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Autore: | Logins Arturs |
Titolo: | Normative reasons : between reasoning and explanation / / Arturs Logins, University of Zurich [[electronic resource]] |
Pubblicazione: | Cambridge University Press, 2022 |
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; ; New York, NY, USA : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2022 | |
Edizione: | 1st ed. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (x, 241 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
Disciplina: | 160 |
Soggetto topico: | Reasoning |
Question (Logic) | |
Normativity (Ethics) | |
Soggetto non controllato: | epistemology |
ethics | |
Classificazione: | PHI000000 |
Note generali: | Open Access. |
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 25 Jul 2022). | |
Sommario/riassunto: | Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Artūrs Logins develops and defends a new theory: the Erotetic view of reasons, according to which normative reasons are appropriate answers to normative why questions (Why should I do this?). This theory draws on evidence of how why-questions work in informal logic, language and philosophy of science. The resulting view is able to avoid the problems of previous accounts, while retaining all of their attractive features, and it also suggests exciting directions for future research. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Normative reasons |
ISBN: | 1-009-08411-9 |
1-009-08431-3 | |
1-009-07601-9 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910585963903321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |