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Bargaining in the shadow of the market [[electronic resource] ] : selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining / / Kalyan Chatterjee
| Bargaining in the shadow of the market [[electronic resource] ] : selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining / / Kalyan Chatterjee |
| Autore | Chatterjee Kalyan |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Singapore, : World Scientific, 2013 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (228 p.) |
| Disciplina | 302.3 |
| Soggetto topico |
Negotiation
Negotiation in business |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN | 981-4447-57-9 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; 1. Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining: An Introduction; 1 Motivation for Studying this Field; 2 Models; 3 Bilateral Bargaining with Complete Information; 4 Bilateral Bargaining with Incomplete Information; 5 Search for Outside Options; 6 Choice of Investment and Outside Options in Bargaining; 7 Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining; 8 Conclusion; References; 2. Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options; 1. INTRODUCTION AND THE MODEL; 2. THE ANALYSIS; 2.1. The Buyer's Behavior in the Second Period; 2.2. The Equilibrium of a
2.3. The Equilibrium of b2.4. The Equilibrium of; 3. DISCUSSION; 4. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 2; APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6A; APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6B; APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 3; APPENDIX E: PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 8 AND PROPOSITION 9; REFERENCES; 3. Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THREE TRADING PROCESSES; 3. THE PUBLIC OFFERS MODEL; 4. THE TARGETTED OFFERS MODEL; 5. PRIVATE OFFERS MODEL; 6. CONCLUSION; APPENDIX; REFERENCES; 4. Bargaining, Competition and Efficient Investment; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Main features 1.2 Related literature2 The Model; 2.1 Payoffs and seller/buyer investment; 3 Equilibrium of Extensive Form 1 (The "Auction-Like" Mechanism); 4 Investment in the "Auction-like" Mechanism; 4.1 The seller investment decision; 4.1.1 Comparison with the single buyer case; 4.2 Buyer investment with the auction-like mechanism; 5 Sequential Offers Extensive Form; 5.1 The bargaining procedure; 5.2 Seller investment under sequential offers bargaining; 5.3 Buyer investment; 6 Discussion about Property Rights and Conclusions; References; 5. A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining 1. INTRODUCTION2. THE EXTENSIVE FORM; 3. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND DELAY; 3.1. No-delay stationary equilibrium; 4. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY; 4.1. Efficiency of stationary equilibria for all protocols; 4.2. Efficiency for some protocol; 5. EFFICIENCY OF STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA: STRICTLY CONVEX GAMES; 6. CONCLUSION; Acknowledgements; REFERENCES; 6. How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation; 1. Introduction: The Role of Communication in Coalition Bargaining; 2. The Experiment: A Game, Communication Configurations, and Two Benchmark Models 3. Laboratory Protocol4. Data Analysis; 4.1. Coalition Formation; 4.2. Controlling Communication; 4.3. Coalition Allocations; 4.4. Round Effects; 5. Discussion: Explaining the Data; 5.1. Comparing the Data with the Models; 5.2. Why the Modified Core Falls Short; 5.3. Private Communication and the Public Treatment; 5.4. Toward a More Formal Model; 6. Summary; Acknowledgments; Appendix A: Written Instructions to Subjects; Appendix B: Rotation of Bargaining Partners; References; 7. Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining; The Model; Parties, Voters and Preferences; Elections Post-Election Bargaining |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910462848203321 |
Chatterjee Kalyan
|
||
| Singapore, : World Scientific, 2013 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Bargaining in the shadow of the market : selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining / / Kalyan Chatterjee, the Pennsylvania State University, USA
| Bargaining in the shadow of the market : selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining / / Kalyan Chatterjee, the Pennsylvania State University, USA |
| Autore | Chatterjee Kalyan |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Singapore, : World Scientific, 2013 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xi, 216 pages) : illustrations |
| Disciplina | 302.3 |
| Collana | Gale eBooks |
| Soggetto topico |
Negotiation in business
Negotiation |
| ISBN | 981-4447-57-9 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; 1. Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining: An Introduction; 1 Motivation for Studying this Field; 2 Models; 3 Bilateral Bargaining with Complete Information; 4 Bilateral Bargaining with Incomplete Information; 5 Search for Outside Options; 6 Choice of Investment and Outside Options in Bargaining; 7 Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining; 8 Conclusion; References; 2. Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options; 1. INTRODUCTION AND THE MODEL; 2. THE ANALYSIS; 2.1. The Buyer's Behavior in the Second Period; 2.2. The Equilibrium of a
2.3. The Equilibrium of b2.4. The Equilibrium of; 3. DISCUSSION; 4. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 2; APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6A; APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6B; APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 3; APPENDIX E: PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 8 AND PROPOSITION 9; REFERENCES; 3. Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THREE TRADING PROCESSES; 3. THE PUBLIC OFFERS MODEL; 4. THE TARGETTED OFFERS MODEL; 5. PRIVATE OFFERS MODEL; 6. CONCLUSION; APPENDIX; REFERENCES; 4. Bargaining, Competition and Efficient Investment; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Main features 1.2 Related literature2 The Model; 2.1 Payoffs and seller/buyer investment; 3 Equilibrium of Extensive Form 1 (The "Auction-Like" Mechanism); 4 Investment in the "Auction-like" Mechanism; 4.1 The seller investment decision; 4.1.1 Comparison with the single buyer case; 4.2 Buyer investment with the auction-like mechanism; 5 Sequential Offers Extensive Form; 5.1 The bargaining procedure; 5.2 Seller investment under sequential offers bargaining; 5.3 Buyer investment; 6 Discussion about Property Rights and Conclusions; References; 5. A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining 1. INTRODUCTION2. THE EXTENSIVE FORM; 3. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND DELAY; 3.1. No-delay stationary equilibrium; 4. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY; 4.1. Efficiency of stationary equilibria for all protocols; 4.2. Efficiency for some protocol; 5. EFFICIENCY OF STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA: STRICTLY CONVEX GAMES; 6. CONCLUSION; Acknowledgements; REFERENCES; 6. How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation; 1. Introduction: The Role of Communication in Coalition Bargaining; 2. The Experiment: A Game, Communication Configurations, and Two Benchmark Models 3. Laboratory Protocol4. Data Analysis; 4.1. Coalition Formation; 4.2. Controlling Communication; 4.3. Coalition Allocations; 4.4. Round Effects; 5. Discussion: Explaining the Data; 5.1. Comparing the Data with the Models; 5.2. Why the Modified Core Falls Short; 5.3. Private Communication and the Public Treatment; 5.4. Toward a More Formal Model; 6. Summary; Acknowledgments; Appendix A: Written Instructions to Subjects; Appendix B: Rotation of Bargaining Partners; References; 7. Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining; The Model; Parties, Voters and Preferences; Elections Post-Election Bargaining |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910786966303321 |
|
Chatterjee Kalyan
|
||
| Singapore, : World Scientific, 2013 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Bargaining in the shadow of the market : selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining / / Kalyan Chatterjee, the Pennsylvania State University, USA
| Bargaining in the shadow of the market : selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining / / Kalyan Chatterjee, the Pennsylvania State University, USA |
| Autore | Chatterjee Kalyan |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Singapore, : World Scientific, 2013 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xi, 216 pages) : illustrations |
| Disciplina | 302.3 |
| Collana | Gale eBooks |
| Soggetto topico |
Negotiation in business
Negotiation |
| ISBN | 981-4447-57-9 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; 1. Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining: An Introduction; 1 Motivation for Studying this Field; 2 Models; 3 Bilateral Bargaining with Complete Information; 4 Bilateral Bargaining with Incomplete Information; 5 Search for Outside Options; 6 Choice of Investment and Outside Options in Bargaining; 7 Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining; 8 Conclusion; References; 2. Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options; 1. INTRODUCTION AND THE MODEL; 2. THE ANALYSIS; 2.1. The Buyer's Behavior in the Second Period; 2.2. The Equilibrium of a
2.3. The Equilibrium of b2.4. The Equilibrium of; 3. DISCUSSION; 4. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 2; APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6A; APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6B; APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 3; APPENDIX E: PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 8 AND PROPOSITION 9; REFERENCES; 3. Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THREE TRADING PROCESSES; 3. THE PUBLIC OFFERS MODEL; 4. THE TARGETTED OFFERS MODEL; 5. PRIVATE OFFERS MODEL; 6. CONCLUSION; APPENDIX; REFERENCES; 4. Bargaining, Competition and Efficient Investment; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Main features 1.2 Related literature2 The Model; 2.1 Payoffs and seller/buyer investment; 3 Equilibrium of Extensive Form 1 (The "Auction-Like" Mechanism); 4 Investment in the "Auction-like" Mechanism; 4.1 The seller investment decision; 4.1.1 Comparison with the single buyer case; 4.2 Buyer investment with the auction-like mechanism; 5 Sequential Offers Extensive Form; 5.1 The bargaining procedure; 5.2 Seller investment under sequential offers bargaining; 5.3 Buyer investment; 6 Discussion about Property Rights and Conclusions; References; 5. A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining 1. INTRODUCTION2. THE EXTENSIVE FORM; 3. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND DELAY; 3.1. No-delay stationary equilibrium; 4. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY; 4.1. Efficiency of stationary equilibria for all protocols; 4.2. Efficiency for some protocol; 5. EFFICIENCY OF STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA: STRICTLY CONVEX GAMES; 6. CONCLUSION; Acknowledgements; REFERENCES; 6. How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation; 1. Introduction: The Role of Communication in Coalition Bargaining; 2. The Experiment: A Game, Communication Configurations, and Two Benchmark Models 3. Laboratory Protocol4. Data Analysis; 4.1. Coalition Formation; 4.2. Controlling Communication; 4.3. Coalition Allocations; 4.4. Round Effects; 5. Discussion: Explaining the Data; 5.1. Comparing the Data with the Models; 5.2. Why the Modified Core Falls Short; 5.3. Private Communication and the Public Treatment; 5.4. Toward a More Formal Model; 6. Summary; Acknowledgments; Appendix A: Written Instructions to Subjects; Appendix B: Rotation of Bargaining Partners; References; 7. Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining; The Model; Parties, Voters and Preferences; Elections Post-Election Bargaining |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910807338503321 |
|
Chatterjee Kalyan
|
||
| Singapore, : World Scientific, 2013 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||