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Intro -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- INTRODUCTION -- 1 DETERMINISM AND FATE -- 1.1 Physical and ontological foundations -- 1.1.1 The active principle -- 1.1.2 Causation -- 1.1.3 Motions and qualitative states -- 1.2 Teleological determinism defined -- 1.3 Causal determinism defined -- 1.3.1 The anti-Stoic argument for spontaneous motions -- 1.3.2 Chrysippus' reply -- 1.3.3 Causal determinism -- 1.4 Fate -- 1.4.1 Fate is God is Providence is Nature is the Active Principle . . . -- 1.4.2 The main aspects of fate -- 1.4.3 Teleological and mechanical aspects of Stoic determinism combined -- 1.4.4 The Fate Principle -- 2 TWO CHRYSIPPEAN ARGUMENTS FOR CAUSAL DETERMINISM -- 2.1 Causal determinism and the Principle of Bivalence -- 2.1.1 Chrysippus' Bivalence Argument -- 2.1.2 Chrysippus versus Epicurus on truth and fate -- 2.2 Causal determinism and prediction -- 2.2.1 Chrysippus' concept of divination -- 2.2.2 Chrysippus' proof of fate through the existence of divination -- 2.2.3 Causal determinism as necessary condition for the existence of divination -- 3 MODALITY, DETERMINISM, AND FREEDOM -- 3.1 Modal logic and the threat of determinism -- 3.1.1 Hellenistic modalities in general -- 3.1.2 Diodorus and necessitarianism -- 3.1.3 Philo and conceptual or essentialist modalities -- 3.1.4 Chrysippus' modal system -- 3.1.5 Contingency and freedom -- 3.1.6 Appendix: Identification of Chrysippus' modal notions -- 3.2 Objection: Stoic determinism and Stoic modal logic are incompatible -- 3.3 A Stoic reply: fate and epistemic modalities -- 3.4 Chrysippus' distinction between Necessity and that which is necessary -- 3.4.1 The textual evidence -- 3.4.2 Necessity and that which is necessary and their relation to fate -- 4 DIVINATION, MODALITY, AND UNIVERSAL REGULARITY -- 4.1 Objection: divination and Stoic contingency are incompatible.
4.1.1 The divinatory theorem -- 4.1.2 The second argument against the Stoics -- 4.1.3 The first argument against the Stoics -- 4.1.4 The relation between the two arguments -- 4.1.5 Chrysippus' modal notions conflict with divination -- 4.2 Chrysippus' reply: active causation versus regularity of occurrents -- 4.2.1 Negated conjunctions in lieu of conditionals -- 4.2.2 Divinatory theorems, sign-relations, and causation -- 4.2.3 A modification of the anti-Stoic objection -- 4.2.4 Divination, determinism, and human action -- 4.2.5 Appendix: Conditional predictions -- 5 FATE, ACTION, AND MOTIVATION: THE IDLE ARGUMENT -- 5.1 The Idle Argument -- 5.1.1 Exposition of the argument -- 5.1.2 The plausibility of the argument -- 5.1.3 Futility and goal-directed activity -- 5.1.4 Is the Idle Argument a sophism? -- 5.2 Replies to the Idle Argument: the sources -- 5.2.1 Cicero, On Fate 30 -- 5.2.2 Origen, Against Celsus II 20, 342.71-82 -- 5.2.3 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 6.8.25-38 -- 5.3 Chrysippus' refutation: fatalism versus causal determinism -- 5.3.1 Simply fated occurrents reconsidered -- 5.3.2 Co-fatedness and causation -- 5.3.3 Chrysippus' refutation and its implications for his determinism -- 5.3.4 Critique of Chrysippus' refutation -- 6 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHRYSIPPUS' COMPATIBILISM -- 6.1 Some preliminary considerations -- 6.1.1 Overview of the central passages -- 6.1.2 Chrysippus' conception of mind and action -- 6.2 Another argument against fate: fate renders moral appraisal unjust -- 6.2.1 The argument in Gellius -- 6.2.2 The argument in Cicero -- 6.3 Chrysippus' reply -- 6.3.1 Chrysippus' counter in Gellius -- 6.3.2 Chrysippus' formal refutation of the argument in Cicero -- 6.3.3 The cylinder and cone analogy -- 6.3.4 Another Chrysippean argument for moral responsibility.
6.3.5 Freedom, moral responsibility, and that which depends on us -- 6.3.6 Moral responsibility and the determination of character -- 6.3.7 The relation between antecedent causes, fate, and necessity -- 6.4 A later interpretation of Chrysippus' concept of fate? -- 6.4.1 The 'framework story' in Cicero's On Fate -- 6.4.2 Plutarch's dilemma -- 7 FREEDOM AND THAT WHICH DEPENDS ON US: EPICTETUS AND EARLY STOICS -- 7.1 Epictetus and that which depends on us -- 7.2 Freedom -- 7.2.1 The early Stoics on freedom -- 7.2.2 Epictetus on freedom -- 7.2.3 Is the only true freedom? -- 7.2.4 Freedom and that which depends on us in later antiquity -- 7.3 Cleanthes, Epictetus, the dog, and the cart -- 7.3.1 Cleanthes on Destiny -- 7.3.2 Epictetus on Cleanthes on Destiny -- 7.3.3 The dog and cart simile -- 8 A LATER STOIC THEORY OF COMPATIBILISM -- 8.1* Some notes on the sources and the origin of the theory -- 8.2 PHILOPATOR'S causal determinism -- 8.3 The role of fate in PHILOPATOR'S theory -- 8.4 PHILOPATOR'S conception of that which depends on us -- 8.5 PHILOPATOR'S compatibilism -- 8.6 The cylinder in later Stoic fate theory -- 8.7 The rise and fall of the problem of freedom to do otherwise and causal determinism -- Bibliography -- Index Locorum -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- G -- H -- J -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- S -- T -- V -- Index Nominum -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- G -- H -- J -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- S -- T -- X -- Z -- Subject Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- I -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- W.
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Determinism and freedom in stoic philosophy [[electronic resource] /] / Susanne Bobzien
