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Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice / / Nienke Oomes, Christopher Meissner



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Autore: Oomes Nienke Visualizza persona
Titolo: Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice / / Nienke Oomes, Christopher Meissner Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (47 p.)
Disciplina: 332.45
Soggetto topico: Foreign exchange rates
Foreign exchange administration
Coinage, International
Currencies
Currency
Exchange rate arrangements
Exchange rates
Exports and Imports
Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
Foreign Exchange
Foreign exchange
Government and the Monetary System
International economics
Monetary economics
Monetary Systems
Monetary unions
Money and Monetary Policy
Money
Payment Systems
Regimes
Reserve currencies
Standards
Soggetto geografico: United States
Altri autori: MeissnerChristopher  
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Evolution of Anchor Currency Choice; A. Measuring Anchor Currency Choice; B. Stylized Facts on Anchor Currency Choice; Figures; 1. All Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1950-2001; 2. Developed Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1950-2001; 3. Developing Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1950-2001; 4. Transition Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1990-2001; C. Why Countries Peg the Way They Peg: A Brief Survey of Recent Experience; III. Conceptual Framework for Anchor Choice: Network Externalities, Multiple Equilibria, and Path Dependence; Tables
1. Initial Payoff Matrix2. Subsequent Payoff Matrix; IV. Empirical Methodology; V. Empirical Determinants of Anchor and Regime Choice; A. Country-Specific Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice; B. Country-Specific Determinants of Regime Choice: Pegs vs. Floats; C. Anchor-Specific Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice; VI. Results; A. Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice; 3. Determinants of Anchor and Exchange Rate Regime Choice, 1990-1998; 4. Determinants of Anchor and Exchange Rate Regime Choice, 1980-1998; B. How Strong Are Network Externalities
5. Actual and Predicted Number of Dollar Anchors, 1990-19986. Actual and Predicted Number of German Mark Anchors, 1990-1998; C. Other Determinants of Anchor Choice; D. Determinants of Regime Choice: Pegs vs. Floats; E. Model Fit; F. Other Specifications and Robustness Checks; 5. Determinants of Anchor Choice, Restricted Choice Set, 1980-1998; 6. Determinants of Anchor Choice, Restricted Choice Set, 1998; G. Other Factors that Appear Less Relevant or Are Hard to Test; VII. Conclusion; Appendixes; I. The Natural Classification
II. A Model of Trade Network Externalities in Anchor Currency ChoiceReferences
Sommario/riassunto: What determines the currency to which countries peg or "anchor" their exchange rate? Data for over 100 countries between 1980 and 1998 reveal that trade network externalities are a key determinant. This implies that anchor currency choice may well be suboptimal in that certain currencies, e.g., the U.S. dollar, could be oversubscribed. It also implies that changes in anchor choices by a small number of countries can have large and rapid effects on the international monetary system. Other factors found to be related to anchor choice include the symmetry of output shocks and the currency denomination of liabilities.
Titolo autorizzato: Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 9786612840845
9781462349746
1462349749
9781452775319
1452775311
9781282840843
1282840843
9781451869910
1451869916
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910960625303321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/132