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Lawlessness and economics [[electronic resource] ] : alternative modes of governance / / Avinash K. Dixit



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Autore: Dixit Avinash K Visualizza persona
Titolo: Lawlessness and economics [[electronic resource] ] : alternative modes of governance / / Avinash K. Dixit Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2004
Edizione: Course Book
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (182 p.)
Disciplina: 330.1
Soggetto topico: Economic policy
Corporate governance
Contracts
Right of property
Corporation law
Business enterprises - Law and legislation
International cooperation
Corporate governance - Developing countries
Contracts - Developing countries
Right of property - Developing countries
Corporation law - Developing countries
Business enterprises - Law and legislation - Developing countries
Soggetto geografico: Developing countries Economic policy
Classificazione: QD 050
Persona (resp. second.): BlundellRichard
Note generali: "Second printing, and first paperback printing, 2007."--T.p. verso.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [155]-161) and index.
Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Economics With and Without the Law -- 2. Private Ordering in the Shadow of the Law -- 3. Relation-Based Contract Enforcement -- 4. Profit-Motivated Contract Enforcement -- 5. Private Protection of Property Rights -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Index -- The Gorman Lectures in Economics / Blundell, Richard
Sommario/riassunto: How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems.
Titolo autorizzato: Lawlessness and economics  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-283-30333-7
9786613303332
1-4008-4137-2
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910820083003321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: Gorman lectures in economics.