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Neurofunctional prudence and morality : a philosophical theory / / Marcus Arvan
| Neurofunctional prudence and morality : a philosophical theory / / Marcus Arvan |
| Autore | Arvan Marcus |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York ; ; London : , : Routledge, , [2020] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (145 pages) : illustrations |
| Disciplina | 179.9 |
| Collana | Routledge focus on philosophy |
| Soggetto topico | Prudence |
| ISBN | 1-000-75151-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910772100503321 |
Arvan Marcus
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| New York, New York ; ; London : , : Routledge, , [2020] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Rightness as Fairness [[electronic resource] ] : A Moral and Political Theory / / by Marcus Arvan
| Rightness as Fairness [[electronic resource] ] : A Moral and Political Theory / / by Marcus Arvan |
| Autore | Arvan Marcus |
| Edizione | [1st ed. 2016.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London : , : Palgrave Macmillan UK : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2016 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (283 p.) |
| Disciplina | 100 |
| Soggetto topico |
Political philosophy
Social sciences—Philosophy Political theory Ethics World politics Political Philosophy Social Philosophy Political Theory Moral Philosophy Political History |
| ISBN | 1-137-54181-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 Ethics for the Twenty-First Century; 1 Distinguishing truth from seeming truth; 2 Seven principles of theory selection; 2.1 Firm Foundations; 2.2 Internal Coherence; 2.3 External Coherence; 2.4 Explanatory Power; 2.5 Unity; 2.6 Parsimony; 2.7 Fruitfulness; 3 The case for instrumentalism; 3.1 The firmest foundation; 3.2 The promise of parsimony, unity, explanatory power, and fruitfulness; 3.3 Advantages over alternatives; 3.3.1 Advantages over intuitionism; 3.3.2 Advantages over reflective equilibrium
3.3.3 Advantages over moral language analysis3.3.4 Advantages over constitutivism; 3.3.5 Advantages over second- and third-personalism; 3.3.6 Advantages over Sterba's dialecticalism; 3.3.7 Conclusion; 4 Disarming initial concerns; 4.1 The wrong kinds of reasons?; 4.2 Not a firm foundation?; 4.3 Unconvincing and artificial?; 4.4 Three promissory notes; 4.4.1 Not the wrong kinds of reasons?; 4.4.2 Firm foundations after all?; 4.4.3 Intuitive and convincing?; 5 Conclusion; 2 The Problem of Possible Future Selves; 1 Our capacities to care about our past and future 2 The problem of possible future selves2.1 Possible futures; 2.2 Possible psychologies; 2.3 Possible choices; 2.4 A very real problem; 3 Morality as the solution?; 4 Is the problem too contingent?; 5 Two nonsolutions; 5.1 Nonsolution 1: probable futures; 5.2 Nonsolution 2: diachronic motivational consistency; 6 Conclusion: an unsolved problem; 3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative; 1 Interests in diachronic cooperation; 2 Three types of interests; 2.1 Involuntary interests; 2.2 Semivoluntary interests; 2.3 Voluntary interests; 3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative; 4 Just conscience? 5 An intuitive solution to the problem of possible future selves?6 Conclusion; 4 Three Unified Formulations; 1 The Humanity and Sentience Formulation; 1.1 Possible other-human-regarding interests; 1.2 Possible nonhuman-animal-regarding interests; 1.3 Possible sentient-being-regarding interests; 1.4 Derivation of the Humanity and Sentience Formulation; 2 The Kingdom of Human and Sentient Ends Formulation; 3 Advantages over Kantian ethics; 3.1 Firmer foundations; 3.2 Greater internal coherence; 3.3 Greater external coherence; 3.4 Greater explanatory power, unity, and parsimony 3.5 Greater fruitfulness4 Conclusion; 5 The Moral Original Position; 1 Rawls' Original Position; 1.1 Rawls' Kantian rationale; 1.2 Rawls' reflective equilibrium rationale; 1.3 Rawls' public reason rationale; 2 Some common critiques; 2.1 Kantian critiques; 2.2 Reflective equilibrium critiques; 2.3 Public reason critiques; 3 The case for a Moral Original Position; 4 Corroborating the critiques; 4.1 Corroborating Kantian critiques; 4.2 Corroborating reflective equilibrium critiques; 4.3 Corroborating public reason critiques; 5 Conclusion; 6 Rightness as Fairness 1 Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910255347303321 |
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Arvan Marcus
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| London : , : Palgrave Macmillan UK : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2016 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||