Autore	Fried Joseph
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York, : Algora Pub., c2012
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (342 p.)
Disciplina	330.973/0931 330.9730931
Soggetto topico	Financial crises - United States - History - 21st century Recessions - United States - History - 21st century Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009
ISBN	0-87586-944-0
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione	eng
Nota di contenuto	Preface: Who Really Drove the Economy Into the Ditch?; Part One: Two governmental policies caused the crisis; Chapter 1: The Rosetta stone of the subprime lending crisis; The origin of no-down payment loans; Lender, Thou Shalt be flexible; "The government was screaming" for subprime; The deadly role of Fannie and Freddie; Alarms were ringing years before the crisis; Chapter 2: Garbage in, garbage out; Say "goodbye" to sensible underwriting standards; F&F pushed the new automated systems with gusto; Automation and subprime don't mix; Push enough subprime and some will slip through Risky, risk-based pricing Fannie and Freddie misconstrued the warning signs; Conclusion; Chapter 3: Appraise a house without leaving your seat; Lending on the basis of Zillow estimates; The many problems of the Automated Valuation Models; Needed for appraisals: A Full Monty; Epilogue; Chapter 4: A liberal pincer creates a thousand points of blight; The sound of silence; It gets worse: Down payments are "gifted"; What did F&F think of down payment corruption assistance?; The real reason we lack affordable homes; Summary; Chapter 5: Fannie and Freddie fudge their delinquency stats Once a crook, always a crook Like Sinatra, they did it their way; What were the real delinquency rates?; More creative accounting; Smoke and mirrors; Epilogue; Chapter 6: Fannie and Freddie's junk loan orgy; Paul's Principle, explained; What are subprime loans?; The junk loan orgy; F&F paid top dollar for subprime; Purchases of subprime were leveraged; The Fannie and Freddie apologists and their logic errors; Ed Pinto: A man completely vindicated; Chapter 7: More subprime promotion by Fannie and Freddie; Fannie and Freddie promoted brokers over banks; They got cozy with subprime aggregators They were cheerleaders for subprime F&F designed the subprime loans of private lenders; Fannie and Freddie misled the market about subprime; F&F redefined "conforming" to include subprime; The GSEs fought predatory lending laws; A brief history of F&F, subprime, and politics; Chapter 8: The Community Reinvestment Act (or Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde); What is the Community Reinvestment Act and how did it change?; The government refuses to produce reliable CRA data; What is the best estimate of CRA's impact on the crisis?; What torture teaches us about the CRA Chapter 9: Fed policy is a secondary cause of the crisis The deflation argument; Exactly when did the housing bubble start?; Can the U.S. Federal reserve cause a world-wide bubble?; Fed policy doesn't affect long-term rates?; The two bubble factors: monetary policy and subprime; Epilogue: Transcripts show a clueless Federal Reserve; Part Two: Resistance to subprime broke down; Chapter 10: Securitization - Who needs it?; A brief history of securitization; Was our 40-year securitization experiment a success?; Mechanics of mortgage loan securitization Securitization is not needed, but it is here to stay
Record Nr.	UNINA-9910786447703321

Autore	Fried Joseph
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	New York, : Algora Pub., c2012
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (342 p.)
Disciplina	330.973/0931 330.9730931
Soggetto topico	Financial crises - United States - History - 21st century Recessions - United States - History - 21st century Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009
ISBN	0-87586-944-0
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione	eng
Nota di contenuto	Preface: Who Really Drove the Economy Into the Ditch?; Part One: Two governmental policies caused the crisis; Chapter 1: The Rosetta stone of the subprime lending crisis; The origin of no-down payment loans; Lender, Thou Shalt be flexible; "The government was screaming" for subprime; The deadly role of Fannie and Freddie; Alarms were ringing years before the crisis; Chapter 2: Garbage in, garbage out; Say "goodbye" to sensible underwriting standards; F&F pushed the new automated systems with gusto; Automation and subprime don't mix; Push enough subprime and some will slip through Risky, risk-based pricing Fannie and Freddie misconstrued the warning signs; Conclusion; Chapter 3: Appraise a house without leaving your seat; Lending on the basis of Zillow estimates; The many problems of the Automated Valuation Models; Needed for appraisals: A Full Monty; Epilogue; Chapter 4: A liberal pincer creates a thousand points of blight; The sound of silence; It gets worse: Down payments are "gifted"; What did F&F think of down payment corruption assistance?; The real reason we lack affordable homes; Summary; Chapter 5: Fannie and Freddie fudge their delinquency stats Once a crook, always a crook Like Sinatra, they did it their way; What were the real delinquency rates?; More creative accounting; Smoke and mirrors; Epilogue; Chapter 6: Fannie and Freddie's junk loan orgy; Paul's Principle, explained; What are subprime loans?; The junk loan orgy; F&F paid top dollar for subprime; Purchases of subprime were leveraged; The Fannie and Freddie apologists and their logic errors; Ed Pinto: A man completely vindicated; Chapter 7: More subprime promotion by Fannie and Freddie; Fannie and Freddie promoted brokers over banks; They got cozy with subprime aggregators They were cheerleaders for subprime F&F designed the subprime loans of private lenders; Fannie and Freddie misled the market about subprime; F&F redefined "conforming" to include subprime; The GSEs fought predatory lending laws; A brief history of F&F, subprime, and politics; Chapter 8: The Community Reinvestment Act (or Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde); What is the Community Reinvestment Act and how did it change?; The government refuses to produce reliable CRA data; What is the best estimate of CRA's impact on the crisis?; What torture teaches us about the CRA Chapter 9: Fed policy is a secondary cause of the crisis The deflation argument; Exactly when did the housing bubble start?; Can the U.S. Federal reserve cause a world-wide bubble?; Fed policy doesn't affect long-term rates?; The two bubble factors: monetary policy and subprime; Epilogue: Transcripts show a clueless Federal Reserve; Part Two: Resistance to subprime broke down; Chapter 10: Securitization - Who needs it?; A brief history of securitization; Was our 40-year securitization experiment a success?; Mechanics of mortgage loan securitization Securitization is not needed, but it is here to stay
Record Nr.	UNINA-9910822416203321

Autore	Zweig Michael <1942->
Edizione	[2nd ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Ithaca, : ILR Press, 2012
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (232 p.)
Disciplina	305.5/620973
Soggetto topico	Working class - United States Working class - Political activity - United States
Soggetto genere / forma	Electronic books.
ISBN	0-8014-6478-1 0-8014-6431-5
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione	eng
Nota di contenuto	The class structure of the United States -- What we think about when we think about class -- Why is class important? -- Looking at "the underclass" -- Looking at values, family and otherwise -- The working class and power -- Power and globalization -- Power and the government -- Into the millennium.
Record Nr.	UNINA-9910457367803321