Normativity in International Tax Law

• Autore: Blum Daniel W
• Pubblicazione: Amsterdam : , : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, , 2023; ©2023
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (657 pages)
• Disciplina: 343.04
• Nota di contenuto: Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Preface -- Chapter 1: Normativity in International Tax Law: Setting the Scene -- 1.1. The importance of legal theory in the field of international tax law -- 1.1.1. Starting point, or the question "why" -- 1.1.2. The substantive aspect, the methodological aspect and the link between them -- 1.1.2.1. International tax law between positivism, realism and naturalism -- 1.1.2.2. Legal theory, legal doctrine and the role of law in tax policy -- 1.2. Existing scholarship and identified research gap -- 1.3. Applied methodology and limitations of the inquiry -- 1.4. Objective, hypotheses and structure -- 1.4.1. Objective -- 1.4.2. Key hypotheses -- 1.4.3. Structure -- Chapter 2: The Debate on How to Reform the International Tax System in Light of Digitalization -- 2.1. Starting point: Tax policy debate on how to reform the rules of international taxation -- 2.2. Proposals for reform: International tax rules in a digital era -- 2.2.1. Origin of the debate -- 2.2.2. Development of the debate -- 2.2.3. Extensions of the right to tax of market/source states -- 2.2.3.1. Treaty/consensus-based proposals -- 2.2.3.1.1. Significant economic presence -- 2.2.3.1.2. User participation and marketing intangibles proposal -- 2.2.3.1.3. The OECD's Unified Approach, or Pillar One -- 2.2.3.1.4. Article 12A of the UN Model: Fees for technical services -- 2.2.3.1.5. Article 12B of the UN Model: Automated digital services -- 2.2.3.1.6. Withholding tax on digital transactions -- 2.2.3.2. Unilateral proposals -- 2.2.3.2.1. Turnover taxes/equalization levies -- 2.2.3.2.2. The GAAR solution: Diverted profits tax -- 2.2.4. Extension of residence-based taxation: Pillar Two, or the global minimum tax (GloBE proposal) -- 2.2.5. Destination-based corporate taxation. ; 2.3. Assumptions underlying the debate on how to address the tax challenges of the digitized economy -- 2.3.1. Relevance of identifying the proposals' underlying assumptions -- 2.3.1.1. Necessity of reform and superiority to current law -- 2.3.1.2. The circular effect of the use of assumptions in international tax discourse -- 2.3.1.3. Two clarifications -- 2.3.2. Necessity of reform -- 2.3.2.1. Fairness, efficiency and adequacy -- 2.3.2.2. Reform necessary to promote fairness -- 2.3.2.2.1. "Fairness" undefined -- 2.3.2.2.2. The allocational fairness argument -- 2.3.2.2.3. The fair competition argument -- 2.3.2.3. Reform necessary to promote economic efficiency and neutrality -- 2.3.2.3.1. Abstract policy benchmark or legal necessity? -- 2.3.2.3.2. Efficiency arguments raised in favour of taxation at destination -- 2.3.2.3.2.1. Manipulability and competitive race to the bottom -- 2.3.2.3.2.2. Cash-flow taxation and marginal tax rate on investment -- 2.3.2.3.3. Efficiency arguments raised in favour of global minimum taxation -- 2.3.2.3.4. Efficiency and neutrality, or the functioning of the internal market -- 2.3.2.4. The technical case for reform: The search for "adequacy" -- 2.3.2.4.1. Key arguments: Outdatedness of the 1920s League of Nations compromise -- 2.3.2.4.2. Theoretical merit of the adequacy argument -- 2.3.3. Justification of taxation under proposed changes -- 2.3.3.1. Justification of taxation: Why it matters -- 2.3.3.2. Justification grounds referred to in the tax policy debate -- 2.3.3.2.1. The justification cocktail: Benefit doctrine, value creation, base erosion and neo-classical theory of residence taxation -- 2.3.3.2.2. The benefit and economic allegiance doctrine -- 2.3.3.2.2.1. Origin and content -- 2.3.3.2.2.2. Concrete use in digital economy policy debate. ; 2.3.3.2.2.3. The value creation paradigm as a novel interpretation of the benefit doctrine -- 2.3.3.2.2.3.1. The notion's entrance into the tax policy debate -- 2.3.3.2.2.3.2. Three questions on the value creation paradigm -- 2.3.3.2.2.3.3. Theoretical merit of the benefit/economic allegiance/value creation doctrine -- 2.3.3.2.2.4. Base erosion as justification -- 2.3.3.2.2.4.1. Implied understanding and use in tax policy debate -- 2.3.3.2.2.4.2. Matching principle -- 2.3.3.2.2.4.3. Benefit doctrine between active business income and passive income -- 2.3.3.2.2.4.4. Base erosion and residence taxation -- 2.3.3.2.3. OECD Pillar Two/GloBE proposal, or neo-classical theory of residence taxation -- 2.3.3.2.3.1. The role of residence taxation in the policy debate on how to tax the digitalized economy -- 2.3.3.2.3.2. The GloBE proposal: Policy context and goal -- 2.3.3.2.3.3. Implicit theoretical justification: Worldwide taxation by the state of residence -- 2.3.3.2.3.4. Residence taxation and the ability-to-pay principle -- 2.3.4. Assumptions about the jurisdiction-to-tax concept -- 2.3.4.1. The issues at hand -- 2.3.4.2. Reform proposals and fiscal sovereignty -- 2.3.4.3. Legal limitations for reform under international and/or EU law -- 2.3.4.3.1. Existing tax and trade treaties -- 2.3.4.3.2. Customary international law -- 2.3.4.3.3. EU primary law -- 2.3.4.4. Interim conclusion: Legal theory implications -- Chapter 3: Normativity and Legal Validity in International Taxation -- 3.1. The relevance of legal theory for international tax law and tax policy -- 3.1.1. Starting point: Why normativity and its source matter -- 3.1.2. The link between theory, philosophy and policy -- 3.1.3. The substantive aspect and its practical implications -- 3.1.4. The methodological aspect: From "is" to "ought" and back. ; 3.1.4.1. The link between theory and doctrine: The role of legal theory in legal scholarship and jurisprudence as science -- 3.1.4.2. The role of legal theory and methodology in tax policy -- 3.1.4.2.1. The traditional perception: Tax policy as the domain of non-legal arguments -- 3.1.4.2.2. The interrelationship between policy and doctrine -- 3.1.4.2.2.1. Tax policy as part of the historical and teleological interpretation -- 3.1.4.2.2.1.1. Policy as expression of the legislative intent at the time of law creation -- 3.1.4.2.2.1.2. Subsequent policy changes and interpretation -- 3.1.4.2.2.2. Interpretation as a tax policy tool or the value of consistency -- 3.1.4.2.2.2.1. Changing the perspective -- 3.1.4.2.2.2.2. Digital permanent establishment: Policy qua analogy? -- 3.1.4.2.2.2.3. The "value creation" paradigm -- 3.1.4.2.2.2.4. UK and Australian diverted profits tax: The notion of "abuse" between policy and interpretation -- 3.1.4.2.3. Conclusion: Necessity of a legal theoretical analysis -- 3.2. Normativity and validity of law: The quest for a theory of international tax law -- 3.2.1. The distinction between normativity and validity -- 3.2.2. Defining normativity -- 3.2.3. The source of normativity in a legal sense -- 3.2.3.1. Identifying the basic problem of validity and its simplications for international taxation -- 3.2.3.2. Key theories on the source of legal normativity in a nutshell -- 3.2.3.2.1. Introductory remarks: A defensible limitation -- 3.2.3.2.2. Legal positivism -- 3.2.3.2.2.1. Key common feature of positivist theories -- 3.2.3.2.2.2. Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law -- 3.2.3.2.2.2.1. Pretext: Rejection of natural law theories -- 3.2.3.2.2.2.2. Basic norm, the unity of law and the separation of "is" and "ought" -- 3.2.3.2.2.3. Hart's The Concept of Law -- 3.2.3.2.2.3.1. Pretext: Rejecting Austin's positivism. ; 3.2.3.2.2.3.2. Law as the union of primary and secondary rules -- 3.2.3.2.2.3.3. Key implication of the different nature of Kelsen's "basic norm" and Hart's "rule of recognition" -- 3.2.3.2.3. Legal realism -- 3.2.3.2.3.1. Starting point: Rejecting "metaphysics" in legal theory -- 3.2.3.2.3.2. Rule scepticism, validity and law as prediction -- 3.2.3.2.4. Natural law and interpretivism -- 3.2.3.2.4.1. Introductory remarks -- 3.2.3.2.4.2. Key features of natural/non-positivist law theories -- 3.2.3.2.4.3. The "third way": Dworkin's interpretivism -- 3.2.3.2.4.3.1. Introductory remarks: Object, nature and key hypothesis of Dworkin's theory in a nutshell -- 3.2.3.2.4.3.2. Rejecting positivism: The role of principles -- 3.2.3.2.4.3.3. Law as integrity: Constructivist interpretation -- 3.2.3.2.4.3.4. Dworkin and Kelsian positivism -- 3.2.3.2.5. Legal theory and international law -- 3.2.3.2.5.1. The transposition of legal theories to international law and their relevance for international tax law -- 3.2.3.2.5.2. Positivism in international law -- 3.2.3.2.5.2.1. Classical international legal positivism: From Austin to Jellinek and beyond -- 3.2.3.2.5.2.2. Validity of international law pursuant to Kelsen -- 3.2.3.2.5.2.3. The rule of recognition and international law -- 3.2.3.2.5.3. Realism and international law -- 3.2.3.2.5.3.1. Ross and international law -- 3.2.3.2.5.3.2. New legal realism and international law -- 3.2.3.2.5.4. Interpretivism and international law -- Chapter 4: Normativity and its Source in International Tax Law: International Tax Discourse between Positivism, Realism and Naturalism -- 4.1. Tying up the loose ends -- 4.1.1. Preliminary question (1): The role of principles from a theoretical perspective -- 4.1.1.1. The questions raised -- 4.1.1.2. Principles versus rules. ; 4.1.1.2.1. The distinction between rules and principles according to Ronald Dworkin.
• Sommario/riassunto: In this book, the author examines the legal theoretical foundations of international tax law and situates the arguments raised in contemporary discourse within the spectrum between legal positivism, realism and naturalism.
• Titolo autorizzato: Normativity in International Tax Law
• ISBN: 9789087228064; 9789087228057
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910838329503321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: WU - Tax Law and Policy Series