Concentrated corporate ownership [[electronic resource] /] / edited by Randall Morck

• Pubblicazione: Chicago, : University of Chicago Press, c2000
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (404 p.)
• Disciplina: 338.7
• Soggetto topico: Corporate governance; Industrial concentration; Stock ownership
• Soggetto non controllato: corporate governance, firms, administration, management, organization, control blocks, concentrated ownership, economic growth, law, economics, finance, industry, venture capital, public, private, trading, investment, canada, taxation, opportunism, trust, inherited wealth, cash-flow rights, dual class equity, cross-ownership, stock pyramids, foreign intermediaries, market business groups, freezeouts, racism, oppression, discrimination, power, nonfiction
• Altri autori: MorckRandall
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Front matter -- National Bureau of Economic Research -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities -- 2. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public: Private versus Social Optimality -- 3. Some of the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Ownership Concentration in Canada -- 4. Corporations and Taxation: A Largely Private Matter? -- 5. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders -- 6. Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations -- 7. Waiting for the Omelette to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression -- 8. Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts -- 9. Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance -- 10. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights -- 11. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth The Canadian Disease? -- Contributors -- Name Index -- Subject Index
• Sommario/riassunto: Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.
• Titolo autorizzato: Concentrated corporate ownership
• ISBN: 1-281-22385-9; 9786611223854; 0-226-53682-3
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910784755103321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Conference report (National Bureau of Economic Research)