciplina 005.824
Altri autori (Persone) MatsuoShin'ichiro
KulykOksana
GudgeonLewis
Klages-MundtAriah
PerezDaniel
WernerSam
BraccialiAndrea
GoodellGeoff
Collana Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Soggetto topico Cryptography
Data encryption (Computer science)
Cryptology
ISBN 3-031-48806-7
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro -- VOTING 2023 Preface -- VOTING 2023 Organization -- CoDecFin 2023 4th Workshop on Coordination of Decentralized Finance -- CoDecFin 2023 Organization -- DeFi 2023 Preface -- DeFi 2023 Organization -- WTSC 2023 7th International Workshop on Trusted Smart Contracts -- WTSC 2023 Organization -- Contents -- Voting -- Belenios with Cast as Intended -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Protocol Description -- 2.1 Participants and Setup -- 2.2 Voting Phase -- 2.3 Tally Phase -- 2.4 Usability Considerations -- 3 Security Analysis -- 3.1 ProVerif -- 3.2 How to Overcome ProVerif's Limitations? -- 3.3 Security Analysis and Result -- 4 Efficiency Considerations -- References -- On the Auditability of the Estonian IVXV System -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 E-Voting in Estonia -- 1.2 The IVXV System -- 2 Scope, Methodology, and Contributions -- 3 Flaw in Individual Verifiability -- 3.1 Attack 1: Discarding a Vote -- 3.2 Attack 2: Changing a Vote with Knowledge of the Private Key -- 3.3 Attack 3: Changing a Vote Without Knowledge of the Private Key -- 3.4 Computational Condition for Precision Attacks -- 3.5 Solution -- 3.6 Why wasn't This Already Noted? -- 4 Analysis with Regards to Haines and Roenne 2021 -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Coercion-Resistant Cast-as-Intended Verifiability for Computationally Limited Voters -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 On the Limitations of the Coercion and of Voters' Capabilities -- 1.2 Related Work -- 1.3 Contributions and Organization of the Paper -- 2 Definitions -- 2.1 Cast-as-Intended Verifiability -- 2.2 Coercion-Resistance -- 3 A Construction for Limited Voters -- 3.1 The Protocol (for ElGamal Ciphertexts) -- 3.2 Cast-as-Intended Verifiability of the Proposed Protocol -- 3.3 Coercion-Resistance of the Proposed Protocol -- 4 Discussion and Conclusions -- 4.1 Practical Considerations.
4.2 Comparison with Bingo Voting: On the Necessity of OED -- References -- Private Internet Voting on Untrusted Voting Devices -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Election Model and Voting Procedure -- 1.2 Contribution and Overview -- 2 Cryptographic Background -- 2.1 ElGamal Encryptions -- 2.2 BLS Signatures -- 2.3 Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs -- 2.4 Verifiable Mix-Nets -- 3 Protocol Description -- 3.1 Election Parameters -- 3.2 Protocol Parties and Communication -- 3.3 General Protocol Idea -- 3.4 Pre-election Phase -- 3.5 Election Phase -- 3.6 Post-election Phase -- 4 Security Discussion -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Overstatement-Net-Equivalent Risk-Limiting Audit: ONEAudit -- 1 Introduction: Efficient Risk-Limiting Audits -- 2 Testing Net Overstatement Does Not Require CVRs Linked to Ballot Cards -- 2.1 Warmup: 2-Candidate Plurality Contest -- 2.2 Numerical Example -- 2.3 The General Case -- 3 Auditing Using Batch Subtotals -- 3.1 Numerical Case Studies -- 4 Auditing Heterogenous Voting Systems -- 5 Sample Sizes for Contest-Level ONE CLCA Vs. BPA -- 5.1 Theory -- 5.2 Numerical Comparison -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) -- 3 Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Winners -- 4 Risk-Limiting Audits for Ranked Pairs Elections -- 4.1 Assertions and Assorters for Transitive Inferences -- 4.2 Correctness of Audit Assertions -- 5 RLAs for Minimax Elections -- 6 Smith -- 7 Kemeny-Young -- 8 Other Condorcet Methods -- 9 Results -- 9.1 IRV vs Ranked Pairs -- 9.2 Elections Without a Condorcet Winner -- 10 Conclusion -- References -- COBRA: Comparison-Optimal Betting for Risk-Limiting Audits -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Notation -- 2.1 Population and Parameters -- 2.2 Audit Data -- 2.3 Risk Measurement via Betting Supermartingales -- 3 Oracle Betting.
3.1 Error-Free CVRs -- 3.2 Betting with CVR Error -- 3.3 Relation to ALPHA -- 4 Betting in Practice -- 4.1 Fixed Betting -- 4.2 Adaptive Betting -- 4.3 Diversified Betting -- 5 Numerical Evaluations -- 5.1 Oracle Simulations -- 5.2 Practical Simulations -- 6 Extensions -- 6.1 Betting While Sampling Without Replacement -- 6.2 Other Social Choice Functions -- 6.3 Batch-Level Comparison Audits -- 7 Conclusions -- References -- CoDecFin -- Shaping Cryptocurrency Gatekeepers with a Regulatory ``Trial and Error'' -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Exchanges as Gatekeepers of Illicit Financial Proceeds -- 2.2 The Current Risks of Terrorist Financing -- 3 Regulation Beyond the ``Wait and See'' Approach -- 3.1 The Inconsistency in Terms and Definitions -- 3.2 International and European Approaches to AML/CFT -- 4 Repercussions of the Ongoing ``Trial and Error'' Phase -- 4.1 The Lack of Consensus and Legal Uniformity -- 4.2 Enforcement Issues with Texts and Actual Compliance -- 4.3 The Sunrise Issue -- 4.4 The Burden of Compliance on Small/Medium Exchanges -- 5 The Future of Policymaking -- 5.1 Common Regulatory Practices in Need of Change -- 5.2 The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation -- 5.3 The Transfer of Funds Regulation -- 5.4 The Role of Law Enforcement -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- A First Dive into OFAC in DeFi Space -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Scope of Jurisdiction -- 2.1 Towards Chain -- 2.2 Towards Cryptocurrency -- 2.3 Towards DApp -- 3 Discussion -- References -- Proposal of Principles of DeFi Disclosure and Regulation -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Benefits, Advantages, and Possibilities of DeFi -- 3 Challenges, Risks, and Questions Related to DeFi -- 3.1 Lack of AML/KYC -- 3.2 Hacking -- 3.3 Is It Really ``Decentralized''? -- 3.4 Is It Really ``Traceable''?, Is It ``Accessible to All''? -- 3.5 Market Manipulation and Difficulties in Investigation.
3.6 Does It Really Contribute to ``Financial Inclusion''? -- 3.7 Operational Risk in DeFi -- 3.8 Characteristics of Procyclicality and the Potential for Systemic Risk Associated with It -- 3.9 Lack of Ability to Address Risks Associated with Information Asymmetry -- 4 Implications for Regulatory Consideration -- 4.1 Innovation Trilemma -- 4.2 Perspectives on Whether Financial Regulations Should Be Applied -- 4.3 Need for Regulation for Providers of Financial Functions -- 4.4 How to Ensure AML/CFT -- 5 Proposal of Principles of DeFi Disclosure and Regulation -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs - An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Methodology and Dataset -- 3.1 Data Collection -- 3.2 Dataset -- 4 Distribution of Voting Power -- 5 Structure of Voting Power Delegation -- 6 Governance Participation -- 7 Pointless Governance Transactions -- 8 Monetary Price of Governance -- 8.1 Price of Governance Transactions -- 8.2 Price of Transfer Overhead -- 9 Conclusion -- A Short Description of Analyzed DAOs -- B Computing the Cost of Governance -- C Computing the Overhead Cost of Governance -- References -- An Intrinsic Mechanism Deciding Hash Rates from Bitcoin Price -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Rational Choice of Hash Rates -- 2.1 Model of Blockchain Network -- 2.2 Single-Period Mining -- 2.3 Multi-period Mining and Dynamic Programming -- 2.4 Myopic Decision of Hash Rates with Isoelastic Utility Functions -- 2.5 Mean-Variance Approximation and Miners' Hash Rates -- 2.6 Rational Network Hash Rate in Blockchain Network -- 3 Conclusion -- References -- Stablecoins: Past, Present, and Future -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Where They Came from and Why -- 3 Current State of Stablecoins -- 4 Stablecoin Classification -- 5 The Collapse of Luna -- 6 Future Directions -- 7 Conclusion.
FTX Collapse: A Ponzi Story -- 1 Introduction -- 2 What is Ponzi? -- 3 The FTX Collapse -- 4 Future Directions -- 5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Policy Design of Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Embedding AML/CFT Compliance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Proposed CBDC Model Structure and Associated AML/CFT Limitations -- 3 Total Cost Structure of CBDC -- 4 Current AML/CFT Mechanism -- 4.1 Stakeholders -- 4.2 Process -- 4.3 Cost Structures and Incentives -- 4.4 Professional Resources in AML/CFT Measures -- 5 AML/CFT Mechanisms in Retail CBDC Projects -- 6 Feasibility of the AML/CFT System Associated with CBDC -- 6.1 Tiered System Based on the Level of Assurance -- 6.2 Collective Customer Due Diligence -- 6.3 Automated Analysis and Evaluation -- 6.4 Judgment and Reporting -- 7 Conclusion -- Appendix A. Generalized AML/CFT Process -- Appendix B. High Performing FIU (Israel, Italy, and Spain) -- Appendix C. Compliance Cost of the Financial Institutions -- Appendix D. Compliance Cost of the Financial Institutions -- Appendix E. Number of Certified Anti-money Laundering Specialists Graduate List (Top 15 Countries/Regions) -- Appendix F. Current AML/CFT Measures in Two-Tiered Retail CBDC -- References -- DeFi -- Uniswap Liquidity Provision: An Online Learning Approach -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Uniswap Overview -- 2.1 Uniswap v3 - Concentrated Liquidity -- 3 Online Learning Model -- 3.1 Reward Function -- 4 Static Strategies -- 4.1 n= -- 4.2 n < -- -- 5 Adaptive Strategy -- 6 Conclusions -- A Reward Function Derivation -- A.1 Trading Fees -- A.2 Change in Value -- A.3 Total Reward -- B Proofs for Section4 -- B.1 Lemma 1 -- B.2 Lemma 2 -- B.3 Theorem 1 -- C Analysis of Algorithm 1 -- References -- Extended Abstract: The Effect of Trading Fees on Arbitrage Profits in Automated Market Makers -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Model -- 3 Results.
4 Conclusion.
Record Nr. UNISA-996587869803316
Essex Aleksander  
Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2024
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. di Salerno
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui