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Industrial Organization : Practice Exercises with Answer Keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, and Felix Muñoz-Garcia
| Industrial Organization : Practice Exercises with Answer Keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, and Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
| Autore | Choi Pak-Sing |
| Edizione | [Second edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2023] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (680 pages) |
| Disciplina | 354.81150006 |
| Collana | Springer Texts in Business and Economics Series |
| Soggetto topico | Industrial organization (Economic theory) |
| ISBN | 3-031-38635-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- 1 Monopoly -- Introduction -- Exercise #1.1: Monopoly with Linear CostsA -- Exercise #1.2: Monopoly with Convex CostsA -- Exercise #1.3: Monopolist with Linear Inverse Demand and Generic Cost FunctionB -- Exercise #1.4: Convex, Concave, and Linear Demand in MonopolyC -- Exercise #1.5: Maximizing Revenue or Maximizing Profit?A -- Exercise #1.6: Learning-by-Doing and Commitment in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.7: Monopolist Serving Two Interdependent MarketsB -- Exercise #1.8: Multiplant Monopolist-IA -- Exercise #1.9: Multiplant Monopolist-IIB -- Exercise #1.10: Ramsey PricingB -- Exercise #1.11: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IA -- Exercise #1.12: Monopolist Serving Two Separated Markets-IIA -- Exercise #1.13: Geographical Price DiscriminationB -- Exercise #1.14: Two-Part PricingA -- Exercise #1.15: Monopoly Facing Entry Threats - Based on Tirole1988C -- Exercise #1.16: Multiproduct Monopoly with Economies of ScopeB -- Exercise #1.17: Vertical Differentiation and Natural MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.18: Persuasive Advertising in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.19: Informative Advertising in MonopolyB -- Exercise #1.20: Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in Monopoly - Based on Fudenberg2007 and Armstrong2007B -- 2 Simultaneous Quantity Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #2.1: Cournot Duopoly with Symmetric CostsA -- Exercise #2.2: Cournot Duopoly - Necessary and Sufficient ConditionsB -- Exercise #2.3: Cournot Oligopoly with Three Symmetric FirmsA -- Exercise #2.4: Cournot Oligopoly with N≥2 Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #2.5: Comparing Equilibrium and Socially Optimal Outputs Under Cournot CompetitionB -- Exercise #2.6: Cournot Pricing Formula - DerivationA -- Exercise #2.7: Cournot Pricing Formula - ApplicationA -- Exercise #2.8: Cournot Pricing Formula - Parametric ExampleA.
Exercise #2.9: Cournot Duopoly with Asymmetric Marginal CostsA -- Exercise #2.10: Cournot Competition with n Firms Facing Asymmetric CostsC -- Exercise #2.11: Cournot with Only One Firm Benefiting from a Cost AdvantageB -- Exercise #2.12: Social Welfare with Cost-Symmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.13: Cournot Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #2.14: Cournot Competition with N≥2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #2.15: Cournot Competition with N≥2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: MergerB -- Exercise #2.16: Cournot Competition with N≥2 Asymmetric Firms Allowing for Product Differentiation: Merger IncentivesB -- Exercise #2.17: Social Welfare with Cost-Asymmetric Firms Selling Heterogeneous Goods and Competing in QuantitiesA -- Exercise #2.18: Entry that Reduces Aggregate OutputA -- Exercise #2.19: Cournot with Asymmetric Fixed CostsB -- Exercise #2.20: Can Fewer Firms Decrease Prices?B -- Exercise #2.21: Cournot with Equity Shares - Based on Reynolds1986B -- Exercise #2.22: Cournot Competition Between a Private and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.23: Cournot Competition Between N Private Firms and a Public FirmB -- Exercise #2.24: Managerial Incentives in Cournot - Based on Fershtman1987C -- Exercise #2.25: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #2.26: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #2.27: Cournot Competition Under Incomplete Information-IIIC -- Exercise #2.28: Cournot Competition When Firms Are Asymmetrically Informed of Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #2.29: Nonlinear Pricing in Oligopoly - Based on Harrison2001C -- 3 Simultaneous Price Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Symmetric CostsA. Exercise #3.2: Price Competition with Homogeneous Products and Asymmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.3: Price Competition with Price-Matching GuaranteesB -- Exercise #3.4: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Symmetric CostsA -- Exercise #3.5: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Asymmetric CostsB -- Exercise #3.6: Price Competition with Homogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsC -- Exercise #3.7: Price Competition with Heterogeneous Goods and Uncertain CostsB -- Exercise #3.8: Entry-Deterring PricesC -- Exercise #3.9: Using Capacity Constraints to Reconcile Bertrand and Cournot ModelsC -- Exercise #3.10: Generalized Hotelling ModelA -- Exercise #3.11: Hotelling Model of Horizontal Product DifferentiationA -- Exercise #3.12: Hotelling with Asymmetric Transportation CostsB -- Exercise #3.13: Socially Optimal Location in Hotelling ModelB -- Exercise #3.14: Hotelling with Non-uniformly Distributed Consumers.C -- Exercise #3.15: Salop Circle of Horizontal Product DifferentiationB -- Exercise #3.16: Horizontal Differentiation in Two Dimensions, Based on Irmean1998C -- Exercise #3.17: Vertical Differentiation, Quality Choice, and Price CompetitionB -- Exercise #3.18: Products Horizontally and Vertically DifferentiatedC -- 4 Sequential Competition -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: Stackelberg Competition with Two Symmetric FirmsA -- Exercise #4.2: Stackelberg Competition with Three Symmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.3: Stackelberg Competition with Two Asymmetric FirmsB -- Exercise #4.4: Stackelberg Competition, General PresentationC -- Exercise #4.5: Stackelberg Competition Between a Private Leader and a Public FollowerB -- Exercise #4.6: Stackelberg Competition Between a Public Leader and a Private FollowerB -- Exercise #4.7: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information - Uninformed LeaderB. Exercise #4.8: Stackelberg with Demand Shocks, Based on Liu2005B -- Exercise #4.9: Stackelberg Competition Under Incomplete Information - Uninformed FollowerC -- Exercise #4.10: Hybrid Competition - Leader Choosing Output and Follower Choosing PriceB -- Exercise #4.11: Stackelberg Competition with m Leaders, Based on Huck2001C -- Exercise #4.12: Sequential Price Competition with Homogeneous GoodsA -- Exercise #4.13: Sequential Price Competition with Heterogeneous GoodsB -- Exercise #4.14: Committing in Prices or Quantities, Based on Singh1984B -- Exercise #4.15: Strategic Pre-commitment by Only One Firm Followed by Cournot Competition, Based on Fudenberg1984B -- Exercise #4.16: Strategic Pre-commitment by Only One Firm Followed by Bertrand CompetitionB -- Exercise #4.17: Strategic Pre-commitment by Both FirmsB -- 5 Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #5.2: Regulating a Polluting MonopolyB -- Exercise #5.3: Regulating a Monopolist Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAA -- Exercise #5.4: Regulating a Natural MonopolistA -- Exercise #5.5: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IB -- Exercise #5.6: Regulating a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information-IIC -- Exercise #5.7: Regulating a Cournot OligopolyA -- Exercise #5.8: Regulating a Polluting Cournot OligopolyB -- Exercise #5.9: Regulating a Polluting Cournot Oligopoly Under Complete Information - Pigouvian EPAB -- Exercise #5.10: Regulating Polluting Firms That Compete à la StackelbergB -- Exercise #5.11: Endogenous Entry DecisionsB -- Exercise #5.12: Tax Incidence in MonopolyC -- 6 R& -- D Incentives -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Incentives to Innovate Under MonopolyA -- Exercise #6.2: Quantity Competition: More Incentives to Innovate Than Under Monopoly?B. Exercise #6.3: Price Competition: Less Incentives to Innovate Under Monopoly?B -- Exercise #6.4: Larger R& -- D Under Monopoly or Duopoly? Welfare EvaluationC -- Exercise #6.5: More Competitive Industries and R& -- D InvestmentC -- Exercise #6.6: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- DB -- Exercise #6.7: Research Joint Ventures in R& -- D When Firms Compete in PricesB -- Exercise #6.8: Spillover Effects in R& -- D InvestmentB -- Exercise #6.9: Two Firms Sequentially Developing New ProductsB -- Exercise #6.10: Green Innovation, Based on Lambertini2017C -- Exercise #6.11: Incentives to Innovate in Cournot, Based on Delbono1991C -- Exercise #6.12: Cost-Reducing Investments That Accommodate EntryB -- Exercise #6.13: Cost-Reducing Investments That Deter EntryB -- Exercise #6.14: Is Entry Deterrence Profitable?B -- Exercise #6.15: Optimal Patent Length, Based on Takalo2001C -- Exercise #6.16: Optimal Patent Length, An ApplicationB -- 7 Mergers -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: Mergers Between Two FirmsA -- Exercise #7.2: Mergers Between n≥2 Firms, Based on Salant1983B -- Exercise #7.3: Unsustainable MergersA -- Exercise #7.4: Bertrand Mergers with Differentiated ProductsB -- Exercise #7.5: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Symmetric CostsB -- Exercise #7.6: Cournot Mergers with Differentiated Products and Asymmetric Costs, Based on Gelves2014C -- Exercise #7.7: Cartels with SynergiesB -- Exercise #7.8: Merger to Gain Economies of ScopeB -- Exercise #7.9: Merger to Gain Stackelberg LeadershipB -- Exercise #7.10: Merger Between a Leader and Follower, Based on Huck2001C -- Exercise #7.11: The ``Tragedy of the Anticommons,'' Heller1998B -- Exercise #7.12: Mergers in Polluting Markets, Based on Fikru2016C -- 8 Collusion -- Introduction -- Exercise #8.1: Collusion with Two Firms Competing à la CournotB. Exercise #8.2: Collusion with n Firms Competing à la CournotC. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910766882903321 |
Choi Pak-Sing
|
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| Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2023] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Industrial Organization : Practice Exercises with Answer Keys / / by Pak-Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, Felix Muñoz-Garcia
| Industrial Organization : Practice Exercises with Answer Keys / / by Pak-Sing Choi, Eric Dunaway, Felix Muñoz-Garcia |
| Autore | Choi Pak-Sing |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2021.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2021 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (XIV, 441 p. 62 illus., 58 illus. in color.) |
| Disciplina | 338.6 |
| Collana | Springer Texts in Business and Economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Industrial organization
Microeconomics Economics - Psychological aspects Industrial Organization Behavioral Economics |
| ISBN | 3-030-57284-6 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | 1. Monopoly -- 2. Simultaneous quantity competition -- 3. Simultaneous price competition -- 4. Sequential competition -- 5. Regulating imperfectly competitive markets -- 6. R&D incentives -- 7. Mergers and Collusion -- 8. Bundling incentives -- 9. Incomplete information, signaling, and competition -- 10. Networks and switching costs. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910483540403321 |
|
Choi Pak-Sing
|
||
| Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2021 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||