The Immaterial Self [[electronic resource] ] : A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind

• Autore: Foster John
• Pubblicazione: Hoboken, : Taylor and Francis, 2002
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (309 p.)
• Disciplina: 128/.2; 147.4
• Soggetto topico: Descartes, René; Dualism; Mind and body; Philosophy of mind; Speculative Philosophy; Philosophy; Philosophy & Religion
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di contenuto: Book Cover; Title; Contents; Preface; THE DUALIST DOCTRINE; NIHILISM AND ANALYTICAL BEHAVIOURISM; ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM; THE TYPE-IDENTITY THESIS; TOKEN-IDENTITY AND METAPHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM; TOKEN-IDENTITY AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL CAUSATION; THE MENTAL SUBJECT; PERSONAL IDENTITY, EMBODIMENT, AND FREEDOM; Notes; Bibliography; Index
• Sommario/riassunto: Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self.John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current phil
• Titolo autorizzato: The Immaterial Self
• ISBN: 0-203-00408-6; 1-280-18224-5; 0-203-27624-8; 1-134-73104-3; 1-134-73105-1; 9786610182244
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910784077203321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: International Library of Philosophy