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The birds of northern Melanesia [[electronic resource] ] : speciation, ecology & biogeography / / Ernst Mayr, Jared Diamond ; color plates by H. Douglas Pratt
The birds of northern Melanesia [[electronic resource] ] : speciation, ecology & biogeography / / Ernst Mayr, Jared Diamond ; color plates by H. Douglas Pratt
Autore Mayr Ernst <1904-2005.>
Pubbl/distr/stampa Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2001
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (537 p.)
Disciplina 598/.09958
Altri autori (Persone) DiamondJared M
Soggetto topico Birds - Papua New Guinea - Bismarck Archipelago
Birds - Solomon Islands
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-280-83503-6
9786610835034
0-19-534966-0
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Introduction; Part I. Northern Melanesia's Physical and Biological Environment; Part II. Human History and Impacts; Part III. The Northern Melanesian Avifauna; Part IV. Colonization Routes; Part V. Taxonomic Analysis: Differences Among Species; Part VI. Geographic Analysis: Differences Among Islands; Part VII. Synthesis, Conclusions, and Prospects; Maps; Appendices; References; Index
Record Nr. UNINA-9910458630103321
Mayr Ernst <1904-2005.>  
Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2001
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
The birds of northern Melanesia [[electronic resource] ] : speciation, ecology & biogeography / / Ernst Mayr, Jared Diamond ; color plates by H. Douglas Pratt
The birds of northern Melanesia [[electronic resource] ] : speciation, ecology & biogeography / / Ernst Mayr, Jared Diamond ; color plates by H. Douglas Pratt
Autore Mayr Ernst <1904-2005.>
Pubbl/distr/stampa Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2001
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (537 p.)
Disciplina 598/.09958
Altri autori (Persone) DiamondJared M
Soggetto topico Birds - Papua New Guinea - Bismarck Archipelago
Birds - Solomon Islands
ISBN 0-19-770043-8
1-280-83503-6
9786610835034
0-19-534966-0
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Introduction; Part I. Northern Melanesia's Physical and Biological Environment; Part II. Human History and Impacts; Part III. The Northern Melanesian Avifauna; Part IV. Colonization Routes; Part V. Taxonomic Analysis: Differences Among Species; Part VI. Geographic Analysis: Differences Among Islands; Part VII. Synthesis, Conclusions, and Prospects; Maps; Appendices; References; Index
Record Nr. UNINA-9910784863103321
Mayr Ernst <1904-2005.>  
Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2001
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
The invisible hands : top hedge fund traders on bubbles, crashes, and real money / / Steven Drobny ; forewords by Nouriel Roubini and Jared Diamond
The invisible hands : top hedge fund traders on bubbles, crashes, and real money / / Steven Drobny ; forewords by Nouriel Roubini and Jared Diamond
Autore Drobny Steven
Edizione [Revised and Updated.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Hoboken, New Jersey : , : John Wiley and Sons, Incorporation, , 2014
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (464 p.)
Disciplina 332.64524
Altri autori (Persone) RoubiniNouriel
DiamondJared M
Soggetto topico Hedge funds
Investment advisors
Mutual funds
Portfolio management
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-118-86568-5
1-118-86562-6
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto THE INVISIBLE HANDS; Contents; Foreword to the 2011 Edition; Foreword to the 2010 Edition; Preface; Preface to the 2011 Edition; Preface to the 2010 Edition; Part One REAL MONEY AND THE CRASH OF '08; Chapter 1 Rethinking Real Money; I. Why Real Money?; Size; Impact on Society; 2008 Losses; Taxpayer; II. The Evolution of Real Money; In the Beginning, There Were Bonds; Along Came Inflation; The 60-40 Model and the Great Moderation; The Dot-Com Crash; We Are All Endowments Now; The Crash of '08; Less Endowed; Pensions Are Different; III. RETHINKING REAL MONEY-MACRO PRINCIPLES
Chapter 2 The Family Office ManagerFrom mid-2008 to mid-2009, you took a year off and went to cash. Isgoing to cash the key differentiator between hedge funds and real money?; How do you value cash?; Looking back at Japan in 1990 or at the United States in 1929, the valueof cash looked pretty good 20 or 30 years after these events. Yet for thelast 20 to 30 years in the U.S., cash looks like a pretty bad investment.; What is the appropriate cash level for an endowment or pension?
We all know that correlations go to one in a disaster, yet it still catchespeople out. What can investors do to prepare for downside tail events?In doing this analysis, are you guilty of investing in the rear viewmirror?; Being cognizant of what everyone else is doing seems to be a big partof your analysis.; So real money managers should use a valuation approach to raise orlower equity and equity-like exposures and cash and cash-like exposures?; What other flaws in the real money world were exposed in 2008?; Should real money funds manage to a risk target rather than areturn target?
Does asset allocation work in a world where extreme events happen moreoften than predicted?If size is the enemy of flexibility, what should large real money fundslike CalPERS, with 200 billion in assets, do?; How should a real money fund manage its portfolios with respectto inflation?; Is there anything else you learned from 2008?; Part Two The Invisible Hands; Chapter 3 The House; How did you get into this business?; How does the feedback of being right or wrong affect you?; At what point in your career did you know you had skill?
If you were asked to run one of the Swedish AP pension funds as part ofyour social welfare duty, how would you go about it?So the weaknesses in the real money world are structural. How wouldyou go about maximizing the strengths, such as the strong balance sheetand credit worthiness that you mentioned?; Isn't levering up a portfolio with illiquid assets what caused so muchtrouble for investors in 2008, especially in the endowment and pensionworld?; What are your thoughts on diversification, which didn't provide muchsafety in 2008?; What else do most institutional investors get wrong?
Should institutional investors use outside advisors to help plug theirknowledge gap?
Record Nr. UNINA-9910463013303321
Drobny Steven  
Hoboken, New Jersey : , : John Wiley and Sons, Incorporation, , 2014
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
The invisible hands : top hedge fund traders on bubbles, crashes, and real money / / Steven Drobny ; forewords by Nouriel Roubini and Jared Diamond
The invisible hands : top hedge fund traders on bubbles, crashes, and real money / / Steven Drobny ; forewords by Nouriel Roubini and Jared Diamond
Autore Drobny Steven
Edizione [Revised and Updated.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Hoboken, New Jersey : , : John Wiley and Sons, Incorporation, , 2014
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (464 p.)
Disciplina 332.64524
Altri autori (Persone) RoubiniNouriel
DiamondJared M
Soggetto topico Hedge funds
Investment advisors
Mutual funds
Portfolio management
ISBN 1-118-86568-5
1-118-86562-6
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto THE INVISIBLE HANDS; Contents; Foreword to the 2011 Edition; Foreword to the 2010 Edition; Preface; Preface to the 2011 Edition; Preface to the 2010 Edition; Part One REAL MONEY AND THE CRASH OF '08; Chapter 1 Rethinking Real Money; I. Why Real Money?; Size; Impact on Society; 2008 Losses; Taxpayer; II. The Evolution of Real Money; In the Beginning, There Were Bonds; Along Came Inflation; The 60-40 Model and the Great Moderation; The Dot-Com Crash; We Are All Endowments Now; The Crash of '08; Less Endowed; Pensions Are Different; III. RETHINKING REAL MONEY-MACRO PRINCIPLES
Chapter 2 The Family Office ManagerFrom mid-2008 to mid-2009, you took a year off and went to cash. Isgoing to cash the key differentiator between hedge funds and real money?; How do you value cash?; Looking back at Japan in 1990 or at the United States in 1929, the valueof cash looked pretty good 20 or 30 years after these events. Yet for thelast 20 to 30 years in the U.S., cash looks like a pretty bad investment.; What is the appropriate cash level for an endowment or pension?
We all know that correlations go to one in a disaster, yet it still catchespeople out. What can investors do to prepare for downside tail events?In doing this analysis, are you guilty of investing in the rear viewmirror?; Being cognizant of what everyone else is doing seems to be a big partof your analysis.; So real money managers should use a valuation approach to raise orlower equity and equity-like exposures and cash and cash-like exposures?; What other flaws in the real money world were exposed in 2008?; Should real money funds manage to a risk target rather than areturn target?
Does asset allocation work in a world where extreme events happen moreoften than predicted?If size is the enemy of flexibility, what should large real money fundslike CalPERS, with 200 billion in assets, do?; How should a real money fund manage its portfolios with respectto inflation?; Is there anything else you learned from 2008?; Part Two The Invisible Hands; Chapter 3 The House; How did you get into this business?; How does the feedback of being right or wrong affect you?; At what point in your career did you know you had skill?
If you were asked to run one of the Swedish AP pension funds as part ofyour social welfare duty, how would you go about it?So the weaknesses in the real money world are structural. How wouldyou go about maximizing the strengths, such as the strong balance sheetand credit worthiness that you mentioned?; Isn't levering up a portfolio with illiquid assets what caused so muchtrouble for investors in 2008, especially in the endowment and pensionworld?; What are your thoughts on diversification, which didn't provide muchsafety in 2008?; What else do most institutional investors get wrong?
Should institutional investors use outside advisors to help plug theirknowledge gap?
Record Nr. UNINA-9910787637603321
Drobny Steven  
Hoboken, New Jersey : , : John Wiley and Sons, Incorporation, , 2014
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
The invisible hands : top hedge fund traders on bubbles, crashes, and real money / / Steven Drobny ; forewords by Nouriel Roubini and Jared Diamond
The invisible hands : top hedge fund traders on bubbles, crashes, and real money / / Steven Drobny ; forewords by Nouriel Roubini and Jared Diamond
Autore Drobny Steven
Edizione [Revised and Updated.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Hoboken, New Jersey : , : John Wiley and Sons, Incorporation, , 2014
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (464 p.)
Disciplina 332.64524
Altri autori (Persone) RoubiniNouriel
DiamondJared M
Soggetto topico Hedge funds
Investment advisors
Mutual funds
Portfolio management
ISBN 1-118-86568-5
1-118-86562-6
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto THE INVISIBLE HANDS; Contents; Foreword to the 2011 Edition; Foreword to the 2010 Edition; Preface; Preface to the 2011 Edition; Preface to the 2010 Edition; Part One REAL MONEY AND THE CRASH OF '08; Chapter 1 Rethinking Real Money; I. Why Real Money?; Size; Impact on Society; 2008 Losses; Taxpayer; II. The Evolution of Real Money; In the Beginning, There Were Bonds; Along Came Inflation; The 60-40 Model and the Great Moderation; The Dot-Com Crash; We Are All Endowments Now; The Crash of '08; Less Endowed; Pensions Are Different; III. RETHINKING REAL MONEY-MACRO PRINCIPLES
Chapter 2 The Family Office ManagerFrom mid-2008 to mid-2009, you took a year off and went to cash. Isgoing to cash the key differentiator between hedge funds and real money?; How do you value cash?; Looking back at Japan in 1990 or at the United States in 1929, the valueof cash looked pretty good 20 or 30 years after these events. Yet for thelast 20 to 30 years in the U.S., cash looks like a pretty bad investment.; What is the appropriate cash level for an endowment or pension?
We all know that correlations go to one in a disaster, yet it still catchespeople out. What can investors do to prepare for downside tail events?In doing this analysis, are you guilty of investing in the rear viewmirror?; Being cognizant of what everyone else is doing seems to be a big partof your analysis.; So real money managers should use a valuation approach to raise orlower equity and equity-like exposures and cash and cash-like exposures?; What other flaws in the real money world were exposed in 2008?; Should real money funds manage to a risk target rather than areturn target?
Does asset allocation work in a world where extreme events happen moreoften than predicted?If size is the enemy of flexibility, what should large real money fundslike CalPERS, with 200 billion in assets, do?; How should a real money fund manage its portfolios with respectto inflation?; Is there anything else you learned from 2008?; Part Two The Invisible Hands; Chapter 3 The House; How did you get into this business?; How does the feedback of being right or wrong affect you?; At what point in your career did you know you had skill?
If you were asked to run one of the Swedish AP pension funds as part ofyour social welfare duty, how would you go about it?So the weaknesses in the real money world are structural. How wouldyou go about maximizing the strengths, such as the strong balance sheetand credit worthiness that you mentioned?; Isn't levering up a portfolio with illiquid assets what caused so muchtrouble for investors in 2008, especially in the endowment and pensionworld?; What are your thoughts on diversification, which didn't provide muchsafety in 2008?; What else do most institutional investors get wrong?
Should institutional investors use outside advisors to help plug theirknowledge gap?
Record Nr. UNINA-9910814319503321
Drobny Steven  
Hoboken, New Jersey : , : John Wiley and Sons, Incorporation, , 2014
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui