Exploring the illusion of free will and moral responsibility [[electronic resource]] / edited by Gregg D. Caruso |
Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, c2013 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (334 p.) |
Disciplina | 123/.5 |
Altri autori (Persone) | CarusoGregg D |
Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Ethics Skepticism |
ISBN |
1-4985-1621-1
0-7391-7732-X |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; I: Philosophical Explorations: Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications; 1 Skepticism about Free Will; 2 The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility?; 3 Determinism, Incompatibilism and Compatibilism, Actual Consciousness and Subjective Physical Worlds, Humanity; 4 The Stubborn Illusion of Moral Responsibility; 5 Be a Skeptic, Not a Metaskeptic; 6 Free Will as a Case of "Crazy Ethics"; 7 The Potential Dark Side of Believing in Free Will (and Related Concepts); 8 The People Problem; 9 Living Without Free Will
10 If Free Will Doesn't Exist, Neither Does Water11 Free Will and Error; II: Scientific Explorations: The Behavioral, Cognitive, and Neurosciences; 12 The Complex Network of Intentions; 13 Experience and Autonomy; 14 What Does the Brain Know and When Does It Know It?; 15 If Free Will Did Not Exist, It Would Be Necessary to Invent It; 16 Free Will, an Illusion?; References; Index; About the Contributors |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910786844803321 |
Caruso Gregg D | ||
Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, c2013 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Exploring the illusion of free will and moral responsibility / / edited by Gregg D. Caruso |
Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, c2013 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (334 p.) |
Disciplina | 123/.5 |
Altri autori (Persone) | CarusoGregg D |
Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Ethics Skepticism |
ISBN |
1-4985-1621-1
0-7391-7732-X |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; I: Philosophical Explorations: Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications; 1 Skepticism about Free Will; 2 The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility?; 3 Determinism, Incompatibilism and Compatibilism, Actual Consciousness and Subjective Physical Worlds, Humanity; 4 The Stubborn Illusion of Moral Responsibility; 5 Be a Skeptic, Not a Metaskeptic; 6 Free Will as a Case of "Crazy Ethics"; 7 The Potential Dark Side of Believing in Free Will (and Related Concepts); 8 The People Problem; 9 Living Without Free Will
10 If Free Will Doesn't Exist, Neither Does Water11 Free Will and Error; II: Scientific Explorations: The Behavioral, Cognitive, and Neurosciences; 12 The Complex Network of Intentions; 13 Experience and Autonomy; 14 What Does the Brain Know and When Does It Know It?; 15 If Free Will Did Not Exist, It Would Be Necessary to Invent It; 16 Free Will, an Illusion?; References; Index; About the Contributors |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910809488903321 |
Caruso Gregg D | ||
Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, c2013 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso |
Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (313 p.) |
Disciplina | 123/.5 |
Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Consciousness Phenomenology |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN |
1-280-66878-4
9786613645715 0-7391-7137-2 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position; 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will; 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem; 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility; Notes; Chapter Two: Against Libertarianism; 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will; 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation; 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?; Notes; Chapter Three: Against Compatibilism; 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument; 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will
3.3 The Phenomenology of FreedomNotes; Chapter Four: Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?; 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being; 4.4 Implications for Free Will; Notes; Chapter Five: Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory; 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will; 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness; 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will; 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness; Notes; Chapter Six: Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation; 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States; 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States; 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?; 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory; 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion; 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation; Notes Chapter Seven: Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down; 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts; 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory; 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency; 7.5 Conclusion; Notes; Works Cited; Index; About the Author |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910451857903321 |
Caruso Gregg D | ||
Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso |
Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (313 p.) |
Disciplina | 123/.5 |
Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Consciousness Phenomenology |
ISBN |
1-280-66878-4
9786613645715 0-7391-7137-2 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position; 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will; 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem; 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility; Notes; Chapter Two: Against Libertarianism; 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will; 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation; 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?; Notes; Chapter Three: Against Compatibilism; 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument; 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will
3.3 The Phenomenology of FreedomNotes; Chapter Four: Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?; 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being; 4.4 Implications for Free Will; Notes; Chapter Five: Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory; 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will; 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness; 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will; 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness; Notes; Chapter Six: Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation; 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States; 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States; 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?; 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory; 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion; 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation; Notes Chapter Seven: Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down; 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts; 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory; 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency; 7.5 Conclusion; Notes; Works Cited; Index; About the Author |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910779269903321 |
Caruso Gregg D | ||
Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Free will and consciousness : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso |
Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (313 p.) |
Disciplina | 123/.5 |
Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Consciousness Phenomenology |
ISBN |
1-280-66878-4
9786613645715 0-7391-7137-2 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position; 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will; 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem; 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility; Notes; Chapter Two: Against Libertarianism; 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will; 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation; 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?; Notes; Chapter Three: Against Compatibilism; 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument; 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will
3.3 The Phenomenology of FreedomNotes; Chapter Four: Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?; 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being; 4.4 Implications for Free Will; Notes; Chapter Five: Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory; 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will; 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness; 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will; 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness; Notes; Chapter Six: Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation; 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States; 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States; 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?; 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory; 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion; 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation; Notes Chapter Seven: Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down; 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts; 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory; 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency; 7.5 Conclusion; Notes; Works Cited; Index; About the Author |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910809284503321 |
Caruso Gregg D | ||
Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|