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Titolo: | Moral psychology . Volume 4 Free will and moral responsibility / / edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong |
Pubblicazione: | Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : The Mit Press, , [2014] |
©2014 | |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (493 pages) |
Disciplina: | 170 |
Soggetto topico: | Ethics |
Free will and determinism | |
Responsibility | |
Soggetto non controllato: | PHILOSOPHY/General |
COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General | |
Altri autori: | Sinnott-ArmstrongWalter <1955-> |
Note generali: | "A Bradford book." |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Sommario/riassunto: | Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga -- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions. |
Altri titoli varianti: | Free will and moral responsibility |
Titolo autorizzato: | Moral psychology |
ISBN: | 0-262-32149-1 |
0-262-32148-3 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910823894403321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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