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Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will [[electronic resource] /] / Norman O. Dahl
Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will [[electronic resource] /] / Norman O. Dahl
Autore Dahl Norman O
Pubbl/distr/stampa Minneapolis, : University of Minnesota Press, c1984
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (316 p.)
Disciplina 171/.3
Collana Minnesota publications in the humanities
Soggetto topico Ethics, Ancient
Reason - History
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 0-8166-5561-8
0-8166-1246-3
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Part One: Practical Reason and Aristotle; Chapter 1 A Statement of the Problem; Section I: The Nature of Practical Reason; Section II: The Scope of Practical Reason; Section III: Does Aristotle's Ethics Rest on Practical Reason?; Chapter 2 Aristotle and Hume: A Preliminary Contrast; Section I: Action as a Result of Appetite; Section II: Action as a Result of Desire and Deliberation; Section III: The Practical Syllogism; Section IV: A Preliminary Contrast; Chapter 3 Reason and General Ends; Section I: Reason Apprehends the Ends of Action
Section II: Universal Ends Acquired by Induction: The Role of Nous in Practical AffairsSection III: Apprehending vs. Acquiring Ends; Section IV: A Sketch of a Theory; Section V: Objections; Chapter 4 The Pervasiveness of Aristotle's Views on Practical Reason; Section I: Practical Wisdom and Virtue; Section II: Excellence in Deliberation; Section III: Nature and the End of Action (NE 1114b16-25); Section IV: Aristotle's Methodology in Ethics and Politics; Chapter 5 The Apparent Support for the Humean Position; Section I: Deliberation Is about Means
Section II: Virtue Preserves First PrinciplesSection III: Phronēsis Provides One with the Right Means, Aretē with the Right Ends; Chapter 6 A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 7 The Interest of Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason: Happiness and the Good Relative to Human Beings; Section I: Happiness as the End of Action; Section II: The Good as Fulfilling the Ergon of Human Beings Well; Section III: The Good for Human Beings and the Good Human Being: Their Connection; Chapter 8 Does Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason Provide an Adequate Basis for Ethics?
Section I: Initial ObjectionsSection II: The Incompleteness of Aristotle's Position; Section III: Objectivity Once More; Part Two: Aristotle and Weakness of the Will; Chapter 9 The Traditional Interpretation: Some Problems and Preliminaries; Section I: The Traditional Interpretation; Section II: Some Problems for the Traditional Interpretation; Section III: The Seriousness of These Problems; Section IV: Variations of the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Methodological Problem; Chapter 10 An Argument for the Traditional Interpretation; Section I: A Thesis about Knowledge and Action
Section II: Aristotle's General Approach to AkrasiaSection III: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section IV: Solutions to the Problems Raised for the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 11 An Argument for an Alternative Interpretation; Section I: Conflicts of Motive and Akrasia; Section II: The Thesis about Knowledge and Action Reconsidered; Section III: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section IV: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section V: Two Final Objections; Section VI: A Summary; Concluding Remarks
Appendix I: NE 1143a35-b5
Record Nr. UNINA-9910452141603321
Dahl Norman O  
Minneapolis, : University of Minnesota Press, c1984
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will / / Norman O. Dahl
Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will / / Norman O. Dahl
Autore Dahl Norman O
Pubbl/distr/stampa Minneapolis : , : University of Minnesota Press, , 1984
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xii, 302 pages)
Disciplina 171/.3
Collana Minnesota publications in the humanities
Soggetto topico Ethics, Ancient
Reason - History
ISBN 0-8166-5561-8
0-8166-1246-3
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Part One: Practical Reason and Aristotle; Chapter 1 A Statement of the Problem; Section I: The Nature of Practical Reason; Section II: The Scope of Practical Reason; Section III: Does Aristotle's Ethics Rest on Practical Reason?; Chapter 2 Aristotle and Hume: A Preliminary Contrast; Section I: Action as a Result of Appetite; Section II: Action as a Result of Desire and Deliberation; Section III: The Practical Syllogism; Section IV: A Preliminary Contrast; Chapter 3 Reason and General Ends; Section I: Reason Apprehends the Ends of Action
Section II: Universal Ends Acquired by Induction: The Role of Nous in Practical Affairs; Section III: Apprehending vs. Acquiring Ends; Section IV: A Sketch of a Theory; Section V: Objections; Chapter 4 The Pervasiveness of Aristotle's Views on Practical Reason; Section I: Practical Wisdom and Virtue; Section II: Excellence in Deliberation; Section III: Nature and the End of Action (NE 1114b16-25); Section IV: Aristotle's Methodology in Ethics and Politics; Chapter 5 The Apparent Support for the Humean Position; Section I: Deliberation Is about Means
Section II: Virtue Preserves First Principles; Section III: Phronēsis Provides One with the Right Means, Aretē with the Right Ends; Chapter 6 A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 7 The Interest of Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason: Happiness and the Good Relative to Human Beings; Section I: Happiness as the End of Action; Section II: The Good as Fulfilling the Ergon of Human Beings Well; Section III: The Good for Human Beings and the Good Human Being: Their Connection; Chapter 8 Does Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason Provide an Adequate Basis for Ethics?
Section I: Initial Objections; Section II: The Incompleteness of Aristotle's Position; Section III: Objectivity Once More; Part Two: Aristotle and Weakness of the Will; Chapter 9 The Traditional Interpretation: Some Problems and Preliminaries; Section I: The Traditional Interpretation; Section II: Some Problems for the Traditional Interpretation; Section III: The Seriousness of These Problems; Section IV: Variations of the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Methodological Problem; Chapter 10 An Argument for the Traditional Interpretation; Section I: A Thesis about Knowledge and Action
Section II: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section III: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section IV: Solutions to the Problems Raised for the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 11 An Argument for an Alternative Interpretation; Section I: Conflicts of Motive and Akrasia; Section II: The Thesis about Knowledge and Action Reconsidered; Section III: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section IV: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section V: Two Final Objections; Section VI: A Summary; Concluding Remarks; Appendix I: NE 1143a35-b5
Record Nr. UNINA-9910778398203321
Dahl Norman O  
Minneapolis : , : University of Minnesota Press, , 1984
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will / / Norman O. Dahl
Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will / / Norman O. Dahl
Autore Dahl Norman O
Pubbl/distr/stampa Minneapolis : , : University of Minnesota Press, , 1984
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (xii, 302 pages)
Disciplina 171/.3
Collana Minnesota publications in the humanities
Soggetto topico Ethics, Ancient
Reason - History
ISBN 0-8166-5561-8
0-8166-1246-3
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Part One: Practical Reason and Aristotle; Chapter 1 A Statement of the Problem; Section I: The Nature of Practical Reason; Section II: The Scope of Practical Reason; Section III: Does Aristotle's Ethics Rest on Practical Reason?; Chapter 2 Aristotle and Hume: A Preliminary Contrast; Section I: Action as a Result of Appetite; Section II: Action as a Result of Desire and Deliberation; Section III: The Practical Syllogism; Section IV: A Preliminary Contrast; Chapter 3 Reason and General Ends; Section I: Reason Apprehends the Ends of Action
Section II: Universal Ends Acquired by Induction: The Role of Nous in Practical Affairs; Section III: Apprehending vs. Acquiring Ends; Section IV: A Sketch of a Theory; Section V: Objections; Chapter 4 The Pervasiveness of Aristotle's Views on Practical Reason; Section I: Practical Wisdom and Virtue; Section II: Excellence in Deliberation; Section III: Nature and the End of Action (NE 1114b16-25); Section IV: Aristotle's Methodology in Ethics and Politics; Chapter 5 The Apparent Support for the Humean Position; Section I: Deliberation Is about Means
Section II: Virtue Preserves First Principles; Section III: Phronēsis Provides One with the Right Means, Aretē with the Right Ends; Chapter 6 A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 7 The Interest of Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason: Happiness and the Good Relative to Human Beings; Section I: Happiness as the End of Action; Section II: The Good as Fulfilling the Ergon of Human Beings Well; Section III: The Good for Human Beings and the Good Human Being: Their Connection; Chapter 8 Does Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason Provide an Adequate Basis for Ethics?
Section I: Initial Objections; Section II: The Incompleteness of Aristotle's Position; Section III: Objectivity Once More; Part Two: Aristotle and Weakness of the Will; Chapter 9 The Traditional Interpretation: Some Problems and Preliminaries; Section I: The Traditional Interpretation; Section II: Some Problems for the Traditional Interpretation; Section III: The Seriousness of These Problems; Section IV: Variations of the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Methodological Problem; Chapter 10 An Argument for the Traditional Interpretation; Section I: A Thesis about Knowledge and Action
Section II: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section III: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section IV: Solutions to the Problems Raised for the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 11 An Argument for an Alternative Interpretation; Section I: Conflicts of Motive and Akrasia; Section II: The Thesis about Knowledge and Action Reconsidered; Section III: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section IV: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section V: Two Final Objections; Section VI: A Summary; Concluding Remarks; Appendix I: NE 1143a35-b5
Record Nr. UNINA-9910821464003321
Dahl Norman O  
Minneapolis : , : University of Minnesota Press, , 1984
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta / / by Norman O. Dahl
Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta / / by Norman O. Dahl
Autore Dahl Norman O
Edizione [1st ed. 2019.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2019
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (357 pages)
Disciplina 110
160
Soggetto topico Philosophy, Ancient
Greek language
Classical Philosophy
Greek
Metafísica
Substància (Filosofia)
Filosofia antiga
Soggetto genere / forma Llibres electrònics
ISBN 3-030-22161-X
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Background Considerations -- Chapter 3: The Categories View of Basic Constituents -- Chapter 4: Two New Candidates for Basic Constituents -- Chapter 5: The Metaphysics and Metaphysics Zeta -- Chapter 6: Z.1, Substantial Forms or Individual Composites as Basic Constituents -- Chapter 7: Z.3, The Rejection of Matter -- Chapter 8: Z.4-5, Essence -- Chapter 9: Z.6 and the Pale Man Argument -- Chapter 10: Z.6 and the Argument About Platonic Forms -- Chapter 11: Z.6 and the Regress Argument -- Chapter 12: Z.7-9, The Reintroduction of Matter and Form -- Chapter 13: Z.10-11, Does Form Have Matter as Part of It? -- Chapter 14: The Universal as Substance: Z.13 1038b8-1039a3 – Problems of Interpretation -- Chapter 15: The Universal as Substance: 1038b8-1039a3 -- Solutions to the Problems -- Chapter 16: The Universal as Substance: Z.13-16 -- An Aporia and What Follows -- Chapter 17: Z.17, A Fresh Start -- Chapter 18: Conclusion.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910349547803321
Dahl Norman O  
Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2019
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui