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Anatomy of victory : why the United States triumphed in World War II, fought to a stalemate in Korea, lost in Vietnam, and failed in Iraq / / John D. Caldwell
| Anatomy of victory : why the United States triumphed in World War II, fought to a stalemate in Korea, lost in Vietnam, and failed in Iraq / / John D. Caldwell |
| Autore | Caldwell John Dean <1940-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham : , : Rowman & Littlefield, , [2019] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (569 pages) |
| Disciplina | 355.00973/0904 |
| ISBN | 1-5381-1478-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Battle of Britain: winning by not losing -- Battle of the Atlantic: protecting the maritime lifeline -- Invasion of Russia: Hitler's strategic mistake -- Battle of El Alamein and operation torch: cracking German invincibility -- Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: regaining initiative in the Pacific -- Strategic bombing offensive: breaking German airpower -- Invasion of Italy: deciding to fight somewhere in Europe in 1943 -- D-Day and Battle for Normandy: retaking the Continent -- Battle for the Rhine: attacking Germany's vitals -- Battle of Okinawa and the bombing of Japan: ending the war -- The strategic architectures of World War II -- Battle of the Pusan perimeter: getting the most out of a bad situation -- Inchon: Operation Chromite: MacArthur's masterstroke -- Crossing the 38th parallel and driving north to the Yalu: the risks of overreaching -- Operations Ripper and Killer: recovery and frustration -- The strategic architectures of the Korean War -- Battle of Ia Drang Valley: not fighting the decisive battle -- Bombing campaign and high-tech initiatives: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White: airpower and technology indecisive -- The Pacification program (1967-1968): failing to change behavior -- The Tet Offensive (1968): strategic disaster -- Vietnamization: never a winning strategy -- The final years (1969-1975): the losing path -- The strategic architectures of the VIetnam War -- Iraqi War I, Persian Gulf War: defeating Saddam, losing politically -- Iraqi War II, 13-year air conflict: the limits of airpower -- Iraqi War III, invasion of Iraq: winning without an endgame -- Iraqi War IV, the insurgency and the surge (2007-2008): relearning counterinsurgency -- Iraqi War V, the rise of ISIS: a new, more violent enemy -- The strategic architectures of the Iraqi Wars. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910793165103321 |
Caldwell John Dean <1940->
|
||
| Lanham : , : Rowman & Littlefield, , [2019] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Anatomy of victory : why the United States triumphed in World War II, fought to a stalemate in Korea, lost in Vietnam, and failed in Iraq / / John D. Caldwell
| Anatomy of victory : why the United States triumphed in World War II, fought to a stalemate in Korea, lost in Vietnam, and failed in Iraq / / John D. Caldwell |
| Autore | Caldwell John Dean <1940-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham : , : Rowman & Littlefield, , [2019] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (569 pages) |
| Disciplina | 355.00973/0904 |
| ISBN | 1-5381-1478-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Battle of Britain: winning by not losing -- Battle of the Atlantic: protecting the maritime lifeline -- Invasion of Russia: Hitler's strategic mistake -- Battle of El Alamein and operation torch: cracking German invincibility -- Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: regaining initiative in the Pacific -- Strategic bombing offensive: breaking German airpower -- Invasion of Italy: deciding to fight somewhere in Europe in 1943 -- D-Day and Battle for Normandy: retaking the Continent -- Battle for the Rhine: attacking Germany's vitals -- Battle of Okinawa and the bombing of Japan: ending the war -- The strategic architectures of World War II -- Battle of the Pusan perimeter: getting the most out of a bad situation -- Inchon: Operation Chromite: MacArthur's masterstroke -- Crossing the 38th parallel and driving north to the Yalu: the risks of overreaching -- Operations Ripper and Killer: recovery and frustration -- The strategic architectures of the Korean War -- Battle of Ia Drang Valley: not fighting the decisive battle -- Bombing campaign and high-tech initiatives: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White: airpower and technology indecisive -- The Pacification program (1967-1968): failing to change behavior -- The Tet Offensive (1968): strategic disaster -- Vietnamization: never a winning strategy -- The final years (1969-1975): the losing path -- The strategic architectures of the VIetnam War -- Iraqi War I, Persian Gulf War: defeating Saddam, losing politically -- Iraqi War II, 13-year air conflict: the limits of airpower -- Iraqi War III, invasion of Iraq: winning without an endgame -- Iraqi War IV, the insurgency and the surge (2007-2008): relearning counterinsurgency -- Iraqi War V, the rise of ISIS: a new, more violent enemy -- The strategic architectures of the Iraqi Wars. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910821393703321 |
|
Caldwell John Dean <1940->
|
||
| Lanham : , : Rowman & Littlefield, , [2019] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||