Democratic Decision-making [[electronic resource] ] : Consensus Voting for Civic Society and Parliaments / / by Peter Emerson |
Autore | Emerson Peter |
Edizione | [1st ed. 2021.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2021 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XXIX, 99 p. 15 illus.) |
Disciplina | 324.6 |
Collana | SpringerBriefs in Political Science |
Soggetto topico |
Elections
Microeconomics Comparative government Electoral Politics Comparative Politics |
ISBN | 3-030-52808-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | The Problem -- Decision-making -- The A-B-C-D of Voting -- Consensus Voting -- The Consequences of Consequences -- Comparing Decision-making Voting Procedures -- Comparing Electoral Systems. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910483355203321 |
Emerson Peter | ||
Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2021 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics [[electronic resource] /] / by Peter Emerson |
Autore | Emerson Peter |
Edizione | [1st ed. 2016.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2016 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (167 p.) |
Disciplina | 320 |
Soggetto topico |
Political theory
Public finance Human rights International relations Comparative politics International humanitarian law Political Theory Public Economics Human Rights International Relations Comparative Politics International Humanitarian Law, Law of Armed Conflict |
ISBN | 3-319-23500-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- 2. Majority Rule: The Right May Be Wrong -- 3. Majority Rule in the West -- 4. The New Democracies -- 5. The GOAT is a GNU -- 6. Electing a Proportional All-Party, Power-Sharing Executive -- 7. Will it Work? -- Annex I: The Rules for an MBC -- Annex II: The Rules for a Matrix Vote Election -- Annex III: Examples of Valid and Invalid Ballots -- Annex IV: Sample Forms Required for a Matrix Vote Paper Count. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910255334303321 |
Emerson Peter | ||
Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2016 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Majority Voting as a Catalyst of Populism [[electronic resource] ] : Preferential Decision-making for an Inclusive Democracy / / by Peter Emerson |
Autore | Emerson Peter |
Edizione | [1st ed. 2020.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2020 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XXXIX, 227 p. 33 illus., 7 illus. in color.) |
Disciplina | 324.6 |
Soggetto topico |
Elections
Democracy Welfare economics Political science Peace Electoral Politics Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Governance and Government Conflict Studies Peace Studies |
ISBN | 3-030-20219-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Decision-making in Parliaments and Referendums -- Parliamentary and Presidential Elections -- Governance: From Power-dividing to Power-sharing -- Majority Voting in Belfast, Dublin and London -- Continental Europe – Are We All Little Bolshevik? -- Asia, Where Voting was Invented -- Majoritarian Democracy – the Catalyst of Populism. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910369928303321 |
Emerson Peter | ||
Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2020 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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The punters' guide to democracy : what it is, sadly ; and what it could be, gladly / / Peter Emerson |
Autore | Emerson Peter |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022] |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (163 pages) |
Disciplina | 929.605 |
Soggetto topico | Consensus (Social sciences) |
ISBN |
9783031069871
9783031069864 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Foreword from Professor Katy Hayward -- Foreword from Professor 杨 , Yáng Lóng -- Preface -- The Book -- The Text -- Reference -- Acknowledgements -- Reviews -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Graphs -- List of Tables -- 1 AI, Artificial Incompetence-The Ubiquitous Use of Binary Voting -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Binary Ballot -- 1.3 Majority Rule -- 1.3.1 The Old Days -- 1.3.2 The Binary Paradox -- 1.3.3 The Blunt Instrument -- 1.4 The Binary Debate -- 1.4.1 The Belfast Agreement -- 1.4.2 Stable Democracies -- 1.4.3 Ethno-Religious Conflicts -- 1.5 Conclusion -- Reference -- 2 Oh Lord, Give Me Consensus, But Not Yet-Pluralism is Possible -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.1.1 The Wrong Question -- 2.2 The Democratic Majority Opinion -- 2.2.1 Plurality Voting -- 2.2.2 The Two-Round System -- 2.2.3 The Alternative Vote -- 2.2.4 Serial Voting -- 2.2.5 Approval Voting -- 2.2.6 Range Voting -- 2.2.7 The Borda Count and Modified Borda Count -- 2.2.8 The Condorcet Rule -- 2.3 An Overall Comparison -- 2.3.1 Choice -- 2.4 Consensus Voting -- 2.4.1 The Right Answer -- 2.5 Not Yet Nirvana -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3 The Art and Science of Compromise -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Consensus Debate -- 3.2.1 The Structure of the Debate -- 3.2.2 Choosing the Options -- 3.2.3 Maintaining a Balance -- 3.2.4 Casting a Vote -- 3.2.5 Analysing the Outcome -- 3.2.6 Consensus Coefficients -- 3.2.7 The Inclusive Average -- 3.3 The Speaker -- 3.4 Conclusion -- Reference -- 4 The Goat is a Gnu*-Electing an All-Party Power-Sharing Executive -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Matrix Vote -- 4.2.1 The Matrix Vote-The Ballot -- 4.2.2 The Matrix Vote-The Vote -- 4.2.3 The Matrix Vote-The Count -- 4.2.4 The Matrix Vote-The Analysis -- 4.2.5 The Matrix Vote-The Result -- 4.2.6 The Matrix Vote-Choice -- 4.3 Realpolitik.
4.3.1 The Matrix Vote in Stable Democracies -- 4.3.2 The Matrix Vote in Conflict Zones -- 4.4 A Consensual Polity -- 4.4.1 Consensus for the Non-consensual -- 4.4.2 Choice -- 4.5 Conclusion -- Reference -- 5 'The People Have Voted… The [Expletives]!'*-Comparing Electoral Systems -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 A Choice of Electoral Systems -- 5.2.1 The Binary Ballot -- 5.2.2 First-Past-The-Post -- 5.2.3 The Two-Round System -- 5.2.4 Serial Voting -- 5.2.5 The Alternative Vote -- 5.2.6 Approval Voting -- 5.2.7 Range Voting -- 5.2.8 Some Other PR Systems -- 5.2.9 Proportional Representation-Single Transferable Vote -- 5.2.10 The Borda and Condorcet Rules -- 5.2.11 A Two-Tier Electoral System -- 5.2.12 The Quota Borda System -- 5.2.13 Condorcet -- 5.3 An Overview -- 5.4 Conclusion -- References -- 6 A Little Long History of Voting Systems -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Traditional Structures -- 6.2.1 Africa -- 6.2.2 Asia -- 6.2.3 Europe, Demos and the World -- 6.3 From Binary Voting to Pluralism -- 6.3.1 Preferential Voting -- 6.4 The History of Social Choice Science -- 6.4.1 The Science Re-born -- 6.4.2 The Lessons Unlearnt -- 6.4.3 Referendums -- 6.5 Conclusion -- References -- 7 A Consensual Milieu -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Conflict Resolution -- 7.2.1 Binary Voting in Binary Conflicts -- 7.2.2 Binary Voting in Stable Democracies -- 7.2.3 Conflict Prevention -- 7.3 The West, Russia and China -- 7.3.1 Choice -- 7.4 Right, Extreme Right and Downright Wrong -- 7.4.1 Interference -- 7.5 Evolution -- 7.6 COVID, Climate Change and… -- 7.7 Conclusion -- References -- Epilogue: A Consensual Polity for a Consensual Milieu -- The Principles -- The Practice -- The Personnel -- Conclusion -- References -- Annex I: The Professors' Synopsis -- I.1 Manifold Manipulation -- I.2 Conclusion -- Annex II: More Manipulation -- II.1 A Binary Lottery. Annex III: The Single-peaked Curve -- III.1 More Precision -- III.1.2 Interpreting the Preferences -- III.2 Sets of Preferences -- III.3 Choice -- Annex IV: The Partial Vote -- IV.1 Preference or Intransigence -- IV.2 Consensus Coefficients and Thresholds -- IV.2.1 Consensus Coefficients Under Partial Voting -- IV.3 Aiming for Perfection -- Annex V: Consensus Coefficients -- V.1 A Mean Average -- V.2 The Thresholds -- Annex VI: The Matrix Vote in Realpolitik -- VI.1 The Completed Matrix Vote Ballot -- Annex VII: Emerson's Taxonomy of Decision-making -- VII.1 Methodologies -- VII.1.1 Binary Voting -- VII.1.2 Plurality Voting, Two-Round System, Serial Voting -- VII.1.3 Modified Borda Count -- VII.2 Analyses -- VII.2.1 Binary Voting -- VII.2.2 Multi-option Non-preferential Systems -- VII.2.3 Multi-option Preferential Systems -- VII.3 Voting Procedures in Decision-Making -- Glossary -- Index. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910616391103321 |
Emerson Peter | ||
Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022] | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|