Operational unpredictability and deterrence : evaluating options for complicating adversary decisionmaking / / Miranda Priebe, Angela O'Mahony, Bryan Frederick, Alyssa Demus, Bonny Lin, Michelle Grisé, Derek Eaton, Abby Doll

• Autore: Priebe Miranda
• Pubblicazione: Santa Monica, Calif, : RAND Corporation, 2021
• Disciplina: 355/.033073
• Soggetto topico: Deterrence (Strategy); Military policy - Decision making; Operational art (Military science) - Evaluation; Diplomatic relations; Military policy
• Soggetto geografico: United States Military policy; United States Foreign relations China; United States Foreign relations Russia (Federation); China; Russia (Federation); United States
• Persona (resp. second.): O'MahonyAngela; FrederickBryan A.; DemusAlyssa; LinBonny; GriséMichelle; EatonDerek <1963->; DollAbby
• Nota di contenuto: Introduction -- Key Concepts and Methodology for Generating Options for Enhancing U.S. Operational Unpredictability -- Approach 1: Create Irregular Deployment Patterns -- Approach 2: Reveal or Demonstrate New Capabilities -- Approach 3: Bluff About U.S. Ability to Conduct Multiple COAs -- Approach 4: Repeatedly Reveal Covert Capabilities -- Findings and Recommendations -- Appendix A: Test of Approach 2: Autumn Forge 1975 -- Appendix B: Test of Approach 2: Ocean Venture 81.
• Sommario/riassunto: The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy instructed the U.S. military to become more operationally unpredictable and suggested that doing so would help the United States deter attacks on U.S. partners. The authors of this report propose a definition of U.S. operational unpredictability—adversary uncertainty about how the United States would fight; develop four potential approaches for increasing U.S. operational unpredictability and deterring attacks on U.S. allies and partners; and assess how the four approaches could affect U.S. relations with Russia and China. They also examine two Cold War–era cases in which the United States sought to be more operationally unpredictable. The authors find that increasing adversaries' perceptions of U.S. operational unpredictability may be possible if the United States has detailed information about their operational analysis and decisionmaking processes. The most promising way to increase U.S. operational unpredictability is to publicize new U.S. capabilities and demonstrate that they give the United States multiple options for achieving its key objectives. However, increasing U.S. operational unpredictability may be costly and, in some cases, involve negative side effects (e.g., reducing U.S. military effectiveness and increasing China's and Russia's threat perceptions). The authors recommend weighing the potential costs and effectiveness of these approaches against more traditional approaches to deterring U.S. adversaries.
• Altri titoli varianti: Operational Unpredictability and Deterrence
• Titolo autorizzato: Operational unpredictability and deterrence
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9911079753403321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II