Thinking, language, and experience [[electronic resource] /] / Hector-Neri Castañeda |
Autore | Castañeda Hector-Neri <1924-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Minneapolis, : University of Minnesota Press, c1989 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (320 p.) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Soggetto topico |
Thought and thinking
Semantics (Philosophy) Language and languages - Philosophy Experience |
ISBN |
0-8166-5539-1
1-4356-0605-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1. Major Objective, Grand Strategy, Chief Topics; 2. The Four Mechanisms of Singular Reference: Our Chief Topics; 3. The Hierarchical Web of Reference; 4. Some Data: A Pentacostal Miracle in Reverse; 5. Strategic Plan and Major Methodological Focus and Constraints; 6. Some Major Theses Developed in the Ensuing Studies; Notes; Part I. The Language of Singular Reference; Chapter 2. The Semantics and the Causal Roles of Proper Names in Our Thinking of Particulars: The Restricted-Variable/Retrieval View of Proper Names
Chapter 3. Singular DescriptionsChapter 4. Indexical Reference is Experiential Reference; Chapter 5. Attributing Reference to Others: The Language of Other Minds; Part II. Reference and Experience; Chapter 6. Perception: Its Internal Indexical Accusatives and Their Implicit Quasi-Indexical Representation; Chapter 7. Deliberation, Intentional Action, and Indexical Reference; Chapter 8. Personality, Anaphora, and Verbal Tenses; Chapter 9. God and Knowledge: Omniscience and Indexical Reference; Chapter 10. Self and Reality: Metaphysical Internalism, Selves, and the Holistic Indivisible Noumenon Chapter 11. Fiction and Reality: Ontological Questions about Literary ExperienceChapter 12. The Language of Other Minds: Indicators and Quasi-Indicators; Part III. A Semantic and Ontological Theory for the Language of Experience: Guise Theory; Chapter 13. Thinking and the Structure of the World; Chapter 14. Method, Individuals, and Guise Theory; Index; Author Index; Subject Index |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910778396303321 |
Castañeda Hector-Neri <1924->
![]() |
||
Minneapolis, : University of Minnesota Press, c1989 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Thinking, language, and experience [[electronic resource] /] / Hector-Neri Castañeda |
Autore | Castañeda Hector-Neri <1924-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Minneapolis, : University of Minnesota Press, c1989 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (320 p.) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Soggetto topico |
Thought and thinking
Semantics (Philosophy) Language and languages - Philosophy Experience |
ISBN |
0-8166-5539-1
1-4356-0605-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1. Major Objective, Grand Strategy, Chief Topics; 2. The Four Mechanisms of Singular Reference: Our Chief Topics; 3. The Hierarchical Web of Reference; 4. Some Data: A Pentacostal Miracle in Reverse; 5. Strategic Plan and Major Methodological Focus and Constraints; 6. Some Major Theses Developed in the Ensuing Studies; Notes; Part I. The Language of Singular Reference; Chapter 2. The Semantics and the Causal Roles of Proper Names in Our Thinking of Particulars: The Restricted-Variable/Retrieval View of Proper Names
Chapter 3. Singular DescriptionsChapter 4. Indexical Reference is Experiential Reference; Chapter 5. Attributing Reference to Others: The Language of Other Minds; Part II. Reference and Experience; Chapter 6. Perception: Its Internal Indexical Accusatives and Their Implicit Quasi-Indexical Representation; Chapter 7. Deliberation, Intentional Action, and Indexical Reference; Chapter 8. Personality, Anaphora, and Verbal Tenses; Chapter 9. God and Knowledge: Omniscience and Indexical Reference; Chapter 10. Self and Reality: Metaphysical Internalism, Selves, and the Holistic Indivisible Noumenon Chapter 11. Fiction and Reality: Ontological Questions about Literary ExperienceChapter 12. The Language of Other Minds: Indicators and Quasi-Indicators; Part III. A Semantic and Ontological Theory for the Language of Experience: Guise Theory; Chapter 13. Thinking and the Structure of the World; Chapter 14. Method, Individuals, and Guise Theory; Index; Author Index; Subject Index |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910808614703321 |
Castañeda Hector-Neri <1924->
![]() |
||
Minneapolis, : University of Minnesota Press, c1989 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
This is philosophy of mind [[electronic resource] ] : an introduction / / Pete Mandik |
Autore | Mandik Pete |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 p.) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Collana | This is philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophical behaviorism |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN |
1-118-60739-2
1-118-60748-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; How to Use This Book; Acknowledgments; 1: Meet Your Mind; Aspects of Mind; Thought and experience; Conscious and unconscious; Qualia; Sensory perception; Emotion; Imagery; Will and action; Self; Propositional attitudes; Philosophical Problems; Mind-body problem; Other problems; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 2: Substance Dualism; Arguments for Substance Dualism; Leibniz's law arguments; Criticism of Leibniz's law arguments: Intensional fallacy; Explanatory gap arguments; Criticisms of explanatory gap arguments; Modal arguments
Criticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability really entail possibility?Mind-Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism; Princess Elisabeth's objection; The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 3: Property Dualism; Introducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain; The Inverted Spectrum; Attack of the Zombies; The Knowledge Argument; The Explanatory Gap Argument; Does Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism?; How Do You Know You're Not a Zombie?; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 4: Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism Solipsism: Is It Just Me?Idealism: It's All in the Mind; Berkeley's argument from pain; Berkeley's argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley's bucket; Berkeley's "Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea"; Berkeley's master argument; Why Berkeley is not a solipsist; Arguing against idealism; Panpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere; The analogy argument; The nothing from nothing argument; The evolutionary argument; Arguing against panpsychism: The combination problem; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 5: Behaviorism and Other Minds; Behaviorism: Introduction and Overview The History of BehaviorismLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument; Gilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine; Objections to Behaviorism; The qualia objection; Sellars's objection; The Geach-Chisholm objection; The Philosophical Problem of Other Minds; The rise and fall of the argument from analogy; Denying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 6: Mind as Brain; Introducing Mind-Brain Identity Theory; Advantages of Mind-Brain Identity Theory; A Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience Major parts and functions of the nervous systemMajor parts and functions of the brain; Neurons, neural activations, and brain states; Lesions, imaging, and electrophysiology; Localism and holism; Learning and synaptic plasticity; Computational neuroscience and connectionism; Neural correlates of consciousness; On pain and c-fibers; Some General Remarks about Identity; Arguments against Mind-Brain Identity Theory; The zombie argument; The multiple realizability argument; Max Black's "distinct property" argument; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 7: Thinking Machines; Can a Machine Think? Alan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910463064103321 |
Mandik Pete
![]() |
||
Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
This is philosophy of mind [[electronic resource] ] : an introduction / / Pete Mandik |
Autore | Mandik Pete |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 p.) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Collana | This is philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Philosophical behaviorism
Philosophy of mind |
ISBN |
1-118-60739-2
1-118-60748-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; How to Use This Book; Acknowledgments; 1: Meet Your Mind; Aspects of Mind; Thought and experience; Conscious and unconscious; Qualia; Sensory perception; Emotion; Imagery; Will and action; Self; Propositional attitudes; Philosophical Problems; Mind-body problem; Other problems; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 2: Substance Dualism; Arguments for Substance Dualism; Leibniz's law arguments; Criticism of Leibniz's law arguments: Intensional fallacy; Explanatory gap arguments; Criticisms of explanatory gap arguments; Modal arguments
Criticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability really entail possibility?Mind-Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism; Princess Elisabeth's objection; The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 3: Property Dualism; Introducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain; The Inverted Spectrum; Attack of the Zombies; The Knowledge Argument; The Explanatory Gap Argument; Does Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism?; How Do You Know You're Not a Zombie?; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 4: Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism Solipsism: Is It Just Me?Idealism: It's All in the Mind; Berkeley's argument from pain; Berkeley's argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley's bucket; Berkeley's "Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea"; Berkeley's master argument; Why Berkeley is not a solipsist; Arguing against idealism; Panpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere; The analogy argument; The nothing from nothing argument; The evolutionary argument; Arguing against panpsychism: The combination problem; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 5: Behaviorism and Other Minds; Behaviorism: Introduction and Overview The History of BehaviorismLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument; Gilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine; Objections to Behaviorism; The qualia objection; Sellars's objection; The Geach-Chisholm objection; The Philosophical Problem of Other Minds; The rise and fall of the argument from analogy; Denying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 6: Mind as Brain; Introducing Mind-Brain Identity Theory; Advantages of Mind-Brain Identity Theory; A Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience Major parts and functions of the nervous systemMajor parts and functions of the brain; Neurons, neural activations, and brain states; Lesions, imaging, and electrophysiology; Localism and holism; Learning and synaptic plasticity; Computational neuroscience and connectionism; Neural correlates of consciousness; On pain and c-fibers; Some General Remarks about Identity; Arguments against Mind-Brain Identity Theory; The zombie argument; The multiple realizability argument; Max Black's "distinct property" argument; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 7: Thinking Machines; Can a Machine Think? Alan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910786984203321 |
Mandik Pete
![]() |
||
Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
This is philosophy of mind [[electronic resource] ] : an introduction / / Pete Mandik |
Autore | Mandik Pete |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 p.) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Collana | This is philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Philosophical behaviorism
Philosophy of mind |
ISBN |
1-118-60739-2
1-118-60748-1 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; How to Use This Book; Acknowledgments; 1: Meet Your Mind; Aspects of Mind; Thought and experience; Conscious and unconscious; Qualia; Sensory perception; Emotion; Imagery; Will and action; Self; Propositional attitudes; Philosophical Problems; Mind-body problem; Other problems; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 2: Substance Dualism; Arguments for Substance Dualism; Leibniz's law arguments; Criticism of Leibniz's law arguments: Intensional fallacy; Explanatory gap arguments; Criticisms of explanatory gap arguments; Modal arguments
Criticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability really entail possibility?Mind-Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism; Princess Elisabeth's objection; The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 3: Property Dualism; Introducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain; The Inverted Spectrum; Attack of the Zombies; The Knowledge Argument; The Explanatory Gap Argument; Does Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism?; How Do You Know You're Not a Zombie?; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 4: Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism Solipsism: Is It Just Me?Idealism: It's All in the Mind; Berkeley's argument from pain; Berkeley's argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley's bucket; Berkeley's "Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea"; Berkeley's master argument; Why Berkeley is not a solipsist; Arguing against idealism; Panpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere; The analogy argument; The nothing from nothing argument; The evolutionary argument; Arguing against panpsychism: The combination problem; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 5: Behaviorism and Other Minds; Behaviorism: Introduction and Overview The History of BehaviorismLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument; Gilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine; Objections to Behaviorism; The qualia objection; Sellars's objection; The Geach-Chisholm objection; The Philosophical Problem of Other Minds; The rise and fall of the argument from analogy; Denying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 6: Mind as Brain; Introducing Mind-Brain Identity Theory; Advantages of Mind-Brain Identity Theory; A Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience Major parts and functions of the nervous systemMajor parts and functions of the brain; Neurons, neural activations, and brain states; Lesions, imaging, and electrophysiology; Localism and holism; Learning and synaptic plasticity; Computational neuroscience and connectionism; Neural correlates of consciousness; On pain and c-fibers; Some General Remarks about Identity; Arguments against Mind-Brain Identity Theory; The zombie argument; The multiple realizability argument; Max Black's "distinct property" argument; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 7: Thinking Machines; Can a Machine Think? Alan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910827085603321 |
Mandik Pete
![]() |
||
Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Trying without willing : an essay in the philosophy of mind / / Timothy Cleveland |
Autore | Cleveland Timothy |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Abingdon, Oxon : , : Routledge, , 2016 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (203 pages) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Collana | Avebury series in philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Philosophy of mind
Will |
ISBN |
1-351-87742-9
1-138-26756-2 1-315-23556-0 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | 1. Volitionism, trying, and the mental in physical action -- 2. Trying, willing, and truth-conditions -- 3. Trying, conditional Cartesianism, and knowledge of one's own actions -- 4. Natural kinds, physical actions, and psychological essentialism -- 5. Act descriptions, basic actions, and trying -- 6. Trying, paralysis, and de re intentionality -- 7. Trying, teleology, and interpretation. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910154996903321 |
Cleveland Timothy
![]() |
||
Abingdon, Oxon : , : Routledge, , 2016 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Unsnarling the world-knot : consciousness, freedom, and the mind-body problem / / David Ray Griffin |
Autore | Griffin David Ray <1939-2022.> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Berkeley, Calif., : University of California Press, c1998 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xv, 266 p. ) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Soggetto topico |
Philosophy of mind
Consciousness Mind and body Free will and determinism Speculative Philosophy Philosophy Philosophy & Religion |
ISBN | 0-585-11902-3 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Altri titoli varianti | Unsnarling the world-knot |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910496142003321 |
Griffin David Ray <1939-2022.>
![]() |
||
Berkeley, Calif., : University of California Press, c1998 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
What is consciousness? : three sages look behind the veil / / Ervin Laszlo, Jean Houston, and Larry Dossey ; foreword by Stanley Krippner |
Autore | Laszlo Ervin <1932-> |
Edizione | [First edition.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, New York : , : SelectBooks, Inc., , 2016 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (177 pages) |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Collana | A New Paradigm Book of The Laszlo Institute of New Paradigm Research |
Soggetto topico |
Consciousness
Human beings |
ISBN | 1-59079-348-X |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910136994803321 |
Laszlo Ervin <1932->
![]() |
||
New York, New York : , : SelectBooks, Inc., , 2016 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
What is thought? [[electronic resource] /] / Eric B. Baum |
Autore | Baum Eric B. <1957-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2004 |
Descrizione fisica | ix, 478 p. : ill |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Soggetto topico |
Philosophy of mind
Cognitive science Thought and thinking Semantics (Philosophy) |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN |
1-282-25380-8
9786613814456 0-262-31057-0 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910458424103321 |
Baum Eric B. <1957->
![]() |
||
Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2004 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
What Is Thought? / / Eric B. Baum |
Autore | Baum Eric B. <1957-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2004 |
Descrizione fisica | ix, 478 p. : ill |
Disciplina | 128/.2 |
Soggetto topico |
Philosophy of mind
Cognitive science Thought and thinking Semantics (Philosophy) |
Soggetto non controllato |
COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
COMPUTER SCIENCE/Artificial Intelligence |
ISBN |
1-282-25380-8
9786613814456 0-262-31057-0 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910784632303321 |
Baum Eric B. <1957->
![]() |
||
Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2004 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|