Talent keepers : how top leaders engage and retain their best performers / / Christopher Mulligan, Craig Taylor |
Autore | Mulligan Christopher <1964-> |
Edizione | [1st edition] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Hoboken, New Jersey : , : Wiley, , [2019] |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (187 pages) |
Disciplina | 658.314 |
Soggetto topico |
Employee retention - United States
Incentive awards - United States Leadership - United States BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Leadership BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / General BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Management |
ISBN |
1-119-55825-5
1-119-55827-1 |
Classificazione | BUS071000BUS000000BUS041000 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Machine generated contents note: Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Energizing a Changing Workplace Blink, and Your Staff Has Changed Embracing the Data (and Everything After) The Confluence of Generations "Begging Them to Stay" Good Leadership Still Wins Building a Winning Strategy Chapter 1 Engaging Your Talent Is a Business Imperative The True Cost of Turnover Leadership as a Market Advantage Introducing the Leader Engagement Index Notes Chapter 2 What Engages People at Work? The Tipping Point I Don't Need No Satisfaction The Four Drivers of Employee Engagement The Four Drivers and the Leadership Engagement Index Chapter 3 Leaders and Their Impact The Case for a Focus on Leadership Why Focusing on Leaders Gets Results Best Boss/Worst Boss Leaders Underestimate Their Impact Different Background, Different Response Commit, Engage, Excel Chapter 4: Communication: The Lubricant of Change Blaming Up What Not to Do What to Do: Sharing Down Chapter 5: Solving the Career Growth Dilemma Recognize the Right Way Trust Each Other with Your Careers Shifting Career Aspirations The Stay Interview Career Growth and Accountability Job Stratification WOWs, Wet Socks, and Snorkels Chapter 6: New Rules for Building a Leadership Team The Fish Rots Promote for More Than Just Job Skill Measuring "Will Do" and "Can Do" Chapter 7: Creating an Engagement and Retention Culture Can You Fix Culture? Communication Is Still the Key Creating the Culture Chapter 8: Building the Business Case for Engagement and Retention Where's the Money? Finding the Money Spreading the Impact Building a Winning Strategy Appendix: TalentKeepers Engagement and Retention Solutions TalentKeepers' Experience and Capabilities Commit, Engage, Excel About the Authors Christopher Mulligan, Chief Executive Officer, TalentKeepers Craig R. Taylor, Vice President, Client Services, TalentKeepers. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910828487603321 |
Mulligan Christopher <1964->
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Hoboken, New Jersey : , : Wiley, , [2019] | ||
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Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Too much is not enough : incentives in executive compensation / / Robert W. Kolb |
Autore | Kolb Robert W. <1949-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford, England : , : Oxford University Press, , 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (225 p.) |
Disciplina | 331.2/164 |
Collana | Financial Management Association survey and synthesis series |
Soggetto topico |
Executives - Salaries, etc - United States
Incentives in industry - United States Incentive awards - United States Corporate governance - United States Executives - Salaries, etc - Government policy - United States |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN |
0-19-997712-7
0-19-025849-7 0-19-982959-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; 1. The Magnitude and Structure of Executive Compensation; The Magnitude of CEO Compensation; The Structure of Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses and Long-Term Incentive Plans; Restricted Stock Awards; Executive Stock Option (ESO) Awards; Other Forms of Compensation; 2. Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment; Corporate Governance, Incentive Alignment, and the Managerial Power Hypothesis; The Levers of Managerial Power
Limits to Pay in the Managerial Power HypothesisAssessing the Conceptual Conflict Between the Agency-Theoretic and Managerial Power Views of Executive Compensation; What About Ethics, Duty, and Justice?; Fiduciary Duty; Executive Compensation and Distributive Justice; 3. The Incentive Structure of Executive Compensation; The Incentive Revolution and Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses; Restricted Stock and Performance Shares; Executive Stock Options; Equity Compensation: Retaining the Employees You Have and Attracting the Ones You Want Different Instruments as Tools of Incentive Compensation4. Executive Stock Options and the Incentives They Create; ESO Incentives, Firm Practices, and the Effect of Accounting Rules; Option Pricing Models; Option Valuation Effects of Individual Option Parameters; The Option Pricing Model and Incentives; Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; What Exercise Price?; Repricing and Reloading Executive Stock Options; The CEO's Utility and the Desire for ESOs; 5. Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; CEO Wealth, Pay, and Performance; Exercise of ESOs Unwinding Incentives6. Executive Incentives and Risk Taking; Equity Compensation and the CEO's Risk Appetite; Executive Compensation and the Risk-Taking Behavior of CEOs; Incentive Compensation, Risk Taking, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009; 7. Incentive Compensation and the Management of the Firm; Incentive Compensation and the Firm's Investment Program; CEO Incentives and the Firm's Financing Decisions; Compensation Incentives, Dividends, and Share Repurchases; Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions, and Liquidations; Compensation Incentives and Corporate Risk Management Compensation Incentives and Corporate Disclosures8. Perverse Incentive Effects: Executives Behaving Badly; Earnings Management; Option Games and Exploitation; Option Games: A Warning About Incentives in Executive Compensation; 9. Incentives in Executive Compensation: A Final Assessment; Incentive Compensation and the Level of Executive Pay; New Legislation and the Shaping of Incentives; How Dysfunctional Is Executive Pay?; On Balance, Is Incentive Compensation Beneficial?; To Improve Executive Compensation, Improve Corporate Governance Executive Pay, Continuing Inequality, and the Question of Justice |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910464946803321 |
Kolb Robert W. <1949->
![]() |
||
Oxford, England : , : Oxford University Press, , 2012 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Too much is not enough : incentives in executive compensation / / Robert W. Kolb |
Autore | Kolb Robert W. <1949-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford, England : , : Oxford University Press, , 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (225 p.) |
Disciplina | 331.2/164 |
Collana | Financial Management Association survey and synthesis series |
Soggetto topico |
Executives - Salaries, etc - United States
Incentives in industry - United States Incentive awards - United States Corporate governance - United States Executives - Salaries, etc - Government policy - United States |
ISBN |
0-19-997712-7
0-19-025849-7 0-19-982959-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; 1. The Magnitude and Structure of Executive Compensation; The Magnitude of CEO Compensation; The Structure of Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses and Long-Term Incentive Plans; Restricted Stock Awards; Executive Stock Option (ESO) Awards; Other Forms of Compensation; 2. Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment; Corporate Governance, Incentive Alignment, and the Managerial Power Hypothesis; The Levers of Managerial Power
Limits to Pay in the Managerial Power HypothesisAssessing the Conceptual Conflict Between the Agency-Theoretic and Managerial Power Views of Executive Compensation; What About Ethics, Duty, and Justice?; Fiduciary Duty; Executive Compensation and Distributive Justice; 3. The Incentive Structure of Executive Compensation; The Incentive Revolution and Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses; Restricted Stock and Performance Shares; Executive Stock Options; Equity Compensation: Retaining the Employees You Have and Attracting the Ones You Want Different Instruments as Tools of Incentive Compensation4. Executive Stock Options and the Incentives They Create; ESO Incentives, Firm Practices, and the Effect of Accounting Rules; Option Pricing Models; Option Valuation Effects of Individual Option Parameters; The Option Pricing Model and Incentives; Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; What Exercise Price?; Repricing and Reloading Executive Stock Options; The CEO's Utility and the Desire for ESOs; 5. Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; CEO Wealth, Pay, and Performance; Exercise of ESOs Unwinding Incentives6. Executive Incentives and Risk Taking; Equity Compensation and the CEO's Risk Appetite; Executive Compensation and the Risk-Taking Behavior of CEOs; Incentive Compensation, Risk Taking, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009; 7. Incentive Compensation and the Management of the Firm; Incentive Compensation and the Firm's Investment Program; CEO Incentives and the Firm's Financing Decisions; Compensation Incentives, Dividends, and Share Repurchases; Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions, and Liquidations; Compensation Incentives and Corporate Risk Management Compensation Incentives and Corporate Disclosures8. Perverse Incentive Effects: Executives Behaving Badly; Earnings Management; Option Games and Exploitation; Option Games: A Warning About Incentives in Executive Compensation; 9. Incentives in Executive Compensation: A Final Assessment; Incentive Compensation and the Level of Executive Pay; New Legislation and the Shaping of Incentives; How Dysfunctional Is Executive Pay?; On Balance, Is Incentive Compensation Beneficial?; To Improve Executive Compensation, Improve Corporate Governance Executive Pay, Continuing Inequality, and the Question of Justice |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910788903903321 |
Kolb Robert W. <1949->
![]() |
||
Oxford, England : , : Oxford University Press, , 2012 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Too much is not enough : incentives in executive compensation / / Robert W. Kolb |
Autore | Kolb Robert W. <1949-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford, England : , : Oxford University Press, , 2012 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (225 p.) |
Disciplina | 331.2/164 |
Collana | Financial Management Association survey and synthesis series |
Soggetto topico |
Executives - Salaries, etc - United States
Incentives in industry - United States Incentive awards - United States Corporate governance - United States Executives - Salaries, etc - Government policy - United States |
ISBN |
0-19-997712-7
0-19-025849-7 0-19-982959-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; 1. The Magnitude and Structure of Executive Compensation; The Magnitude of CEO Compensation; The Structure of Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses and Long-Term Incentive Plans; Restricted Stock Awards; Executive Stock Option (ESO) Awards; Other Forms of Compensation; 2. Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment; Corporate Governance, Incentive Alignment, and the Managerial Power Hypothesis; The Levers of Managerial Power
Limits to Pay in the Managerial Power HypothesisAssessing the Conceptual Conflict Between the Agency-Theoretic and Managerial Power Views of Executive Compensation; What About Ethics, Duty, and Justice?; Fiduciary Duty; Executive Compensation and Distributive Justice; 3. The Incentive Structure of Executive Compensation; The Incentive Revolution and Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses; Restricted Stock and Performance Shares; Executive Stock Options; Equity Compensation: Retaining the Employees You Have and Attracting the Ones You Want Different Instruments as Tools of Incentive Compensation4. Executive Stock Options and the Incentives They Create; ESO Incentives, Firm Practices, and the Effect of Accounting Rules; Option Pricing Models; Option Valuation Effects of Individual Option Parameters; The Option Pricing Model and Incentives; Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; What Exercise Price?; Repricing and Reloading Executive Stock Options; The CEO's Utility and the Desire for ESOs; 5. Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; CEO Wealth, Pay, and Performance; Exercise of ESOs Unwinding Incentives6. Executive Incentives and Risk Taking; Equity Compensation and the CEO's Risk Appetite; Executive Compensation and the Risk-Taking Behavior of CEOs; Incentive Compensation, Risk Taking, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009; 7. Incentive Compensation and the Management of the Firm; Incentive Compensation and the Firm's Investment Program; CEO Incentives and the Firm's Financing Decisions; Compensation Incentives, Dividends, and Share Repurchases; Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions, and Liquidations; Compensation Incentives and Corporate Risk Management Compensation Incentives and Corporate Disclosures8. Perverse Incentive Effects: Executives Behaving Badly; Earnings Management; Option Games and Exploitation; Option Games: A Warning About Incentives in Executive Compensation; 9. Incentives in Executive Compensation: A Final Assessment; Incentive Compensation and the Level of Executive Pay; New Legislation and the Shaping of Incentives; How Dysfunctional Is Executive Pay?; On Balance, Is Incentive Compensation Beneficial?; To Improve Executive Compensation, Improve Corporate Governance Executive Pay, Continuing Inequality, and the Question of Justice |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910816380803321 |
Kolb Robert W. <1949->
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Oxford, England : , : Oxford University Press, , 2012 | ||
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Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Treasury established appropriate conference, travel, and award policies |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | [Washington, D.C.] : , : Office of Inspector General, Department of the Treasury, , 2016 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (ii, 16 pages) |
Collana | Audit report |
Soggetto topico |
Waste in government spending - United States
Administrative agencies - Officials and employees - United States Congresses and conventions - United States - Attendance Government travel - United States Incentive awards - United States |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910711942703321 |
[Washington, D.C.] : , : Office of Inspector General, Department of the Treasury, , 2016 | ||
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Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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