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Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth
Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth
Autore De Palma André
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (25 p.)
Altri autori (Persone) PrunierGuillaume
LeruthLuc
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Public-private sector cooperation
Privatization
Risk management
Infrastructure
Macroeconomics
Public Finance
Organizational Behavior
Transaction Costs
Property Rights
Bureaucracy
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations
Corruption
Asymmetric and Private Information
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures
Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation
Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis
Public Enterprises
Public-Private Enterprises
Public Administration
Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General
Public finance & taxation
Civil service & public sector
Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP)
Public sector
Risks of public-private partnership
Transportation
Expenditure
Economic sectors
Public financial management (PFM)
National accounts
Finance, Public
Fiscal policy
Saving and investment
ISBN 1-4623-4164-0
1-4527-6015-2
9786612843884
1-4518-7324-7
1-282-84388-5
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References
Record Nr. UNINA-9910788229103321
De Palma André  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth
Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth
Autore De Palma André
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (25 p.)
Disciplina 332.1;332.152
Altri autori (Persone) PrunierGuillaume
LeruthLuc
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Public-private sector cooperation
Privatization
Risk management
Infrastructure
Macroeconomics
Public Finance
Organizational Behavior
Transaction Costs
Property Rights
Bureaucracy
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations
Corruption
Asymmetric and Private Information
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures
Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation
Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis
Public Enterprises
Public-Private Enterprises
Public Administration
Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General
Public finance & taxation
Civil service & public sector
Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP)
Public sector
Risks of public-private partnership
Transportation
Expenditure
Economic sectors
Public financial management (PFM)
National accounts
Finance, Public
Fiscal policy
Saving and investment
ISBN 1-4623-4164-0
1-4527-6015-2
9786612843884
1-4518-7324-7
1-282-84388-5
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References
Record Nr. UNINA-9910825973103321
De Palma André  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Ukraine : : Second Review Under the Extended Fund Facility and Requests for Waivers of Non-Observance of Performance Criteria, Rephasing of Access and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine
Ukraine : : Second Review Under the Extended Fund Facility and Requests for Waivers of Non-Observance of Performance Criteria, Rephasing of Access and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2016
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (152 pages) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina 338.94771
Collana IMF Staff Country Reports
Soggetto topico Banks and Banking
Finance: General
Public Finance
Taxation
Criminology
Exports and Imports
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Debt
Debt Management
Sovereign Debt
Trade Policy
International Trade Organizations
Bureaucracy
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations
Corruption
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
International Lending and Debt Problems
Banking
Public finance & taxation
Corporate crime
white-collar crime
Finance
International economics
Public debt
Tariffs
Revenue administration
Taxes
External debt
Crime
Banks and banking
Debts, Public
Tariff
Revenue
Debts, External
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. UNINA-9910136708503321
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2016
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : : An Analysis of Rent Capture / / Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : : An Analysis of Rent Capture / / Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris
Autore Paul Elisabeth
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (35 p.)
Altri autori (Persone) Dabla-NorrisEra
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Corruption - Developing countries - Prevention - Econometric models
Rent (Economic theory) - Econometric models
Transparency in government - Econometric models
Labor
Taxation
Criminology
Demography
Bureaucracy
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations
Corruption
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Employment
Unemployment
Wages
Intergenerational Income Distribution
Aggregate Human Capital
Aggregate Labor Productivity
Demographic Economics: General
Corporate crime
white-collar crime
Labour
income economics
Public finance & taxation
Civil service & public sector
Population & demography
Tax incentives
Civil service
Population and demographics
Population
ISBN 1-4623-9722-0
1-4519-9339-0
1-282-47425-1
1-4527-0241-1
9786613821782
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910788525903321
Paul Elisabeth  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : : An Analysis of Rent Capture / / Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : : An Analysis of Rent Capture / / Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris
Autore Paul Elisabeth
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (35 p.)
Altri autori (Persone) Dabla-NorrisEra
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Corruption - Developing countries - Prevention - Econometric models
Rent (Economic theory) - Econometric models
Transparency in government - Econometric models
Labor
Taxation
Criminology
Demography
Bureaucracy
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations
Corruption
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Employment
Unemployment
Wages
Intergenerational Income Distribution
Aggregate Human Capital
Aggregate Labor Productivity
Demographic Economics: General
Corporate crime
white-collar crime
Labour
income economics
Public finance & taxation
Civil service & public sector
Population & demography
Tax incentives
Civil service
Population and demographics
Population
ISBN 1-4623-9722-0
1-4519-9339-0
1-282-47425-1
1-4527-0241-1
9786613821782
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910814669903321
Paul Elisabeth  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui