Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth |
Autore | De Palma André |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (25 p.) |
Altri autori (Persone) |
PrunierGuillaume
LeruthLuc |
Collana | IMF Working Papers |
Soggetto topico |
Public-private sector cooperation
Privatization Risk management Infrastructure Macroeconomics Public Finance Organizational Behavior Transaction Costs Property Rights Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption Asymmetric and Private Information National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures Other Public Investment and Capital Stock Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis Public Enterprises Public-Private Enterprises Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General Public finance & taxation Civil service & public sector Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) Public sector Risks of public-private partnership Transportation Expenditure Economic sectors Public financial management (PFM) National accounts Finance, Public Fiscal policy Saving and investment |
ISBN |
1-4623-4164-0
1-4527-6015-2 9786612843884 1-4518-7324-7 1-282-84388-5 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910788229103321 |
De Palma André | ||
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth |
Autore | De Palma André |
Edizione | [1st ed.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (25 p.) |
Disciplina | 332.1;332.152 |
Altri autori (Persone) |
PrunierGuillaume
LeruthLuc |
Collana | IMF Working Papers |
Soggetto topico |
Public-private sector cooperation
Privatization Risk management Infrastructure Macroeconomics Public Finance Organizational Behavior Transaction Costs Property Rights Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption Asymmetric and Private Information National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures Other Public Investment and Capital Stock Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis Public Enterprises Public-Private Enterprises Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General Public finance & taxation Civil service & public sector Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) Public sector Risks of public-private partnership Transportation Expenditure Economic sectors Public financial management (PFM) National accounts Finance, Public Fiscal policy Saving and investment |
ISBN |
1-4623-4164-0
1-4527-6015-2 9786612843884 1-4518-7324-7 1-282-84388-5 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910825973103321 |
De Palma André | ||
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Ukraine : : Second Review Under the Extended Fund Facility and Requests for Waivers of Non-Observance of Performance Criteria, Rephasing of Access and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Ukraine |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2016 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (152 pages) : illustrations, tables |
Disciplina | 338.94771 |
Collana | IMF Staff Country Reports |
Soggetto topico |
Banks and Banking
Finance: General Public Finance Taxation Criminology Exports and Imports Banks Depository Institutions Micro Finance Institutions Mortgages Debt Debt Management Sovereign Debt Trade Policy International Trade Organizations Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General International Lending and Debt Problems Banking Public finance & taxation Corporate crime white-collar crime Finance International economics Public debt Tariffs Revenue administration Taxes External debt Crime Banks and banking Debts, Public Tariff Revenue Debts, External |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910136708503321 |
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2016 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : : An Analysis of Rent Capture / / Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris |
Autore | Paul Elisabeth |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (35 p.) |
Altri autori (Persone) | Dabla-NorrisEra |
Collana | IMF Working Papers |
Soggetto topico |
Corruption - Developing countries - Prevention - Econometric models
Rent (Economic theory) - Econometric models Transparency in government - Econometric models Labor Taxation Criminology Demography Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General Employment Unemployment Wages Intergenerational Income Distribution Aggregate Human Capital Aggregate Labor Productivity Demographic Economics: General Corporate crime white-collar crime Labour income economics Public finance & taxation Civil service & public sector Population & demography Tax incentives Civil service Population and demographics Population |
ISBN |
1-4623-9722-0
1-4519-9339-0 1-282-47425-1 1-4527-0241-1 9786613821782 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910788525903321 |
Paul Elisabeth | ||
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : : An Analysis of Rent Capture / / Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris |
Autore | Paul Elisabeth |
Edizione | [1st ed.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (35 p.) |
Altri autori (Persone) | Dabla-NorrisEra |
Collana | IMF Working Papers |
Soggetto topico |
Corruption - Developing countries - Prevention - Econometric models
Rent (Economic theory) - Econometric models Transparency in government - Econometric models Labor Taxation Criminology Demography Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General Employment Unemployment Wages Intergenerational Income Distribution Aggregate Human Capital Aggregate Labor Productivity Demographic Economics: General Corporate crime white-collar crime Labour income economics Public finance & taxation Civil service & public sector Population & demography Tax incentives Civil service Population and demographics Population |
ISBN |
1-4623-9722-0
1-4519-9339-0 1-282-47425-1 1-4527-0241-1 9786613821782 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910814669903321 |
Paul Elisabeth | ||
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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