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| Autore: |
Double Richard
|
| Titolo: |
Metaphilosophy and free will [[electronic resource] /] / Richard Double
|
| Pubblicazione: | New York, : Oxford University Press, 1996 |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (189 p.) |
| Disciplina: | 123/.5 |
| Soggetto topico: | Free will and determinism |
| Methodology | |
| Soggetto genere / forma: | Electronic books. |
| Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references (p. 167-172) and index. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Contents; 1 Introduction; 1. Free Will Subjectivism and Metaphilosophy; 2. An Example of the Importance of Metaphilosophy; 3. A Provisional Definition of Free Choice; 4. Overview of the Book; I: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM AS A PROBLEM IN METAPHILOSOPHY; 2 Metaphilosophies; 3 Intermediate-Level Philosophical Principles; 4 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (I); 5 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (II); II: FREE WILL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHILOSOPHY AS CONTINUOUS WITH SCIENCE; 6 How to Frame the Free Will Problem; 7 The Fragmentation of Free Will |
| 8 Free Will Is a Moral Concept9 Hume's Principle: The Subjectivity of Moral Responsibility and Free Will; 10 Conclusion; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; Z | |
| Sommario/riassunto: | In this text, the author looks at the contending schools of thought on the problem of free will. He argues that the free will problem is intractable because free will theorists are separated by metaphilosophical differences in the way they view the philosophical enterprise itself. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Metaphilosophy and free will ![]() |
| ISBN: | 1-280-45290-0 |
| 0-19-535541-5 | |
| 1-4237-4093-9 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910449761503321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |