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Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff / / Enrique Mendoza, Ceyhun Bora Durdu



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Autore: Mendoza Enrique Visualizza persona
Titolo: Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff / / Enrique Mendoza, Ceyhun Bora Durdu Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (42 p.)
Soggetto topico: Economic policy
Globalization
Exports and Imports
Finance: General
Investments: Stocks
Macroeconomics
International Investment
Long-term Capital Movements
Pension Funds
Non-bank Financial Institutions
Financial Instruments
Institutional Investors
Price Level
Inflation
Deflation
Macroeconomics: Consumption
Saving
Wealth
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
International economics
Investment & securities
Finance
Sudden stops
Stocks
Asset prices
Consumption
Moral hazard
Capital movements
Prices
Economics
Financial risk management
Soggetto geografico: Mexico
Altri autori: DurduCeyhun Bora  
Note generali: "March 2006."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A MODEL OF GLOBALIZATION HAZARD AND PRICE GUARANTEES""; ""III. CHARACTERIZING THE GLOBALIZATION HAZARD-MORAL HAZARD TRADEOFF""; ""IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS""; ""V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto: An implication of the "globalization hazard" hypothesis is that sudden stops could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard by creating international moral hazard. We study this tradeoff using an equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by Fisher's debt-deflation process. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign asset demand, but their effectiveness and welfare implications depend critically on the price elasticity of foreign demand and on making the guarantees contingent on debt levels.
Titolo autorizzato: Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-3770-8
1-4527-0878-9
1-283-51818-X
1-4519-0869-5
9786613830630
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788696103321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2006/073